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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a document based administrative study of the British 
occupation of Germany, 1945-49, and its impact on specific areas of the lives of 
German women who were living in the British zone. The study examines the 
effect of British occupation policy on the regulation of marriage, prostitution and 
venereal disease, and German women's organizations. British occupation 
strategies were unique; although the British worked with the Americans on many 
levels they maintained separate policy approaches. The British brought their own 
social perspectives and systems to Germany and attempted to impose them on 
German social and civil procedures. German women were often the targets of 
the re-ordering of German society and were viewed and treated as the 
embodiment of the failure of Germany. They were widely persecuted as 
prostitutes and the carriers of disease for example. Thus gender roles, 
victory/defeat and nationality can be seen to intersect in specific and traditional 
ways. British women involved in the occupation also endeavoured to impose 
systems of traditional British gender roles through distinctive approaches to 
women's voluntary organizations. The traditional model of social activism of 
middle-class British women, such as Townswomen's Guilds, were singularly 
offered to German women as the proper way to exercise power within society. 
Despite the British effort to re-model German women in a British image, German 
women contested these definitions and categories in many ways. The British 
were forced to adapt their methods and policies in the face of this opposition. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In July 1945 Winston Churchill surveyed Berlin, a city referred to by one 
resident as "that rubble heap near Potsdam." Churchill observed that "the 
passengers in his motorcade grew sick, utterly stunned by the stark display of 
carnage in the humbled German city."1 
The canals were choked with bodies and refuse....From urban center to 
rural village, Germany looked charred and ravaged. Bomb-gutted Cologne 
and Nuremberg were hardly recognizable. Ninety-three percent of the 
houses in Dusseldorf [sic] were totally destroyed. ...In Dresden mounds of 
bodies had to be bulldozed into mass graves or burned on huge makeshift 
grills, so great was the toll and the fear of epidemic disease....An American 
army air corpsman flying low over the country at the end of the war could 
not spot streets or homes in Mannheim - only tossed dirt." Another asked 
"Where do the people live?"2 
These are some of the images that remain of Germany at what is often described 
as "the end of the war." The assumption that the end of official military hostilities 
was in fact the end of the war is problematic, however, when we look at the 
details of the occupation period. Hostilities did not cease; they took a different 
form. Physical violence was frequent, access to food became political, German 
public and private spaces were regulated by British laws, orders and police, and 
the two sides stole from each other and damaged property frequently. Armies 
may have stopped fighting, but war on the domestic front continued for Germans, 
albeit in these different forms. The experience of German women in the British 
occupied zone between 1945 and 1949 clearly illustrates that hostility between 
these two groups continued, although in the immediate post-war years, it was 
German women who were often the focus rather than male soldiers. These 
1
 Thomas Paterson, On Every Front (Norton & Co.: New York & London, 1992), p. 3. 
2
 Ibid, p. 5. 
1 
women were blamed for the venereal disease among the troops and persecuted 
because of it. Many were abandoned with the children of those same troops, 
forbidden to marry British fathers who acknowledged their children, and were 
patronized by British women who believed they had defeated the patriarchy in 
their own country and could show German women how to do this for themselves. 
There were very few areas of life where German women felt that peace had 
returned to their lives. 
Occupation policy added to the turmoil of German women's lives in 
significant ways both because of the manner in which it was developed and 
because of the underlying assumptions of gender that also informed British 
conceptions of "German." A significant part of British policy was developed "on 
the spot" due to lack of wartime planning and was influenced by relationships "on 
the ground," both formal and informal. As these relationships changed, so did 
British occupation policy. Through examining the extensive debates and 
discussions between various departments of the British administration and the 
implementation of specific measures, my thesis will make clear how traditional 
ideas of gender difference influenced British policy and how this policy, in turn, 
influenced the conditions of German women's social and economic status. This 
thesis is thus a document focused administrative study of specific areas of 
interaction between British occupiers and German women including marriage, 
prostitution and attempts to control venereal disease. 
From the beginning of occupation planning, bodies such as the European 
Advisory Council (EAC) developed an occupation strategy which reflected the 
2 
idea that it would be a period of transition, opening a new path for Germany. This 
transition was to involve the re-education of the German people. The German 
police state was destroyed and, as agreed in negotiations at Potsdam, the aim of 
the occupation was to achieve the four main goals of disarmament, 
demilitarization, denazification, and democratization. It has been firmly 
established by historians of the Potsdam conference that disagreement among 
the Allies precluded agreement on what was "to be done" with the German threat 
to peace in Europe.3 As a result, the principles of occupation were in some 
respects deliberately vague in order to prolong the illusion of Allied solidarity. 
They were also vague because it was understood, if not officially sanctioned, that 
each occupier would have a different approach to "democracy" and some of the 
differences in the Allies' approaches were officially and deliberately codified 
within the agreement. As an example, the Commanders-in-Chief "[i]n matters 
exclusively affecting his own zone shall exercise supreme authority in 
accordance with directives received from his own government...."4 The general 
goals developed at Potsdam as guiding principles for the occupation left 
significant room for each of the occupying powers to plan and carry out policy in 
their own way. Though planning for the post-war period began much earlier than 
Potsdam, these efforts did not resolve Allied differences on post-war policy. In 
the end, the pressures of both war and peace resulted in an incomplete planning 
3
 See for example, James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three 
Diplomacy, 1945-1947 (Wilmington, Del: SR Books, 1990) and Gar Aperovitz, Atomic 
Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, (New York: Vintage, 1967). 
4
 Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers (FRUS) The Conference of 
Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, vol. II, p. 775. 
3 
process that had serious consequences for the occupation. These consequences 
are a major theme of this study. 
While historical interpretation of this period has frequently focused on the 
establishment of the cold war with the U.S. as the central player,5 recent 
scholarship includes a larger and more realistic appraisal of the British role in the 
creation of cold war politics. Historians such as Anne Deighton and Ian Turner 
have shifted the focus of Cold War historiography to illuminating Britain's unique 
role in the development of post-war western policy.6 They suggest that the initial 
period of 1945-47, before the U.S. took center stage, was one during which the 
British agenda was equally important and influential in the unfolding of the cold 
war. Similarly, early work by Barbara Marshall on the German civil service makes 
it clear that Britain's role in the civil development of Germany was equally 
5
 For example, contemporary foreign policy makers Dean Acheson, Present at the 
Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton & Co, 1969) and George 
F. Kennan, Memoirs (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1968); 'revisionists' include Aperovitz,; 
Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States 
Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis The 
United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1972); 'post-revisionists' Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1992); Vojtec Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin 
Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Arnold Offner Another Such Victory: 
President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2002); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold 
War, From Stalin to Khrushchev (London & Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); 
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know, Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997); and the collection edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David 
S. Painter, Orig/'ns of the Cold War, An International History (New York & London: 
Routledge, 1994). 
6
 Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1990) and Ian Turner 
ed., Reconstruction in Post-War Germany (Berg: Oxford, New York & Munich, 1989). 
Also Patricia Meehan, Strange enemy people: Germans under the British, 1945-1950 
(London and Chester Springs: Peter Owen Publishers, 2001); Jeremy Noakes, Peter 
Wende and Jonathan Wright eds., Britain and Germany in Europe, 1949-1990 (Oxford, 
New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
4 
significant.7 A main theme of her argument is that British long-term plans for 
democratization were blocked at several points, one of the main difficulties being 
disagreement with the U.S. on the future of German political priorities. 
Differences in the American and British approaches are also emphasized by 
F.S.V. Donnison, the official historian of the British administrative postwar 
organization.8 Marshall argues that appointing what the British considered to be 
politically trustworthy German administrators and giving them a great deal of 
power worked in favour of German traditionalism and that instead of introducing 
democracy at the local level the British made the German administrators more 
authoritarian and powerful. The British dismissed or reprieved politically suspect 
personnel strictly on the advice of the local administrators that they had 
appointed. In a recent study of the American experience in Germany during this 
period, Rebecca Boehling has suggested that jurisdictional rivalry between the 
U.S. Treasury and Justice Departments on one hand and the War and State 
departments on the other led to problematic training and ambiguous instructions 
in the American Zone. She suggests that this allowed numerous local-level 
German administrators and the U.S. Military Government officials, who appointed 
and approved them, to grant priority to material reconstruction over political and 
social democratization. This prioritization ultimately meshed with Western 
concerns regarding communism and the concurrent decline in concern with 
Nazism. German municipalities were the first level of administrative occupation 
7
 Barbara Marshall, "British Democratisation Policy in Germany", in Turner, p. 189-214. 
8
 F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government Central Organization and 
Planning (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966) and F. S. V. Donnison, Civil 
Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe 1944-1946 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1961). 
5 
for the allies and local German administrators argued that material recovery 
involved order, efficiency and an avoidance of politics. Thus, often the local 
administrators were in a position to effect change or retain the old political, 
economic and social structures.9 
Historical interpretation of Germany's social and cultural history in this 
period has also been concerned almost exclusively with the American sector, 
since the U.S. is generally considered to have been the major cultural influence 
in the western occupied zones.10 There is very little available regarding the 
unique British contribution. That is one of the gaps that this study seeks to fill. 
There are indeed many areas where the British differed both in interpretation and 
agenda from the Americans. Each Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) for example, 
was responsible for the "educational journey" of the Germans within his zone. 
The U.S. statement of policy regarding education was that it was to be part of a 
"comprehensive program for rehabilitation." The first point in the statement was 
"[t]he political and moral re-education of the German people will foster the 
reestablishment of universally valid principles of justice."11 David Welch argues 
Rebecca Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic 
Recovery in Postwar Germany (Oxford, Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996). 
10
 These include Robert G. Moeller ed., West Germany Under Construction: Politics, 
Society and Culture in the Adenauer Era (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1997); Stephen Brockmann & Frank Trommler eds., Revisiting Zero Hour 1945: The 
Emergence of Postwar German Culture (Washington D.C.: American Institute for 
Contemporary German Studies, 1996); Petra Goedde, Gl's and Germans, Culture, 
Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); 
Maria Hohn, Gl's and Frauleins, The German-American Encounter in 1950's West 
Germany (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002); 
Elizabeth Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital 
Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 1999); as well as many studies of the rebirth of the German film 
industry, newspapers and consumerism. 
11
 FRUS, vol. I, p. 485. 
6 
that "the rationale behind Britain's policy of re-education was to change the 
political behaviour and social outlook of the German people by means of a 
fundamental restructuring of all the means of opinion and communication." In 
other words, the notion of re-education was all-encompassing. It included the 
idea of responsible government and was to be accomplished partly through the 
"projection of Britain."12 This "projection" was no doubt contested by different 
groups in particular ways in Britain, but is clearly in evidence as an agreed upon 
idea in the official records, the organization of social space and the structures 
through which this education was carried out. These structures include the 
organization of women's groups along lines of British upper class voluntarism, 
traditional hierarchies of class, and the policies developed on an ongoing basis. 
The intent of the British occupiers to project their own social structures as the 
basis of peacetime order will be repeatedly demonstrated throughout this paper. 
The occupying powers had, in addition, differing policies on race and 
gender. Maria Hohn's study Gl's and Frauleins is a significant contribution to an 
understanding of their impact on the post-1945 development of West Germany. 
She suggests that "Americanization" rather than simply "westernization" was a 
measurable outcome evidenced by the interplay between gender and race. She 
supports this through an examination of the definition of prostitution which she 
contends came to signify a relationship between a black Gl and a white woman. 
Central to this argument is her suggestion that Germans transferred their racial 
prejudice from Jews to blacks and that this attitude was learned from American 
12
 David Welch, "Priming the Pump of British Democracy. British 'Re-education' Policy in 
Germany after the Second World War", in Turner, Reconstruction, p. 221. 
7 
practices of segregation and judgment of those same relationships. She 
demonstrates through the recorded testimony of local officials that this attitude 
progressed from a position of greater racial tolerance across colour lines in the 
late 1940's to one of entrenched racial prejudice by about 1955.13 The issue of 
race is one that is notably different in the two zones. The racial attitudes of the 
British were predominantly informed from a history of colonialism rather than a 
history of slavery. Prostitution did not have the same racial overtones as it did for 
the Americans in this context and this will be illustrated in chapter six. Although 
this study will not be a comparative one, there are specific issues where the 
difference illustrates a point and comparison is useful. The differences between 
the British and the American approaches should not be over-stated; however, 
some areas of discussion, for example the behaviour of American and British 
troops or the approach to marriage regulations, demonstrate the unique British 
approach. This in turn adds to our understanding of the complex problems faced 
by German women in this period. 
This study will thus focus on one area of the experiences of German 
women in the immediate postwar. Sexuality, prostitution and marriage were 
aspects of life that had a multitude of significant influences alongside the 
occupation. Continuities and discontinuities from the Nazi regime, discussion of 
links between sexual repression or licentiousness and the Holocaust are 
extremely complex and important topics in themselves and have been the 
13
 Maria Hohn, Gl's and Frauleins (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North 
Carolina Press), p. 14. 
8 
subject of extensive examination by Dagmar Herzog and Annette Timm. The 
complexity of defeat and consequent occupation experiences form one part of 
our understanding of the immediate post-war period in which the German people 
had to come to terms with the war's violence and its victims. Historians such as 
Sabine Behrenbeck remind us that it is important to ask "what period Germans 
perceived as the era of violence, who was seen as victims and who as 
perpetrators of violence."15 Behrenbeck's work seeks to answer the question of 
"what was the legacy of war in the German mind?"16 While these themes are not 
specifically addressed in what is essentially an administrative study of British 
occupation policies and their impact on German women, there can be no doubt 
that occupation with all its violence and difficulties is one of the legacies. 
That the occupation was seen as connected to the war and not a time of 
peace is supported by a number of other historians, particularly those of women's 
history, who suggest a periodization of 1943-48 with 1945 being only the point at 
which the bombs stopped, not the point at which the war stopped.17 Behrenbeck 
goes so far as to argue that post-war deprivation was more traumatizing than 
many parts of the war had been, particularly until 1944. She points out that "[i]n 
the private sphere, stories of hunger, cold and privation and of the varied efforts 
14
 Dagmar Herzog, "Sexuality, Memory, Morality" in History and Memory 2005 17(1-2), 
and "Desperately Seeking Normality: Sex and Marriage in the Wake of the War" in Life 
After Death, Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940's 
and 1950's ed. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, (Washington D.C. and Cambridge: 
The German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 2003); Annette Timm 
"Sex with a Purpose: Prostitution, Venereal Disease, and Militarized Masculinity in the 
Third Reich" in Journal of the History of Sexuality Jan-Apr 2002, vol. 11 Issue 1/2. 
15
 Sabine Behrenbeck, "Between Pain and Silence: Remembering the Victims of 
Violence in Germany after 1949' in Bessel and Schumann, p. 39. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Moeller, West Germany; Heineman. 
9 
to procure the necessities of life were told and repeated." Particularly in the 
absence of a government to create an "official" memory through official 
ceremonies or monuments, this memory was created through families or in other 
parts of the private sphere.18 In this sense, the years 1945-49 were a transition 
for German women who were technically not at war though certainly not at 
peace. "Especially in the early occupation period through 1947," Atina Grossman 
notes, "much that would seem settled by the 1950's...was still open and fluid; 
nothing about the postwar order was fixed."19 This includes a social and sexual 
order. 
This study thus engages the recent shift of historical enquiry that has 
moved beyond a focus on high politics and international relations in this period of 
Germany's history to begin to illuminate the kinds of events that were 
experienced on the level of an attempt to reconstruct everyday life. In addition, 
these historians have examined the intersection of daily life and survival and the 
state/nation as it re-developed. The illumination of these intersections 
underscores the fluid boundaries between political, social, economic and cultural 
history. In a recent collection of essays, Robert Moeller reminds us that such 
work, 
builds on the methodological approaches of women's history, social 
history and cultural studies, which have combined to transform the 
concept of political culture by outlining a range of contexts outside the 
area of parliamentary electoral politics and formal associational life where 
Behrenbeck, "Between Pain and Silence", p. 40. 
19
 Atina Grossman, "Trauma, Memory and Motherhood: Germans and Jewish Displaced 
Persons in Post-Nazi Germany, 1945-1949", in Bessel and Schumann, Life After Death, 
p. 99. 
10 
political consciousness emerges and in turn influences politics at the 
national level.20 
The development of political consciousness, therefore, takes place not only in 
parliament but also in dance halls, at work and in social situations where the 
politics of daily life, sexuality and gender are absorbed, communicated and 
discussed. These experiences formed part of the daily "re-education" of German 
people. For example, Marshall asserts that "the main point of contact between 
the British and the German population at large and much of the communication 
between them went through these official German channels."21 While this seems 
an accurate statement with regard to the development of civil administrative 
structures, it is not true of all areas of civilian life. This study contends that 
significant contact occurred at a much less formal level and that British policy 
was altered as a result. 
The major events that are typically highlighted in a discussion of post-war 
Germany with the regard to the cold War, for example the creation of a British-
American economic zone ("Bizonia") as a prelude to currency reform, the 
defence of Western Berlin in the airlift, and the increasing diplomatic tension 
between the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union leading to the establishment of 
the Cold War, are noticeably absent from this study. Specific aspects of cold war 
events such as the creation of Bizonia, is relevant here with regard to the 
bureaucratic and social aspects of, for example, the reorganization of Public 
Health and its approach to disease and prostitution. This development is most 
important to this study due to the implementation of Ordinance 57 which, as part 
20
 Moeller, West Germany, p. 20. 
21
 Marshall in Turner, Reconstruction, p. 195. 
11 
of the overall streamlining associated with Bizonia, gave German organizations 
and civil institutions more responsibility for their own population. This obviously 
changed the dynamics of the relationship between the British administration and 
Germans and the implication of this is discussed in more detail in chapter three. 
The Cold War itself was a more prominent factor in the development of 
women's organizations because this part of the re-education program was 
instituted partly to oppose the communists. German women were seen by the 
British as having been very weak in their resistance to Nazism and were 
expected to be just as susceptible to communism. This aspect of the re-
education of German women is examined most specifically in Denise 
Tscharntke's Re-educating German Women.22 The re-education of Germans by 
the British Military Government has been the subject of examination by other 
historians but these do not specifically focus on German women.23 In general the 
re-education of Germans, specifically by the German Education Department was 
directed towards the prevention of further German aggression. However, the 
work of the Women's Affairs department was additionally focused on the 
infiltration of communist women's groups into the western zones. This will be 
discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
British assumptions concerning German women both in terms of gender 
and nationality are apparent in many of their policy decisions. The regulation of 
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sexual contact between British and Germans, for example, defined "good 
Germans" and "good women." German women became complex signifiers of 
everything that was "wrong" with Germany for the occupation administration. 
They became a symbol of both impaired German masculinity as well as the literal 
"embodiment" of Nazism. For the purposes of marriage screening, however, 
German women remained "ex-enemy aliens" and a security concern with respect 
to their Nazi past rather than a communist threat. The post-war "Fraulein" was a 
"much denounced and despised" figure, particularly for her "foreign affairs," and 
the British had to deal with her in ways they had not anticipated.24 Through an 
examination of the British approach to marriage policy, prostitution, venereal 
disease, and women's groups, I will show that British Policy was shaped and 
reshaped by the interaction of British personnel and German women which in 
turn sheds light on specific policy changes. Chapter two will outline British policy 
as it existed at the outset of the occupation and also make clear the haphazard 
approach to some of the planning. Chapter three will illustrate how occupation 
policy changed in response to a multitude of factors such as the shift to German 
control of various social and administrative issues. It will also begin to show the 
place of German women in the overall approach to occupation. Additionally, it 
outlines the re-development of some of the relevant regulating bodies such as 
the police and the attention paid by the British to imposing "the projection of 
Britain" here too. In this manner the first chapters describe the framework on 
which specific policies were built. 
Behrenbeck, p.40. 
13 
Chapters four and five examine marriage policy and the ways in which it 
changed in response to the actions of German women and British men. 
Marriage was a socially and legally complex issue on every level and the policy 
revisions that the occupation administration felt were necessary were not easy to 
implement. One of the administration's main concerns, for example, centered on 
ensuring that those who did marry had done so legally. Since people chose to 
circumvent the official procedures however, this was an impossible task. These 
chapters will also discuss the security measures eventually put into place to 
ensure that British men were marrying "good" German women. Chapter six 
demonstrates the central ways in which those women were treated who were 
suspected of being prostitutes, as part of the British effort to protect their male 
population. 
The one aspect of the occupation where German women were 
deliberately considered was Women's Affairs (WA) and the work of this 
department will be considered in chapter seven. WA and the German Education 
Department (GED) worked together to teach German women how to be good 
democratic citizens. WA officers designed programs for women's groups along 
the lines of socio-political institutions that middle-class British women had found 
to be effective for themselves. WA was hampered in these endeavours by a 
significant lack of resources, making their work even more difficult. 
Primary source material for this kind of project is problematic for some 
obvious reasons. The women that are the main subject of this study did not keep 
diaries or write letters. Although their presence and agency can clearly be seen 
14 
and felt in British action and re-action, they seldom have a direct voice. Key 
German political figures were most often male, as were members of the 
committees that engaged the British occupation in order to re-establish civil 
society. Shortages of paper and time in the immediate post-war period resulted 
in an absence of documentation in important areas. The preservation of records 
during this transitional period also appears to have been a low priority. Standard 
Foreign Office (FO) procedures regarding dating and form were seldom followed. 
Nevertheless, an examination of FO documents in the chapters that follow shows 
that a particular style of occupation was established by the British and that that 
occupation did have to take German women into account. Behrenbeck notes that 
"[d]espite its deep impact on collective German memory, this time was not 
accorded recognition as an historical era in its own right."25 This clearly reflects 
my own experience in German archives. German archivists repeatedly told me 
they had nothing on this period (which was untrue and they were surprised at 
what I found) or they said it was occupation (war) and I should go to the British 
archives. When I said I had already seen the British records and now wanted to 
research the German side, they remained skeptical but were interested. It was 
repeatedly assumed that when I asked questions concerning the location of post-
war material I meant post-1949. 
Although secondary literature on the British occupation is scant at best, 
the one area where such sources are relatively plentiful is in the area of the 
establishment, structure and development of the administrative part of the 
Military Government (MG) and the Control Commission for Germany (CCG) 
25
 Behrenbeck, p. 40. 
15 
sometimes referred to as the British Element (BE). I have relied in a significant 
manner on this literature in the subsequent chapter as it clearly describes the 
structure of the occupation administration. An understanding of the initial 
problems faced by the occupiers and the haphazardness of the establishment of 
the administrative structure is essential to understanding subsequent 
developments. The devastation of the war confronted the British occupiers with 
challenges that could not be fully anticipated nor in the end properly planned. 
The ongoing role of German women and their relationship with the occupation in 
specific areas is best understood in the context of the successes and failures of 
British planning and operations. 
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Chapter 2: Planning, Structure and Operations, British-Style 
Osmar White, an Australian journalist who followed Montgomery's troops 
into Germany, recently published memoirs of the experience, including an 
unrevised manuscript he wrote in 1945: 
With scores of other newspapermen working in Germany after the 
collapse, I too received the inevitable memorandum suggesting that now 
this unpleasant business of killing and destroying was finished, readers 
would be grateful for stories emphasizing the humours, the lighter side of 
victory. 
This in a charnel house! There was no lighter side to victory. Victory 
weighed even heavier on the spirit than fears during conflict.26 
White's observations of the early occupation and the problems facing the Military 
Government (MG) were insightful. He saw little jubilation among the victorious 
troops, particularly in Berlin where he suggested that the responsibility of victory 
and occupation was felt profoundly: "[T]he war was over. There was no foe left to 
defeat. Whatever happened was solely the responsibility of the victors."27 And, 
while White may be overstating this slightly, the truth is that in many ways the 
Allies were unprepared for the completeness of their victory and the totality of 
their defeat of Germany. Much of the wartime planning for the postwar period 
was based on unrealistic assumptions and was unworkable both in terms of 
structural change and social regulation. Germans responded in a variety of ways 
to the destruction, the chaos and to the British plan for their future. German 
women, who were most often the targets of much of the regulation of the post-
war social order, negotiated in a variety of ways with the developing 
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administrative structures. The peace-time order that the British envisioned 
involved the re-creation of civil and government structures, but also envisioned a 
historic patriarchal order in which women played a traditional role. This chapter 
will examine some of the obstacles the British faced in the planning and 
executing of a civil order. Subsequent chapters will portray the roles that German 
women were expected to have in this reconstructed world. 
White reports hearing an American Major in the MG division say early in 
1945 that, in his view "the Military Government is to restore and preserve order in 
Germany, to find and punish the guilty, to revive the moral perception of the 
German people, and to prevent a recurrence of German aggression."28 White 
comments that this was, of course, what everyone hoped would happen but it 
was easy to see at the time that the practical difficulties were enormous. Among 
the complications to which White refers was the fact that there were four military 
governments and that British, American, French and Russian definitions of 
"moral," "order" and "guilt" were likely to be quite different. Although agreement 
had been reached on some issues between the Allies, there was substantial 
disagreement on others. Democratization was a stated priority but, as became 
very clear at Potsdam, although all four powers agreed in a general way on the 
long-term goal of "democratizing" Germany, the kind of democracy to be 
implemented was certainly less clear and each power had its own priorities. As 
Barbara Marshall has observed, 
as the relations between the allies grew increasingly strained and their 
willingness to run Germany jointly weakened, the different zones took on 
28
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separate identities, reflecting in their political, economic and administrative 
structures the traditions of their respective occupying powers.29 
The British planning for its role as an occupying power in Germany took 
account of Allied discussions at the conferences of Tehran and Yalta, but was 
developed within the corridors of Whitehall. The key administrative challenges 
that emerged in both the inter-allied diplomatic sphere and departmental 
discussions revolved around the issues of planning, organization, and policy, and 
need to be understood within the shifting context of bringing the war to an end 
and establishing some kind of peace. In this regard British policy was shaped in 
important ways by the relative decline of Britain both economically due to the 
cost of war, and politically as the United States and the Soviet Union sought to 
take a leading role. The British approach to occupation therefore reflected both 
its own unique role among the Allies and its domestic situation. The planning for 
the occupation was, as a result, completed within the context of wartime 
diplomacy but also involved internal departmental issues. The organization of the 
occupation required the shifting of an Allied wartime army to a British peacetime 
occupying force, the creation of a large civil administration and the transition of 
responsibility from military to civilian personnel. Policy guidelines to this effect 
were influenced by the Allied agreement on the goals of occupation for Germany 
Barbara Marshall, The Origins ofPost-War German Politics, (New York: Croom Helm, 
1988), introduction. 
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but in practice were developed by various individuals in the Foreign Office (FO) 
and officials of the CCG(BE).30 
The British proposal of an inter-allied CCG was originally accepted in 1944 
by the European Advisory Committee (EAC), set up after the Tehran conference. 
Although there is some debate concerning the anticipated length of the 
occupation period for each of the Allies, it is fairly clear that the British intended it 
to be relatively short and that it was to become a civilian High Commission as 
soon as possible particularly since demilitarization and democratization were 
high on the agenda.31 The CCG(BE) was to be organized so that each 
department paralleled its corresponding Reich ministry and was to shadow that 
ministry in a supervisory capacity. This presumably had the purpose of making 
the restoration go more smoothly, but would also have the effect of allowing 
German institutions more input than might have been expected at the end of a 
long and devastating war. Nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of 
each army was expected to be in command of his respective zones working with 
some vestige of a German government. An Allied Control Council (ACC) 
comprised of the military commanders was to be in charge from Berlin.32 There 
were several problems with this plan at the cessation of hostilities, the most 
Hereinafter the Control Commission for Germany in the British Zone, sometimes 
referred to as the British Element (BE), will be referred to as the CCG(BE) unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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significant being the lack of a central German government. In the event, the 
occupation of Germany was in fact the filling of a vacuum rather than a 
supervisory process as had been envisaged. As a result, many of the CCG(BE) 
departments were not prepared for the level of involvement that was required of 
them. 
The CCG (BE) and the FO were, however, only part of the early planning 
picture. The War Office (WO) preparations began in 1943 with the establishment 
of four Civil Affairs departments: one at Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command 
(COSSAC), one at 21s t Army Group, the General Staff for Civil Affairs (G-5), and 
one each at the Pentagon and the WO.33 There were thus five separate 
departments with overlapping responsibilities. In January 1944, COSSAC 
became Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and the 
efforts for the entire planning for a Military Government of Germany and Civil 
Affairs for Western Europe was to be coordinated by G-5.34 Even with better 
coordination in the military there was a noticeable lack of coordination apparent 
in occupation planning given the differing agendas of each of the Allies. 
Confusion was magnified by the fact that it appears never to have been clear to 
the army exactly what role the CCG(BE) would have or when. 
In 1944 General Kirby left the WO to begin to set up the British Element 
(BE) of the CCG, located at Norfolk House (Whitehall). Eventually LA. Kirkpatrick 
33
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(later Sir Ivone) was appointed from the FO. The establishment of the CCG(BE) 
received very little support from either the WO or the FO and it was shunted back 
and forth between the two over the next five years. Both the WO and the FO 
wanted to have a say in policy regarding Germany but neither wanted 
responsibility for the large bureaucracy anticipated for administering the 
occupation, nor the cost of it.35 The WO was clearly going to be in charge initially 
as it was the 21s t Army Group that would be responsible for re-establishing basic 
services and control over the "post war" Germans, so it took charge of the 
CCG(BE) for that period. Other inter-departmental challenges also influenced the 
outcome. For example, the Treasury was reluctant to support the plan and 
hampered the efforts of FO officials who were responsible for the recruitment of 
personnel and would only agree to employ CCG(BE) employees on one-year 
contracts.36 No one at any higher level ever clarified the mandate or forced 
cooperation between departments and offices. CCG was left in a position of 
being responsible for much of the occupation but without any status or real 
authority to go with it. 
The CCG(BE) was to remain at Norfolk House until after the MG was 
officially established in Germany, which created some communication problems 
for the departments involved. The War Office Directorate of Civil Affairs finally 
decided in June 1945 that a new body, the Control Group for Germany and 
Austria (COGA), would be created to coordinate communication between 
35
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Germany and London on issues which necessarily involved both the WO and the 
FO. Policy toward Germany was the prerogative of the FO and COGA was thus 
intended to be responsible only for the administration of CCG.37 Its creation did 
not, however, eliminate the communications challenges. It has been suggested 
that the MG in the British zone felt that COGA did not represent its interests and 
it was by-passed in favour of the FO which was not formally responsible for it at 
that time. MG officials corresponded through the Political Advisor in CCG Political 
Division to the Foreign Secretary or FO.38 It is likely that this resulted in CCG 
personnel often not knowing their opposite number in COGA.39 This was further 
complicated by the decision of Prime Minister Atlee and the new Labour 
government to make COGA independent, the responsibility of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, and represented in Parliament by the WO. COGA therefore came into 
existence on 22 October, 1945 under John Hynd, Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Minister for Germany and Austria.40 Marshall argues that since 
neither the Duchy of Lancaster nor the WO had a seat in the Cabinet and 
communication with the lower levels of MG went through Berlin, there were 
problems caused by delays and bureaucratic congestion that made 
communication in all directions more difficult.41 These problems no doubt 
influenced decisions to change the structure. By 1946, COGA, along with the rest 
37
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of CCG(BE), was again under FO authority. The director at that time, Lord 
Pakenham, reported to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. COGA was 
officially disbanded in April 1947 and taken into the German section of the FO.42 
It is difficult to assess the COGA's impact in the process of planning since it was 
so often by-passed. It appears to have had very little ability to participate in any 
policy or operational decisions. Most likely, its creation was a symptom of the 
confusion and lack of coordination of occupation planning which was to have 
such consequences in the early part of the occupation. 
The pattern of lack of communication and cooperation was not limited to 
any one area of occupation planning. For example, SHAEF published a "Basic 
Handbook for Military Government of Germany" in August 1944 and a "Germany 
Handbook" was produced in Britain in October, both with the goal of providing 
policy direction. The British version was substantially different and had 38 
directives entitled "Germany and Austria in the post-surrender period: Policy 
Directives for Allied Commanders in Chief." Both of these publications were 
withdrawn, however, at the end of that year because of larger political issues 
concerning the overall plan for Germany, particularly debate concerning the 
Morgenthau Plan.43 They were replaced with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
Directive 1067, released in April 1945, which became the main policy document 
on the treatment of Germany in the post-war period.44 JCS 1067 reflected 
Morgenthau's punitive stance on Germany and directed the C-in-C of the US 
42
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forces on the goals of occupation including the basic objective of inhibiting the 
German economy as well as "strongly discouraging" fraternization.45 
Policy direction was therefore clear enough for the first year of the 
occupation. Operational instructions to the MG were left relatively broad, with the 
expectation that gaps would be filled-in later. CCS Directive 551 (Combined 
Chiefs of Staff Directive for Military Government in Germany prior to Defeat or 
Surrender) of April 1944, stated: 
Military Government will be established and will extend over all parts of 
Germany.. .progressively as the forces under your command capture 
German territory...your rights in Germany prior to unconditional surrender 
or German defeat will be those of an occupying power. By virtue of your 
position you are clothed with supreme legislative, executive and judicial 
authority and power in areas occupied by forces under your command 
...Military Government will be effected as a general principle through 
indirect rule...The principal link for this indirect rule should be at the Bezirk 
[sic] (region) or Kreis [sic] (district) level; controls at higher levels will be 
inserted at your discretion.46 
This remained the main operational policy directive longer than originally 
anticipated since the MG was not even fully established until July 1945. The lack 
of specific direction in this statement was very characteristic of the tone 
throughout the early occupation. 
The structure of the British Element (BE) of the MG was complex. The MG 
was devised to be headed by the four C-in-C's of each zone in an Allied Control 
Council (ACC), which would take decisions on matters affecting the whole of 
Germany. The Allied Kommandatura was similarly set up for the control of Berlin. 
Twelve Directories were to be established to parallel central German 
Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding 
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departments and were headed by the chiefs of the zonal divisions concerned. 
For example, the Manpower Directorate was headed by the heads of Manpower 
Division from each zone.47 This structure was additionally very inefficient. Due, in 
part, to the fact that the plan anticipated Germany remaining a whole unit of 
some sort and then was adapted on the ground as it became increasingly clear 
that Germany would be divided. The ACC was increasingly unable to fulfill its 
function as decision maker for the whole country since CCG(BE) headquarters 
were moved to Berlin from Liibeck in the summer of 1946.48 The link between the 
ACC and the provincial or Land level was not always clear and the British 
struggled with the task of inventing and implementing one.4 9 
The CCG(BE) moved to Germany in stages, as planned. The first phase 
entailed establishing local and regional offices in the zone. The four regions 
became the four Lander of Nord-Rhine Westfalen (North-Rhine Westphalia), 
Hamburg, Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), and Schleswig-Holstein. Each of the 
four "provinces" was controlled by an Army Corps and administered by a 
provincial (P) Military Government Detachment. The Military Government 
detachments were at Miinster, Diisseldorf, Kiel and Hannover, and Corps I, VIM 
and XXX, were headquartered at Iserlohn, Plon, and Nienburg.50 These offices 
were initially staffed by personnel drawn from G-5, the British Army of the Rhine 
47
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(BAOR), and CCG(BE) administration. Zonal Headquarters (HQ) was divided 
between Minden, Herford, Lubeck, and Bad Oeynhausen due to lack of housing, 
although the Zonal Executive Office (ZECO) was in Lubeck until 1948 when it 
was moved to Hamburg. It was headed by the Military Governor/Chief of Staff 
(COS) who was supported by the heads of Divisions for the zone. Below the 
provincial level were regional administrations (Regierungbezirke) which began to 
function from June 1945, and then the district or town, Kreis or Stadt-Kreis ("K" 
Detachments), which began to function in July.51 
The "K" detachments were expected to be the first link in the system of 
indirect rule.52 It had been anticipated that the occupation would be put into effect 
on a piece-by-piece basis and smaller administrative units were expected to be 
able to be the first to establish control in their areas. This was felt to be 
necessary because the system of administration was designed primarily to serve 
military requirements. Disruption of communications was also likely, and these 
units would then have no contact with higher administrative levels for periods of 
time.53 The Kreis level administrative units were often comprised of only five or 
six people and remained under the control of local military units for several 
months. In day-to-day operations, they were unlikely to receive specific directives 
from higher levels and "it was more important for them to cooperate with local 
troop commanders than with the remote (and due to lack of communications 
51
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often inaccessible) higher Military Government echelon. As each unit 
established itself, the pattern became clear and was eventually more or less 
permanently in place. 
Hannover was a center of military administration that experienced six 
changes in administrative units between 10 April and 22 May. Colonel Bruce, the 
head of the "P" (Land) Military Government in Hannover, expressed his 
frustration concerning the situation: 
All (K) detachments are placed under command of local formations. In 
some cases they were further allotted to regiments.. This system has, in 
my view, been extremely unfortunate as it has resulted in my being 
divorced from all detachments in this area which have been allotted to 
important towns. For four weeks I have had no control of the doings of the 
detachments in the towns of Hanover [sic], Hildesheim and Brunswick 
while I never had any say in the affairs of Hamlin and Gottingen. 
Meantime an unknown and ever changing number of American 
Detachments and Military Government officers have been working at 
Gemeinde level. It has proved utterly impossible to keep track of their 
movements, especially as they were operating under the command of 
various Divisions and even lower formations. 
The presence of this kaleidoscopic array of troops on the ground 
has rendered the reactivation of the civil administration at 
Regierungsbezirk and Provinz level extremely difficult. It does not help if a 
food official is sent out three times in a car to do a particular job and each 
time returns afoot despite the liberal plastering of his various vehicles with 
every conceivable kind of authority, both British and American.55 
In Diisseldorf, after the establishment of the Regierungbezirk and Provinz level, 
most orders were given to the German administration at Provinz level and then 
copies were sent to the Detachments through MG channels. One official 
expressed the view that the Detachment's work was becoming much more that of 
an Inspector and its central role was to see that the various directives were 
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complied with. His Detachment was divided into three departments: 
Administration, Public Safety and Industry. Their three main tasks were the 
introduction of the British system of local government, introduction of a new 
system under which the Germans would do their own screening and make 
recommendations concerning denazification, and control of industry. His opinion 
of the German grasp of democracy was very low at that point. 
They cannot understand our idea that a council or committee is made up of 
a number of members who have equal status, of whom one is elected 
chairman so that the work can be efficiently done, but who has no more 
power than the others. .. .They do not like the idea of collective 
responsibility. They definitely prefer the system of selecting the strongest 
man and letting him decide. However I see signs that some of them are 
beginning to like our system, but it will take a long time.56 
Although complete equality of committee members was not likely a reality in 
Britain either, there is no doubt that the British did believe they were striving for 
this and that they were having a difficult time convincing Germans that it was a 
worthy goal. The education of Germans was, however, one of the CCG(BE)'s 
main tasks.57 
The lack of mandate for the CCG(BE), the lack of clarity in roles and 
responsibilities, and the resulting rivalry between CCG(BE) and G-5 made 
implementation of this goal an even greater challenge. The arrival of CCG(BE) 
personnel, whose purpose was to take over the functions that the Army had 
organized from the start and carried out with some success, compounded with 
the creation of the ACC as well as the British Element (BE) of the higher CCG 
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levels in Berlin, significantly increased the tension between the two groups. As 
early as 13 May 1945, a memo was sent from the COS, 1 Corps district to 
various Divisions and army personnel stating that "except in urgent 
circumstances the Military should initiate no action which affects CCG (BE)/Mil 
Gov [sic] (which includes the normal life of the German civilian) without first 
consulting the CCG(BE)/Mil Gov [sic] Officer concerned."59 This Chief also 
emphasized the necessity of the "closest liaison" between the two groups. His 
orders included instruction to report immediately the full details of any action that 
had been taken without the prior approval of CCG/MG.60 
The CCG(BE)'s initial task was to take control of the MG units and to 
transform the military field organizations to civilian units which was an enormous 
task on every level. The official transfer of power occurred on three levels. First, 
21s t Army Group became, as British Army of the Rhine, a purely military 
formation on 25 August 1945 and was divested of all MG functions. On 3 
September the chief of Military Government affairs at 21s t AG, General Templar 
.became Deputy Chief of Staff (Execution) at the main headquarters of the 
CCG(BE), responsible to Montgomery as Chief of Staff (British Zone) and in his 
capacity as British member in the ACC. Second, COGA took over CCG(BE) 
business from the WO in London. Third, the Corps Commanders, who had also 
acted as Military Governors of "their" areas became civilians and their Military 
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Government functions were transferred to "P" Detachments. This very gradual 
process happened as personnel became available and as each individual unit 
gained some degree of control over the amount of devastation in their area. 
Civilian specialists were added to a unit or demobilized soldiers recruited for jobs 
they had already been doing. Civilian Regional Commissioners did not replace 
the corps commanders until April 1946.62 This may have contributed to the 
extended military character of the occupation, particularly since even civilians 
wore uniforms, ostensibly to maintain respect from Germans.63 
Practical difficulties were often difficult to remedy because of the lack of 
resources and supplies in the zone, but also because of the dynamics of the 
occupation forces that were assigned to solve them. The armed forces and the 
CCG(BE) had different purposes in Germany and different goals for the 
occupation. These differing agendas, along with a variety of attitudes towards the 
whole endeavour, were part of the dynamic that evolved between the two groups 
and then affected the work of both groups with the German population. The lack 
of pre-war planning in this regard continued to be a problem in important areas, 
particularly with regard to the differing purposes in Germany for military and 
civilian personnel. The British Element of the CCG was developed for a particular 
purpose, which was at odds with military reality at many stages of the 
occupation. These differences manifested in a variety of ways. Early on, the 
military authorities reported that they were determined to establish control over 
the civilian members of the CCG(BE). These military authorities considered some 
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of the civilians to be of a "very bad type," particularly those that had been found 
in bed with German women during the fraternization ban.64 CCG(BE) proposed 
football and other sport matches between British and Germans in early 1946 as 
one tool in the process of the democratic re-education of Germans even though 
that kind of fraternization was prohibited by the Foreign Office. C-in-C Field 
Marshall Montgomery's answer expressly prohibited his troops from playing 
matches with German ex-military teams. Games between civilian teams, 
however, were deemed to be acceptable.65 Later in 1946 a report was filed 
concerning a disturbance where "glass was broken, people on the river were 
interfered with, and general melee went on." British Civil Police did not "interfere" 
because the disturbance was caused by military personnel.66 
One of the most important initial challenges faced by the occupation 
authorities was the issue of developing structures and processes to provide 
security, promote the rebuilding of civil society in order to address the issues 
related to crime. On a practical level this required the efforts of a number of 
specific departments and sections of the MG including Public Safety (PS), Public 
Health (PH), Internal Affairs & Communication (IA&C), and the various 
departments into which they evolved. Several departments overlapped both with 
each other and with parallel German agencies. For example, the roles of the 
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Military Police, British civil police and the re-established German civil police were 
not always clear. As I suggested, some of this lack of planning was due to lack of 
coordination and will to get the job done. A great deal of the chaos of the 
immediate post-hostilities situation, however, was due to the inability to anticipate 
the scope of destruction and starvation, as well as the lack of resources to deal 
with the situation. 
Occupation planners had, for example, assumed that there would be a 
functioning German police force of some sort that, when quickly reorganized, 
would be active in fighting crime among the German population. Again, the actual 
situation required a much different approach since, much like the German 
government, the police force had virtually disappeared. There were no German 
police at all in many towns and the initial task was far greater than expected. 
Significantly, this left the British in the unusual situation of creating a police force 
before the German state was re-created and the German police therefore had to 
be responsible to the occupation authority. The original plan anticipated that, 
since the surviving force had been completely subservient to the Nazis, the 
Public Safety (PS) officials were to control the existing police force at different 
stages through its reorganization. The German police force was to be 
decentralized immediately and its control given to the local authorities, who were 
to be immediately democratized by other military government departments. The 
police were to form a civil force rather than a quasi-military one, disarmed and 
without any judicial function. It was assumed that the German police could 
quickly learn to function on the British model once the Nazi police state was 
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destroyed. This was an important assumption since both the military police and 
the counter-intelligence departments were also going to need a functioning civil 
police.67 The creation of a police force in the British image was a central factor in 
the reconstruction of German civil society. British notions of law and order and 
how they should be imposed on a population is evident in the whole process by 
which this force was created. Teaching the Germans meant guiding them in 
implementing a democratic police force, a democratically run court system and a 
rehabilitation system based on a British model. Not surprisingly the German 
response was to both cooperate and negotiate for position in ways the British 
were often sympathetic with. 
One of the first tasks of PS, then, was to set up a police training school. 
According to Donnison this "caused difficulties which can hardly be properly 
described."68 There was no housing for students or teachers, no uniforms, food, 
paper or textbooks and no money to pay the graduates. New recruits wore 
armbands and those who had the old green uniforms wore them until the British 
insisted on replacing them with blue ones at the end of 1945. The lack of a police 
personnel resulted in PS having to take a much stronger role, and also in an 
increased need for PS officers, which, in the general atmosphere of shortages of 
all kinds including personnel, resulted in some less than ideal situations. For 
example, Marshall relates the case of Police Constable Winterbotham who had 
previously been responsible for traffic offences in Cambridge and was hardly 
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prepared for the conditions of post war Germany. This in turn led to some 
peculiarly British stories of heroism. For example, 
...a mob of Russian displaced persons had murdered a farmer near 
Soltau and wanted to make further trouble. A Military Government Public 
Safety Officer arrived - in peace-time a London policeman. He pulled out 
his notebook and began "What's all this, we can't 'ave this 'ere..." It 
needed no more to restore the situation.70 
Another Public Safety Officer who was working in a prison wrote: 
We were, of course, frequently dug out of our beds because the prison 
was being attacked to release prisoners, but fortunately they always used 
to disappear on our approach. In one case about fifty "green" partisans 
were besieged by about 100 "red" ones with much firing and explosion of 
the little red devil egg bombs. A British policeman walked in armed only 
with an ash walking stick and stopped them and sent them home - much, 
I may add, on his reflection, to his utter astonishment and relief.71 
These stories represent an almost imperial and certainly paternalistic view 
suggesting that all that was needed was someone in authority to give firm 
direction and set this example for the backward Russians and Germans, 
including the German police force, which continued to want to use other and 
inferior methods. 
It was clear that the British democratic tradition included a civil and locally 
controlled police force in which members understood themselves to be public 
servants. It has been suggested by at least one historian of the German police in 
the post-war years, however, that despite the best efforts of PS, the German 
police system was not completely reformed. The "Instruction on the Re-
Marshall, p. 37. This situation was repeated in many instances according to Brigadier 
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Organization of the German Police" did limit the concept of police work to crime 
prevention and the guaranteeing of order and public safety but a lasting 
agreement on the form policing would take was not built in the long run despite 
this reform. Although the central hierarchy of the police was changed and its 
duties passed to local institutions, the force itself was not looked at any differently 
by the German public, or the police themselves, who still expected it to have the 
same responsibility it had held previously.72 This reform process was, however, 
taken quite seriously by the British. The "Military Government Instruction on the 
Reorganization of the German Police System in the British Zone", released in 
September 1945, was a significant part of it.73 It was distributed to both "L" and 
"R" MG detachments as they were expected to oversee the implementation. The 
aim was to completely change the German police system in both structure and 
character including, 
new conditions of service, providing a professional civil career on a long 
term basis to young men with the right personal and educational 
qualifications, with opportunities of promotion from the lowest to the 
highest ranks, and reasonably generous scales of pay and pensions.74 
Structural change was to begin with the replacement of the Nazi command 
hierarchy, the demilitarization and disarmament of the force, the "complete 
removal from the police of all judicial and legislative functions," and the 
"introduction of proper safeguards against unlawful arrests and detention." It was 
explicitly stated that these would be developed "on the lines of the larger city and 
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borough police forces in the United Kingdom. Interestingly, this included details 
of police uniforms such as cape, mackintosh, gloves, driving gauntlets, belts, 
whistles and lamps.76 Specific technical instruction was distributed detailing the 
expected method of cooperation between forces, record keeping, collection of 
evidence and the submission of it to Regional and Zonal records bureaux.77 
Instructions on daily operations included temporary solutions for some of the 
specific problems police faced at that point in time. For example, there was a lack 
of judicial facilities in some areas and the police were allowed to retain some part 
of their judicial authority although this was restricted to traffic offences only and 
for as short a period of time as possible. It was also decided that parts of the 
force in the British zone had to be temporarily armed due to problems concerning 
displaced persons (DP's) in some locations although these weapons were stored 
by British units and not at German police stations.78 While these emergency use 
weapons were welcomed, the German Police officers felt that this was of no 
assistance to them in the course of normal duty where they were routinely 
confronted by armed men and unable to respond to the situation.79 Administrative 
concerns included fears that the Oberprasidenten in some areas continued to 
exercise a stronger role then the British felt desirable. They consequently re-
issued instructions reiterating the entirely new role they envisioned for this 
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position. In the new democratic German police force, the Oberprasident was to 
have no authority to issue instructions either to the Chief of Police or to any local 
police authorities. All orders to police forces were transmitted through 
Land/Region (L/R) and Kreis/District (K) levels to police headquarters and would 
not be passed through the Oberprasident.80 
A number of circumstances influenced a reassessment of the approach to 
occupation in 1946. At the highest level it was recognized that initiatives such as 
JCS 1067 had made the situation economically distressing for Germans at a time 
when the Western powers did not want to be pushing Germany towards either 
communism or any other form of totalitarian government. The confluence of the 
Soviet refusal to transport goods across zonal boundaries and the Marshall Plan 
meant that the British and U.S. boundaries needed to be as open as possible, at 
least for economic purposes. This fusion of the two zones into Bizonia was a 
complex process and there were any number of reasons for it. It was meant to 
solve certain economic problems, which it did, and at the same time it highlighted 
other difficulties. For example, it was soon discovered that although the two 
groups had started out with the same MG structure, there were now a number of 
what were seen as significant differences. 
A tour of the U.S. zone was undertaken in July 1946 by four key figures in 
the BE of the MG, including Major General Balfour and Brigadier Robinson. They 
reported that the Regional Branch (RB) Detachments had been withdrawn in the 
American zone and the Regional offices dealt directly with the Kreise. 
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Furthermore, the Kreise ("K" Detachments) were, in the British opinion, largely 
there for liaison purposes with the Army and for intelligence duties. Balfour 
reported that "Its [the Kreis's] proper Military Government functions are 
secondary and their fulfillment depends on the personality and interests of the 
individual concerned."81 The Americans set up what were in effect three Lander 
that operated independently with no coordinating machinery for the zone. There 
was no Zonal HQ and the Landerrat coordinated all matters of German Civil 
Administration. It was responsible to the Lander collectively and its decisions had 
to be accepted by the Land governments for implementation. When zonal issues 
such as railways or crime arose, the Americans created directorates to deal with 
them. The advantage of this method, as the British were well aware, was that it 
needed far fewer MG staff. Comparative figures for personnel engaged in 
economic matters show the British staff was many times greater. Personnel 
levels in the three American Lander were 82, 53 and 48. British personnel at the 
five Regional HQ's were 205, 138, 394, 369 and 320.82 
There were, therefore, some obvious difficulties in the combining of the 
two systems. Since each Land in the US zone had its own German controlled 
Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Transportation, the Americans themselves 
did not have as clear a picture of ground operations. In addition, each Minister of 
Economics had slightly different constitutional criteria to work with since these 
had been set up differently by each Land government. There were no US 
81
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personnel below Land HQ for any economic division functions. This meant that 
the combining could not be done locally, which was what the British preferred. 
On the local level, the lack of what the British called "supervision" meant that US 
intelligence sources were responsible for reporting any misuse or misallocation of 
resources. All production data and inventory information was gathered by 
Germans and then reported to US economic staff as were details regarding 
production planning, factory inspections and price controls.83 On the one hand, it 
was a challenge to blend the two systems. On the other, cost reduction for the 
British was extremely important. Thus divesting themselves of many of their 
perceived responsibilities through this process, Ordinance 57 allowed them to 
blend with the Americans and reduce their costs, both of which were popular 
initiatives. 
These two initiatives by the occupation authority significantly changed the 
dynamics in the zone, as many German agencies took on greater responsibility 
for their own population, paralleling the revamped occupation plan for German 
self-sufficiency early in 1947. Ordinance 57 came into effect on January 1 and 
devolved onto Germans "the maximum of responsibility for managing their own 
affairs" and the MG was to "intervene only to the extent necessary to ensure the 
purposes of our occupation". For example, the CCG(BE) insisted that the 
German police force be responsible for the "suppression of riots, maintenance of 
law and order and protection of life and property" and the military should be 
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called on for assistance only when the situation had gone beyond their control. 
Thus the maintenance of public peace had passed from the MG to the Land 
government along with many other specific responsibilities.85 
The maintenance of public peace, however, raised questions concerning 
the reliability of the German police force. Occupation authorities were aware of 
course of widespread criticism and were relieved that police had performed their 
duties very well during an attack on coal trains in Hannover by large crowds.86 
However, the Deputy Inspector General of Niedersachsen doubted they could be 
relied upon in the event of a widespread movement. In his view PS had 
previously been in a position to threaten the employment security of individual 
officers but since the implementation of Ordinance 57 along with "anti-
Occupying" and "pro-German" demonstrations, he felt the police might be 
reluctant to take action.87 This put the British in the position of having to decide 
what to do with the force they had created in the continued absence of a working 
German state. In the opinion of the Inspector General, about half of the force 
were young men who had been recruited by PS and trained in British methods, 
but were inexperienced and required a good deal of supervision and guidance. 
His concern with the reliability of the force stemmed from the dissatisfaction 
expressed by the officers themselves regarding shortages of winter clothing, food 
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and housing. He argued that arrangements needed to be made to ensure that 
police continued to receive "heavy workers" rations, that efforts be made to 
provide them with better clothing and that support for their efforts be maintained. 
At that time there were about 40,000 German police in the zone. It was a goal of 
the CCG(BE) to reduce numbers of Public Safety (PS) officers from 750 to 600 
by April 1947 and supervision of police was expected to be an issue.88 Many PS 
officers expressed their criticism of this option to the Military Governor, arguing 
that their position was weak already given that they had lost contact with the local 
position since their withdrawal from Kreis level and the standard in Germans 
courts had not yet improved to a satisfactory level.89 
Feedback from local forces in early 1947 was not altogether positive. PS 
officers reported they received regular complaints from individual police. 
Although issued with heavy workers rations, many did not receive them. Morale 
was reportedly very low due to lack of fuel and clothing, but particularly food.90 
Several letters and reports were received from police chiefs regarding these 
shortages. The situation received a good deal of attention due to fears of the 
collapse of the force if better rations were not received. Since crime was 
generally increasing in 1947, this was of particular concern. By June, it was 
considered imperative that something be done to improve the living conditions of 
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the police. Pay, conditions of service, uniforms and housing were all found to be 
unsatisfactory and were felt to be factors in the continued loyalty and reliability of 
the police. It was also suggested that the police officers as individuals required 
some degree of financial independence to ensure their immunization against 
corruption.91 One positive action was an instruction that women police officers be 
paid at the same rate as men.92 The situation was considered so desperate that 
the C-in-C, Sir Sholto Douglas, instructed the British Joint Chairman at the 
Bipartite Control Office to issue instructions to the Economic Council to authorize 
Land governments to meet the clothing requirements of the police units.93 
The degree to which the police should be privileged in terms of clothing 
and food, however, was not simply for the British to dictate, particularly since the 
passing of Ordinance 57. The amount of clothing issued to police was an entirely 
German matter and the Land governments were responsible to the whole 
population. They were not anxious to prioritize the police. In addition, the U.S. 
authorities would not back the British on this issue since in their own zone, the 
condition of clothing, rations, transport and housing was satisfactory.94 Reports 
as late as January 1948 detailed continuing concerns on the part of German 
police regarding these resources. North-Rhine Westphalia reported that their 
police were "very shabbily and poorly clothed"; Hamburg reported that pay was a 
"very sore point", and in Niedersachsen, two men were off duty until clothing 
91
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could be obtained for them. Some officers had only one uniform and no civilian 
clothing; others were living in cellars with their families. Although a good deal of 
the population was in the same situation, many workers in other categories 
received some payment in kind from employers, which made their situations 
relatively better.95 In April reports were requested from each Land regarding lack 
of supplies. Where Niedersachsen had requested 10,500 shirts, they had 
received none and had only received 2,760 of the required 7,500 overcoats for 
their force of 10,967 officers. This had resulted in a situation where a number of 
people were off duty due to lack of uniforms. It was also noted that many officers 
performed their duties without socks since only 375 of the requested 31,000 had 
been received.96 The statistics from other Lander reflected the same situation. 
This was of particular concern since a report from the Public Opinion Research 
Office at Bielefeld stated that the public had noted that the feet and legs of a 
large number of police in the zone were in bad condition and neither group 
needed the bad press.97 
Ordinance 57 also affected the court system. The Amtsgericht and 
Landsgericht had been reopened in Hannover on 1 June, 1945 but the British 
were not convinced that the courts operated democratically or that they could 
handle political issues.98 However, the MG courts were already overloaded and 
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the German courts were required to hear civil matters between Germans. As will 
be discussed further in chapters three and six, Germans were not able to bring 
suits of any sort against British subjects. Interestingly, in January 1946 German 
courts were able to hear cases which involved an offence against an MG 
enactment and to pass judgment on the German individual concerned." By 
December 1946 the occupation and Germany's recovery had evolved to a point 
where it was sensible for the CCG(BE) courts to take over some civil jurisdiction 
from the MG courts. The bulk of these were traffic accidents where a German 
was at fault and a CCG(BE) vehicle damaged. In taking over these cases from 
the MG, the cost of damages was also shifted from German public funds as a 
cost of occupation to individual Germans. The CCG(BE) did not want these 
cases to be heard in German courts.100 
MG courts continued to hear cases involving any war department 
property, some of which were petty or even trivial. A case against one man who 
was arrested in Berlin for possession of Allied property, in this case cigarettes, 
was dismissed when the judge determined that he had obtained them from an 
Allied soldier in return for a watch. A woman who stole property belonging to 
Allied forces received a suspended sentence when it was discovered that she 
stole candy, biscuits and a tin of tobacco from a Sergeant's room: 
She had been to a dance with him the previous evening and she left a 
bracelet at his billet. She went back next day to get it. The accused had no 
previous record and was stated to be of good reputation and that she had 
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given in to a momentary temptation. The judge decided that a suspended 
sentence was the best way to deal with the matter. He probably took into 
account the circumstances of friendship between the soldier and the 
accused.101 
On 31 May 1946, four cases were heard at Charlottenburg. Two people were 
fined and two cases dismissed. Concerning "Case No. 3" the report stated that; 
Prosecution asked this case to be withdrawn as the man was mental. He 
was said to have stated that he was Canadian Officer but from his 
appearance in the dock by no possible stretch of imagination could one 
believe him capable of deceiving anybody.102 
"Case no. 4" was reported to have been "...completely trivial". This was a twenty-
one year old who was charged with "wrongful possession of part of an Allied 
uniform". The judge stated that he "examined the garments which had been 
'acquired' during the war from a POW camp by the accused's [sic] father. They 
were of Allied origin but in a very sorry state."103 On June 19 in Intermediate 
Court more serious charges were heard such as unlawful possession of firearms, 
stealing petrol and theft of gold coins.104 
By 1947 CCG(BE) civilians massively outnumbered military personnel 
making the job of the civil police that much more significant. In Lubeck in May 
there were 801 CCG(BE) personnel and 147 military. This appears to have been 
typical of other towns in the area: Minden, 1028 and 85; Btinde, 486 and 13; and 
Herford, 1377 and 166.105 A discipline and morale report to HQ Land North-Rhine 
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Westphalia in September comments on relations between all grades of CCG(BE) 
with other Services and Allied forces and confirms that some friction stemmed 
from the differing perspectives of the two groups. Senior Army officers for 
example were concerned with "occupying the spare time of their young officers 
and men by encouraging games and sports in order to keep them away from the 
Germans", whereas the main work of CCG(BE) was focused on the Germans. 
Changes in personnel in 1946 and 1947 had further exacerbated the situation 
including the elimination of officers from the MG who had been serving longest 
and their replacement with "raw young officers and recruits who are not really 
interested in their own service", many of whom did not speak German.106 
There were, of course, areas where military and civilian personnel worked 
well together and understood each other's position. A memo from the 
Commander Second British Infantry Division requests that CCG(BE) personnel 
indicate the need for whatever activities are necessary since "the re-education of 
Germans is sponsored by the CCG who are the experts on the subject." The 
army's resources in that area could be utilized, necessary contacts could be 
arranged and co-operation effected in the planning and execution if required or 
desired.107 Many of the difficulties experienced by CCG(BE) employees no doubt 
affected their attitude as well. For example, some were employed in Germany 
without a contract and others who were on contract still had no job security which 
resulted in many employees not knowing whether or not they would still be in 
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Germany in six months' time. In addition, CCG employees with families 
reportedly had a very difficult time with the cost of living and acquiring enough 
food and clothing since they were not adequately supplied by CCG(BE).108 
Reports concerning relations between the two groups note the differing 
agendas through 1948. The CCG(BE)'s stated aim in Germany was to develop a 
"sincere and lasting belief in the value of a democratic and Christian way of life" 
and that this is taken to be Britain's aim in Germany. The CCG(BE) requested 
the services take a stronger role with regard to German youth and participate in 
Anglo-German discussion groups. These discussion groups were felt to be 
particularly useful method of educating Germans in the "principles and values of 
democracy" and were considered "an excellent medium through which to learn 
how the German reacts, and how his mind works." Since the army's role in 
Germany was to manage rather than understand Germans, military personnel 
were less than enthusiastic and declined to meet more often with CCG(BE) to 
talk about gaps in their understanding of each other's difficulties. There is also 
some evidence that salaries were higher in the CCG(BE) for comparable 
positions and that they had more vehicles at their disposal.109 
Two opposing positions taken up within the CCG(BE), however, resulted 
in differences of opinion concerning how to implement existing policy and the 
attitude that should be taken. Amongst CCG(BE) Commanders there was an 
amazing array of opinions and observations represented in statements in the 
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September 1947 morale report. The commander in Dusseldorf commented that 
while some families clearly felt very bitterly towards Germans, others were 
working hard to provide clothing for refugees, including Germans. RB Arnsberg 
reported that the attitude towards Germans was "tolerant or correct". The 
commander of RB Aachen stated that he did not think that the attitude towards 
Germans had been all that it should be, with certain exceptions. He felt there had 
been an "insufficient attempt to mix on social grounds" and that while efforts were 
being made to remedy the situation, "with such a small British Community and 
the almost insuperable difficulty of private entertaining it is far from easy to attain 
satisfactory results."110 In contrast, an opinion from headquarters in North-Rhine 
Westphalia suggested that while it was important to be friendly and sympathetic, 
a "certain dignity" should be maintained, "undue familiarity" should be checked, 
and "lack of respect which is not normally permitted in German circles and which 
is quickly taken advantage o f should be avoided.111 
These differences and issues continued to resound throughout the 
CCG(BE) for a noticeably long time. For example, as late as May 1948 the 
Military Governor issued a statement "reaffirming" existing policy and expected 
practice in relationships between CCG(BE) employees and Germans. The 
Governor took the position that it was necessary for Germany to "join the 
Western democracies in a common effort for the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
of Europe" and to that end should develop its own self-governing institutions as 
soon as possible, an opinion no doubt reflecting wider cold war concerns. 
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Furthermore, the Governor suggested this would also "encourage the rebirth of 
self-respect among the German people." Relations between British and Germans 
were expected to reflect this policy and CCG(BE) employees should "behave 
toward the German as the people of one christain [sic] and civilized race to 
another" particularly because the interests of the two countries were seen to 
converge in many ways. The behaviour of CCG(BE) employees was expected to 
be beyond reproach so that German respect "for our own race and our own 
ways" could be solidified. The order included a suggestion that it should be 
published widely, but to begin with was circulated within each Land by the 
respective Regional Commissioners.112 One respondent doubted that this 
statement would be well received by Germans and recommended against simply 
handing it to the German press since, in his opinion it would be taken as 
"sanctimonious and patronizing" in tone. In addition, the writer stated that "it is 
somewhat late to stress that our attitude...should be that of a christain [sic] and 
civilized people" and it will be difficult to "carry this intention into effect without 
exciting resentment and ridicule."113 
In July 1948 a "final" report on relations between BAOR and Germans was 
prepared by Liaison Officer, Lt. Col. Clegg, after a tour of the zone and included 
some recommendations for change. The Senior Control Officer of the 
Governmental Group HQ Hamburg agreed with Clegg's major recommendation 
that the Army needed to be re-educated before it could re-educate the Germans. 
The Army's objectives were understandably different from the CCG(BE), but this 
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made it very difficult to achieve the desired goal. He stated that those who "have 
talked to the Units also know how little even Field Officers know of our aims and 
activities and how apathetic the troops are towards them."114 The Deputy 
Regional Commissioner underlined the need for a non-patronizing tone in British-
German relations at ground level and objected to the use of the term "re-
education," in part because Germans resented it. His aim was to eliminate "the 
view that in all spheres we can instruct the poor benighted Germans [and the] 
tendency to consider them as uncivilized Africans." He did, however, want to 
make clear what he believed should be done; "We must meet them and 
exchange ideas (by all means let us think that ours are better) and to give them 
help in re-establishing normality, but we must not patronize."115 Suggestions for 
the education of Germans continued to emphasize individual contact within a 
proscribed range of behaviour including the suggestion that officers should invite 
Germans of a similar rank to the cinema, issue formal invitations to messes or 
married quarters, depending on the availability of food, or join German sporting 
or cultural clubs in some circumstances.116 
These differences in opinion concerning the correct attitude towards 
Germans resulted from the lack of a clear mandate for the CCG at the start of the 
occupation as were the differences in approach between CCG and the military 
components of the occupation machinery. The lack of mandate resulting from a 
lack of clear planning produced structural confusion and even rivalry between 
114
 Senior Control Officer, Governmental Group, HQ Hansestadt Hamburg to Regional 
Commissioner. 3 July 1948. FO 1014/26. 
115
 Deputy Regional commissioner to Senior Control Officer, HQ Hansestadt Hamburg, 
14 July 1948. FO 1014/26. 
116
 Ibid, Appendix. 
51 
military and CCG approaches to the various problems. The lack of planning in 
this regard coupled with the layers of CCG bureaucracy that developed during 
the post-surrender period resulted in an even greater communication gap. As 
well as struggling within itself, this bureaucracy struggled with its approach to 
Germans, and particularly German women, as did many of the civil agencies that 
it brought into being such as the police and social welfare. These agencies had 
to develop strategies for controlling the population as part of the goal of imposing 
order and developing a civil society. In the next six chapters, this study will show 
how the operation of these various agencies of occupation authority dealt with 
the defeated Germans and specifically German women as they struggled to carry 
out these objectives. 
In addition, many of the original objectives of the occupation that did not 
work and had to be adapted due to unforeseen circumstances, such as the 
amount of destruction or the relative poverty of Britain in the immediate post-war 
period. Some of the changes or adaptations occurred as British occupiers and 
German civilians negotiated with each other on various levels and in many 
different ways to create the envisioned democratic civil society. Germans 
became something other than "A Strange Enemy People"117 to the British as 
contact increased and agencies worked together to try to improve daily life. 
Contact between the two peoples became increasingly important in the absence 
of a German state; rather than the anticipated military occupation of a defeated 
state it became an occupation of a defeated people. 
117
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Social contact between the two groups was officially intended and 
expected to be minimal at the outset of the occupation period, but the reality of 
having an army and a male-dominated civil administration in Germany forced 
changes in the MG and CCG(BE) rules and expectations at all levels by the end 
of 1945. The rules of social engagement were further adapted over the 1946-
1949 period. Both British men and German women had roles to play in the 
outcome. The evolution of marriage regulations for example, clearly illustrates 
the changes negotiated between the lawyers of the occupation, ordinary recruits, 
PS and German women. The dynamics between the two groups was also 
negotiated in the more formal settings of daily life such as workplaces. 
To begin with, before these more structured systems could be put in 
place, administrative concern focused on a contract between a victorious army 
and a defeated people. Prior to the troops reaching Germany it was anticipated 
that the German people should be treated in such a way as to promote a specific 
social order. The regulation of the behaviour of both the Allied army and the 
German population was discussed at some length by various departments and 
officials. At this initial stage, the rules concerning non-fraternization with the 
enemy were directed at the German population in general. Once the occupation 
got underway, the non-fraternization rules ceased to be aimed at Germans-as-
Nazis and became increasingly concerned with German women. The next 
chapter will examine the non-fraternization rules and the reasons for their 
demise. Alongside the attempt to maintain separation of British men and 
German women, other issues required attention such as control of crime and the 
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treatment of Germans as employees. The next chapter will also engage these 
topics and includes some examples of the different ways that German women 
experienced them. 
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Chapter 3: Engaging with a Strange Enemy People 
You are going into Germany. You are about to meet a strange people in a 
strange enemy country.118 
It is difficult to know how many soldiers crossing into Germany actually 
believed this notion when it was presented to them, but there is little doubt that 
not many of them believed it a short time later. Although the army did its best to 
keep its troops separated from the German population, and in particular German 
woman, it was an impossible task. As contact at all levels increased between the 
two groups, the MG found itself facing several unanticipated social problems 
including high levels of venereal disease. Some aspects of CCG(BE)'s role, 
however, involved working as closely as possible with Germans to remedy the 
issues facing them politically, socially and physically. The various departments of 
the CCG(BE) set up working structures to tackle these problems based on British 
models. As well as setting up a bureaucratic structure, however, an important 
first major task of the military on arrival in Germany was to create a peacetime 
civil order. While this clearly involved duties such as the clearing of roads, it also 
involved regulating the activities of the civilian enemy population. In addition to 
the challenges to the relationship between the CCG(BE) and army groups, the 
official relationship of both groups with the German population was critically 
important. These relationships were complex and multi-dimensional, and evolved 
over time. The following is an examination of the dynamics of the relationships as 
From the official handout to British occupation personnel as quoted in Meehan, p. 12. 
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they shaped and reshaped the interaction between the occupier and the 
occupied. 
After the cessation of hostilities Germans began to be categorized by the 
Allies in a number of ways, the most well known being the categories of Nazism 
- black, white, or grey listed. Before these categories were established, however, 
Germans were labeled en masse "A Strange Enemy People" and Allied troops 
were forbidden to talk to them except to give orders. Both of these labels suggest 
that "German" was equated with Nazi from an early date. The official document 
regulating and restricting interaction between the two groups was the "Policy on 
Relations Between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany" 
released by SHAEF in September 1944.119 
The first section described the "German Attitude and Propaganda" and 
suggested that while all attitudes of mind might be encountered, the German self-
conception as a Master Race had been too deeply implanted to be eradicated 
outright and the occupying forces should be prepared for civil disobedience, 
assaults, riots and armed resistance. In addition, members of the forces could be 
certain that Germans would certainly try to elicit their sympathy with the aim of 
reducing the consequences of defeat and occupation. Forces personnel were 
advised to be aware that any such sympathy would weaken Allied solidarity and 
lower morale and effectiveness. German methods of achieving this were 
presumed to include "fraternization by civilians (especially by children, women, 
and old men); attempts at 'soldier-to-soldier' fraternizations and social, official, 
119
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and religious contacts." Further, it was suggested that Germans would try to 
convince Allied forces personnel that they were an oppressed, misled and 
starving people and that "Nazism was an alien idea implemented against the 
general will in the cultured and unaggressive minds of Germans."120 
The subsequent section dealt with regulations concerning general 
conduct, and some specific warnings regarding drinking, for example. A specific 
definition of fraternization was given and the terms through which non-
fraternization would be reinforced. These included segregation in quarters, a ban 
on marriage, separation of religious services, and even more specific restrictions 
on contact: forces members were forbidden to shake hands with Germans, go to 
their homes, or go to German theatres or taverns. Specific punishments 
concerning fraternization were laid out in a memo of 30 March 1945.121 Offences 
of a minor nature were punished though forfeiture of pay; on a first offence a 
soldier lost seven to fourteen days pay and on a second offence, twenty-one to 
twenty-eight days pay. A third offence was considered grounds for Court Martial 
even if it was apparently trivial. Officers were to be punished by Court Martial on 
a second offence. It is important to note that this was not widely accepted even 
by those who were to enforce it since minor offences involved "ogling" women or 
girls, shaking hands with a German, giving chocolate to children or letting them 
climb on a vehicle. Punishing such acts was considered "nonsense" and "piffling" 
by some commanders.122 
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In fact, it was recognized as unworkable by many occupation authorities 
even before it was implemented. Andrew Clark argued in 1944 that much of the 
policy needed to be "considerably toned down."123 His assessment of the 
situation was that the policy of non-fraternization would in fact amount to 
segregation and "have the affect [sic] of making us the prisoners and the 
Germans the free people" and would, in addition, decrease British prestige. Clark 
suggested that Allied personnel should go where they please and use all 
amenities to the fullest possible extent: "They should be seen at all the best 
hotels, restaurants, theatres, opera and other places...where the best seats 
should be reserved for them." He further suggested that "social intercourse" with 
Germans could be avoided through the reservation of seats and he did not 
consider "talking to waiters, hall porters, hotel managers or other servants for the 
purpose of obtaining proper service" a social intercourse in any way. It is 
interesting to note that Clark's letter came from Norfolk House in London and it is 
hard to imagine exactly what was made of it later in Germany where of course, 
restaurants, theatres, opera houses and hotels were quite rare. Fraternization 
was in fact much more likely to occur on the street and in bars. Therefore, while 
the lifting of the fraternization ban in October 1945 has often been viewed as an 
early sign of Cold War dynamics, it is more likely that it was simply 
unenforceable. It has been suggested by John Willoughby that Army Command 
lost control of its soldiers and by Petra Goedde that American soldiers' 
relationships with Germans softened the hard-line administrative position rather 
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than the reverse.124 It appears unlikely that the equation of German with Nazi 
was sustainable for long after the two populations came into closer contact with 
each other. Most immediately the business of occupation required significant 
contact with the German population in the form of translators, labourers, 
domestic servants and police. As the reconstruction progressed over the summer 
of 1945 the two groups worked increasingly closely to begin the rebuilding of 
Germany on many levels and their relationship became that much more complex, 
particularly as both groups looked for "peace" and "normality." 
Historian John Willoughby argues that the vast shifts in personnel and 
organization in 1945 created a situation in which it was recognizably hard to carry 
out "poorly articulated postwar policies,"125 but that in similar circumstances, 
Army Command usually maintained authority over its soldiers and the policies in 
place were observed. In this particular situation this did not happen and there 
was an explosion of Gl crime in late 1945 to early 1946.126 An accurate picture is 
difficult to formulate, suggests Willoughby, since the categories used by the 
Provost Marshall varied and the data available has not been systematically 
analysed.127 He argues, however, that Gl crime in this early period can be 
explained on an economic basis. The official US Army rate of exchange was 10 
marks (RMs) for one US dollar in May 1945 and the street rate was 200 RMs. 
This in effect encouraged American soldiers to participate in the black market, 
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purchasing liquor and cigarettes from the supply store, selling them and then 
turning the RM back into US dollars. One historian of this period calculated that a 
US soldier could acquire a gross annual income of $11,820 at a cost of $93.20. 
The soldiers concerned simply reported huge gambling winnings. In July 1945 
American soldiers in Berlin sent home four times as much as they were paid: the 
payroll was $1 million and they sent home $4 million.128 
There is little doubt that the US troops were the most pampered, had the 
most resources and made the most money. Red Army troops in contrast could 
not convert their military RMs into roubles and had nothing to trade. British 
soldiers did have cigarettes, candy and chocolates but were clearly "poor 
cousins" to the Americans. This was only one factor, however, in the differing 
military attitudes to Germans in the different zones, but an important one in day-
to-day relations. A US General has described the attitude of American soldiers as 
follows: 
The soldier felt that he and his buddy had won the war, and they wanted 
nothing so much as return to normal civil life. He had demonstrated his 
willingness and ability to submit to controls essential for winning the war. He 
had demonstrated that he was the finest soldier of all time. But these men 
were still American, with the American characteristic of resenting controls 
and restrictions that they considered in interference with individual rights 
and liberties After all, he believed in democracy and individual human 
rights and in our system of free enterprise for which he had fought. Letters 
from home, newspapers, and radios informed him that many at home who 
had not suffered his hardships were making profits from the war, as he felt, 
at his expense.129 
There are some points in this statement that quite obviously describe American 
sentiments and not British. British soldiers did not likely consider themselves the 
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finest of all time and news from home was not telling them that many people had 
made a profit. This does not mean that they abstained from participating in the 
Black Market, but that their motivation for doing so was much more in pursuit of 
items not as readily available to them as to their American counterparts. 
It appears that the Americans may also have been more violent and 
caused more harm to Germans. Willoughby relates the American predilection for 
"liberating blonds" and stresses the tense relations between German and 
American men. He argues that the violent behaviour of American troops included 
"[u]nprovoked attacks by United States personnel on German civilians in Munich, 
Nuremberg, and Dachau, [that] fostered an animosity that indirectly provoked the 
worst elements of the civil populace to action."130 Willoughby suggests that there 
is a general consensus that British soldiers were in some respects more 
disciplined, particularly with regards to women and property, although 
conclusions must remain tentative until more comparative research has been 
done. As will be discussed, discipline became a more immediate issue for the 
British as military personnel were replaced with civilians. Preliminary research on 
fraternization, however, suggests that its relative extent among British soldiers 
was about half that of the Americans.131 Interestingly, the reaction of German 
men to American soldiers appears to have been more violent than it was towards 
British soldiers and some historians have suggested that this was a reaction to 
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American attitudes.132 In some cases British Intelligence officers noted 
similarities in the hostility of Austrians to U.S. soldiers and the "bitterness" of 
British men to American soldiers stationed in wartime Britain.133 It is obviously 
impossible to quantify the exact differences between American and British 
attitudes and it is not the purpose of this chapter to do so. It is worth noting some 
of the more obvious differences, as part of gaining an understanding of the social 
and political differences that developed and increased in each of the zones 
during the interregnum. 
Military personnel were a decreasing part of the problem, however, as 
their numbers shrunk over the 1945-47 period and the number of civilian 
administrators grew. CCG(BE) numbers increased until it ballooned from 2,500 in 
February 1945 to 26,000 in 1947, creating a situation in which both control of 
British personnel and their inevitable clashes with Germans were additional 
concerns.134 The official regulation concerning British criminal behaviour in 
Germany was Ordinance No. 5, which clarified that anything that was considered 
a criminal offence in Britain was a criminal offence in Germany and was 
punishable through the MG courts. It also clarified that no British civilian could be 
tried for an offence against German law without the "express authority" of the MG 
and that they would be tried in a CCG(BE) court. This included their wives and 
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families. The British Military Police did have the same jurisdiction over British 
civilians as they would over the armed forces if the offence was military.135 
The lack of surviving records makes impossible a detailed picture of the 
criminal behaviour of British personnel in the zone. What is available indicates 
that there was a range of crimes committed from petty theft to murder. Crime 
committed by forces personnel appears to peak in 1948 and incidents of rape is 
higher than any other category of offence. Surviving reports of crimes committed 
by British personnel are plentiful enough for 1947 through 1950. The RAO 
reported in September 1947 that since July, 9 civilian members of the CCG(BE) 
staff had been sent home by the FO for offences such as discreditable conduct, 
forgery and false pretences (18 months in prison), drunkenness and assault (two 
cases), illegal imports and trading (six months in prison), persistent drunkenness, 
obstructing the Military Police and larceny of War Department petrol.136 Other 
reports for 1947 include the same types of offences for both military and civilian 
members of the CCG(BE). For discreditable conduct, the employee or forces 
member was generally reprimanded. In some cases the person was reprimanded 
in writing and transferred. Some people resigned. Theft and larceny were 
generally prosecuted.137 
Offences of military personnel were sent separately to the Provost 
Marshall and add more detail to the picture. The crime statistics for North-Rhine 
Westphalia for 1947 and 1948 specifically regarding rape indicate that this crime 
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was not reported with any frequency as regards Allied personnel. From July 1947 
to June 1948 there was one British soldier charged with rape. In that year there 
was a total of 307 rapes reported, none of which were committed by Allied 
personnel according to the official statistics. Similar statistics are available for 
Niedersachsen for the months of July 1947 to May 1948 and indicate a similar 
situation. The total "Allied Offences" for the same year for Niedersachsen was 
162 and for North-Rhine Westphalia was 263. Zonal statistics for a similar period 
are incomplete but are available for most months. The lowest reported number of 
incidents occurred in October 1947 and the highest in August 1948. On 29 
October 1947 there were 56 rapes reported and 167 sex offences with children. 
British personnel committed 42 offences, two of which were "sex offences." In 
August there were 109 rapes reported and 431 sex offences with children. 
Eighteen British personnel were charged with various offences, one of which was 
rape and four sex offences. For comparative purposes, it is interesting to note 
that during the year September 1947 to September 1948, German men were 
charged with 571 cases of rape, 1959 charges of sex offences with children and 
2210 charges of abortion were brought against women. By far the largest number 
of reported crimes involved wounding and theft. 
Numbers of crimes were slightly higher for the period December 1948 to 
September 1949. In total, 1017 rapes were reported, 8 of which were alleged to 
have been committed by British personnel. The number of rapes did occasionally 
draw comment from the PS officer as he passed on the report. In March 1949, for 
example, 97 cases of rape had been investigated by the police, a number which 
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the PS officer thought was significant, but probably "seasonal" and occasioned 
by the improved food situation and the increase in consumption of alcohol.138 The 
office of the COS and the legal department debated the issue of disciplinary 
action rather than prosecution for some offences. It was noted that from August 
1948 to September 1949 proceedings were instituted against fifty-six men and 
one woman, more than half of which involved indecency (15) and theft and 
larceny (17). Fourteen other cases of indecent conduct were dealt with by 
disciplinary action rather than prosecution, although two cases of sodomy were 
prosecuted and the offenders received twenty-one months and fifteen months. 
The outcome of the discussion was that from that point disciplinary action would 
be favoured over prosecution for indecency charges. It was felt that conditions in 
Germany were a contributing factor and it was most important to get the offender 
concerned removed from the country as quickly as possible.139 This type of 
decision influenced the perspectives of many of the participants in the occupation 
including both British personnel and German perceptions of "the projection of 
Britain." 
The regular reports of the police to PS paint a remarkably clear picture of 
a number of issues facing both British and German police, PS and the German 
public. The number and type of crime, the categorization of the crimes recorded, 
the conditions reported by the German police and the response of PS all suggest 
a significant level of fear and frustration on the part of all groups concerned. A 
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police report from Hannover for July 1945, for example, conveys the amount of 
lawlessness in the area: 
Crime # of Incidents 
Robbery, armed 4,606 
Robbery 2,895 
Serious Thefts 1,186 
Theft of Bicycle 1,303 
Plundering of Warehouses, 
Shops, Dwellings 
Simple Larceny 
Theft of Motor car 
Rape 
Fraud in business 
Grievous bodily harm 
Murder and manslaughter 
Fraud 
Illegal trading 
Indecent assault 
Suicides 
Theft of ration coupons 
Illegal slaughter of cattle 
Arson 
Grievous bodily harm with 
fatal results 
Immoral crimes involving 
children 
Forgery of Ration Coupons 
680 
508 
320 
51 
48 
44 
29 
22 
25 
19 
18 
13 
9 
8 
7 
3 
-i140 
It is obvious from this list that robbery of various types was the overwhelming 
problem. Major Timmerman noted, in this report, that crime incidence in 
Hannover was particularly high for the period the report covers, 15 May to 1 July 
1945. He attributed the high crime rate to the disarming of the German police, the 
lack of control of the German police over the German population, and the lack of 
preventative and protective police measures during curfew hours. This was in 
part because the German police were subject to curfew hours the same as the 
140 Timmerman report. (See footnote #79). 
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rest of the German population. 1 It is also remarkable that the largest category 
other than theft is rape. Yet nowhere in any report does this show up as a major 
concern. If one adds indecent assault and immoral crimes involving children to 
the number of rapes, the total is 73. The total number of other crimes involving 
violence against a person (grievous bodily harm, murder and manslaughter and 
grievous bodily harm with fatal results) is 80. The number of crimes involving 
sexual violence against women and children therefore is almost the same as the 
number of other types of violent crimes. Additionally, this report does not 
demarcate the sex of the murder or grievous bodily harm victims, some or many 
of whom may also have been women. It was noticed in some locales that women 
were more vulnerable, particularly if they lived alone, which was likely a good 
number of them, considering the war, but this was generally the extent of specific 
concerns. 
The situation in Hamburg appears similar to that in Hannover, although 
the reporting categories were different and it is difficult to make direct 
comparisons. Some of the differences in categories of offences are, however, 
particularly revealing. For example, information on types and numbers of crimes 
for October 1945 were reported to PS as follows: 
Offences against laws and ordinances of Mil.Gov. [sic] 1770 
Larcenies, embezzlements and concealments of stolen 
property 4428 
Frauds and forgeries 338 
Housebreaking, breaches of the public peace, insults, 
injuries and damages 3240 
67 
Murder, manslaughter and abortion 13 
Sexual crimes and offences 82 
Robbery and blackmail 60 
Offences against trading 1269142 
Figures for November and December are similar and are reported in the same 
categories.143 
There are two items of particular interest in this list: first, that abortion is 
included with murder and manslaughter, and second, that there were more 
sexual crimes than robberies. Abortion was illegal in Britain at the time and it is 
not surprising that it had or was given the same status in Germany.144 It is 
noteworthy, however, given the British insistence on a non-political administration 
of police work and enforcement of crime. Disallowing any instruction to be given 
through the Oberburgermeister for example was put in place to ensure a 
democratic structure. Again, it is not surprising that this categorization of abortion 
was considered acceptable given historic patterns in British society regarding the 
roles of men, women and family. Similarly, the fact that the higher rate of sexual 
crime appears not to have raised much reaction speaks to the acceptance of a 
lower regard for women's personal safety, also a historic pattern. 
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An additional concern for the German police was lack of manpower and 
women were not seriously considered for these jobs. In November, for the 
second time since July, two police officers had been dismissed for political 
reasons. It was noted by the PS officer in charge that this was rather frustrating 
because of the obvious lack of experienced officers to replace them. He also 
insisted that this created the further difficulty of causing fear amongst the 
remaining officers and they therefore did not perform their duties efficiently. And, 
although one recent study has highlighted the role of women in the German 
police force during this period, this was not a popular choice for women.145 
Germany had no long history of women in the police force and while the British 
talked about the employment of women, as will be discussed in chapter five, they 
envisioned German women in more traditional roles. Hence in Hamburg, in 
November, of a total of 165 police officers, only 12 were women. It is impossible 
to know how duties were assigned but the ledger shows that while there were no 
female mounted police, all other active categories did include at least one 
woman, most at the staff level.146 Shortly after this the Germans took on more 
responsibility and gained direct control of many parts of the civil infrastructure, 
including the police. These changes in the occupational structure decreased 
British influence over how the force should be run and they had less influence 
over the gender of new hires. It is not clear what impact this had on the gender of 
the German force. 
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After January 1947, when Germans took on increased responsibility for 
their own people, differences in approaches to crime and punishment between 
Germans and British became more obvious and solutions for these 
disagreements were neither easy nor obvious. In some situations, where British 
ideology clashed with German reality, no solution was achieved. One study of 
juvenile delinquency in the British zone by David F. Smith highlights theoretical 
approaches that led to longer-term differences in both method and treatment of 
many types of juvenile crime.147 Smith contends that the British intention was to 
establish a "separate and enlightened system for the treatment of juvenile 
delinquency where rehabilitation would take precedence over punishment" and 
that they did so because they believed that this was necessary for the eradication 
of Nazism.148 He argues that the British envisioned their own system in Germany, 
one based on a range of social welfare agencies and probationary sentences for 
juveniles rather than harsh jail terms. Smith suggests that there were three main 
problems with this expectation. Firstly, the German authorities continued to 
emphasize punishment and, secondly, the Penal and Educational Branches did 
not have the long occupational period they were anticipating and therefore had 
not enough time to implement this plan. However, the biggest difficulty in Smith's 
view was that the officials involved did not appreciate the situation in Germany. 
For example, they did not understand the degree to which lack of food, clothing 
and shelter motivated black market activity and theft, particularly for the many 
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juveniles who were orphans. It is clear, based on my own research that they 
also did not understand the degree to which these issues motivated teenage girls 
to turn to prostitution. This will be discussed in detail in chapter six. 
Decisions regarding response to juvenile crime at all stages of the 
occupation were complicated by differing perceptions of both gender and 
education on the part of German and British agencies, resulting in a situation 
where the treatment or punishment received depended on the decision of the 
arresting authority. In December 1947, John Watson, a court investigator, 
reported that youth could come to a detention center or school for re-education 
through either the British or German court system. Through German courts, girls 
were categorized as "merely 'endangered': it is impressed upon them from the 
out-set [sic] that their treatment is not punishment but education. Girls with 
similar records of behaviour sent here by British courts.. .are sentenced for an 
offence."150 This action by British authorities contradicts the stated philosophy of 
their approach to juveniles, leaving young women with a sentence that was often 
at odds with the purpose of the school to which they were sent. In contrast, boys 
of 15 were commonly charged by German courts for stealing food. If the same 
boy was arrested by a British Security Officer, he would not be sent to prison 
because he would be tried in CCG(BE) courts which could not imprison anyone 
under 16. Watson's report highlights an additional difference in approach, 
underlining gender role assumptions. He regrets that there are no women 
employed in German boys' prisons. He argues that, 
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all our experience in England goes to show that the maternal influence of a 
wise and understanding woman can be a far more potent influence for good, 
especially upon the adolescent who glories in his "toughness", more than 
most men. Too many German boys are tough.151 
This notion of motherly women contrasts sharply with the treatment of juvenile 
women (and women in general) who were sentenced in British courts and held 
responsible for many crimes, including infecting British personnel with venereal 
disease (VD). This traditional distinction between "good" and "bad" women, is of 
course, a confused and emotional one that informed much of the policy that will 
be examined in subsequent chapters. The difference in treatment between males 
and females is reflected in other scenarios as well. For example, women were 
regularly charged with procuring an abortion during the same time period 
whereas comparatively few men were charged with rape or sexual assault. In 
March 1947, the reported statistics for rape, abortion and infanticide were 46, 
114, and 9 respectively; in April they were 44, 185 and 21.152 Charging women 
with offences such as abortion (which can clearly be seen as a defensive 
measure particularly when the pregnancy was the result of a rape) compounded 
the difficulties they faced in the interregnum and after. 
Women of all ages faced barriers of specific kinds at all stages of the 
occupation. Employment of women, both in type and frequency was an issue 
throughout the period. Despite the non-fraternization policy, in July 1945 the MG 
in Hameln employed 635 Germans, of which only 143 were women.153 In 
September, MG detachments in Hoya and Diepholm districts employed 1,490 
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men and 426 women.154 This and other labour reports highlight two specific 
areas where women were particularly vulnerable in the employment arena. One 
notes that five female workers were dismissed "to get the places free for 
returning soldiers and for war-invalids."155 Another stated that there was scarcely 
any industry employing women in many areas and this left them filling orders for 
domestic servants and cooks, which were clearly lower paying and gender-typed 
jobs.156 It is clear in these examples that British occupiers were colluding with a 
German expectation that gender roles would re-form on a traditional male 
breadwinner model. Since many women were supporting families on their own 
this was clearly a detriment. 
The organization and coordination of German employees remained 
haphazard until Germans began raising their concerns more directly regarding 
the ongoing conditions of their employment. Although it had been noted in 1945 
that German absenteeism among employees of the MG was high because the 
MG did not supply a hot meal at lunch hour, very little action was taken until 
1947.157 A document released in June stated that it was at that point "imperative" 
that an effort should be made to improve the general conditions of welfare for all 
German personnel employed by CCG(BE) units in the Region. It stated that the 
most important considerations were the mid-shift meal, sporting and social 
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events, theatre and cinema, footwear and clothing, medical and dental facilities, 
a German welfare fund for "genuine hardship cases" and the repairing of 
workshops so that the coming winter would not see a repeat of the extremely 
cold working conditions of the previous winter.158 A similar memo in August 
stated that authority had been given "for recreation and reading rooms to be 
equipped to the scale laid down for British troops". It was noted that some units 
had already organized excursions and movies for workers' children.159 In 
addition, "HQ BAOR" was examining the possibility of a hot drink with the 
midshift meal and this memo noted that "certain units have in operation a system 
whereby used tea leaves are passed to the German employees' cookhouse and 
brewed again."160 A scheme whereby used War department footwear would be 
available to Germans was being considered. In areas where Germans were 
employed on scattered sites, personnel were advised to appoint a German 
representative whose task was to visit the sites and promote welfare activities. 
Most of these plans and activities reportedly went smoothly. Exceptions generally 
occurred where the British felt that "welfare" activities had to be stopped because 
of "political influences" which were reported to be causing issues between 
employees, or where a technical difficulty caused issues for the British. For 
example, where peat was being cut by some units for distribution to workers, the 
question of labour and transport costs for the peat collection was actively 
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debated as was the question of whether or not military transport could be used 
for this purpose.161 
The CCG(BE) was concerned for the general health and well-being of the 
German population for any number of reasons. Most obviously, it made it easier 
to get their job done. There also appears to have been genuine concern on the 
part of many that the "projection of Britain" be a truly civil one and demonstrate 
the best aspects of democracy. The writer of a monthly report to HQ states that 
in his opinion, 
It is regrettable that in a great number of instances the British person in 
actual charge of staffs takes little or no interest in the German personnel. 
There are examples where the individual concerned has not known the 
numbers employed, the duties allocated to them nor the names of the 
Germans in the Unit or Section.162 
More humane treatment was called for both in terms of physical conditions and 
personal respect. The report also addresses "unfortunate discrimination" which 
was most obvious in office buildings that continued to have notices on lavatory 
doors stating "Nur Fur Englander", which by that time was considered a 
"deliberate slur on their characters."163 
Another specific issue was the management of the mid-shift meal provided 
by the employer. Complaints had been regularly received concerning facilities 
and equipment, but it was not until 1948 that specific recommendations were 
given. These included instructions that both the dining room and the women's 
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rest room be heated in the winter and that the dining room be "reasonably 
equipped."164 One practical difficulty was that if employers were not going to 
provide a meal, they had to give the employees time to organize one for 
themselves, which might require standing in line for hours. The provision of tea, 
dining rooms and mid-shift meals had developed haphazardly across the zone, 
paralleling communications and administrative structures. The author of one 
report notes that it was not surprising that the welfare of German employees was 
uncoordinated and efforts were patchy, given the pattern of development of 
RAOs and other functioning divisions.165 By 1947 the situation was quite 
different, with an administrative network existing that could begin to even 
differences across the zone. 
One significant category of employment by the CCG(BE) was the use of 
Germans as domestic servants for married families. Almost 2,000 women were 
employed as "housemaids" in the zone in the second half of 1947 with an 
additional 600 employed as "daily helps," charwomen, handymen, governesses 
or gardeners.166 Judging from the amount of correspondence on the subject, 
there appears to have been a significant effort to standardize the wages of these 
women throughout 1948.167 In June, however, it was still the case that all of 
these categories of domestic employees were paid more in Berlin than anywhere 
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else and in Bad Oeynhausen slightly higher than in Hamburg.168 It seems unlikely 
that there was a shortage of labour in Berlin so the higher wages may relate to 
cost of living. It is possible that the higher rate in Bad Oeynhausen is related to a 
shortage in supply, but this is not explicitly discussed in these documents. 
A more challenging issue was that of welfare provision, which was 
approached from a number of different angles. HQ Hamburg recommended that 
consideration be made for the "German character and its reaction to Welfare 
activities," although the report does not state what that reaction might be. It 
does, however, suggest that it should be remembered that Germans were 
working for an occupying enemy administration and that the CCG(BE) had to be 
careful that Germans did not think they were being bribed to work through the 
provision of amenities because they would "just sit back and ask for more."169 
The writer of this report believed that Welfare Committees headed by a British 
Chairman were a better solution than the traditional German system of Worker 
Councils that, it was felt, might become political. In addition, a number of Welfare 
Committees started by Germans had folded due to lack of ability to have even 
modest demands met and it was assumed that British guidance, advice and 
support was required in order to build up a well functioning German welfare 
service together with a restraining influence on the more "importunate" demands 
that had been made.170 The list of items that Welfare was expected to deal with 
contained 19 issues, including work conditions, personal problems and illness, 
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provision of clothing and food, child welfare, lost relatives, educational facilities 
and sports, clubs and entertainment. Achievement of these goals was assumed 
to depend for success on the aid and guidance of the British Authority, the 
"keenness and ability of the German Welfare officials and on the co-operation of 
the German worker."171 
It was not until September 1948 that an organization was created to be 
officially responsible for the welfare of German employees of the CCG(BE). This 
organization was formed in response to German complaints which fell into 3 
categories according to the official report of July 1948. These categories were 
status and security, personnel management and welfare. A Manpower Division 
Working Party was convened with the purpose of recommending policy on the 
matter of status and security. Their aim was to give Germans job security, 
opportunity for advancement and protection from victimization. Since any policy 
would require bipartite agreement, it was felt that approval would take some 
time.172 This responsibility was transferred to the office of the Director of Labour 
Control Services in February 1949. The memo of February 1949 outlines a more 
formal structure that gave more direct responsibility to German officials including 
staffing changes creating a Chief German Welfare Official at Zonal HQ, a 
Regional German Welfare Official at each Regional HQ and at least one Welfare 
Official in each Unit. Regional officials were expected to coordinate 
communication and material coming up from Unit level and down from HQ. Pay 
grades were standardized throughout the zone, with the exception of Berlin, 
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since it contained a significantly larger number of Units. In an effort to maintain 
bureaucratic lines of communication, it was noted that all queries concerning the 
welfare of German employees should go first to HM Labour Control Services who 
would refer to the appropriate Branch.173 
Administrative concern with the welfare of German employees increased 
as resources became available, but also because of increased pressure from the 
employees themselves. As German employees found ways of working to bring 
their lives back to normal, to work in a heated building and have enough food, 
they put pressure on their British employers. These official and formal types of 
contact between the two groups were important in determining the kind of 
relationships that occurred on other levels as well. If Germans were to believe 
that British democracy worked, then they needed to see it working. 
The relationship between the occupiers and the occupied changed a great 
deal from the point of first military entry into Germany. In 1945, no contact was 
officially thought to be the most appropriate, and by 1949 the welfare of German 
employees was a significant priority. The attitude of CCG(BE) and military 
personnel towards Germans was debated within and between these 
bureaucracies over this period of time and it is remarkable that this was the case 
given that these two countries had been at war so recently and for the second 
time in thirty years. The 'strange enemy people' were a complex challenge for 
the British authorities even in peace-time. 
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The peacetime order that the military was charged with creating on entry 
into Germany meant, in part, regulating the lives and movement of the German 
population which was likewise addressed through the restoration of the German 
police to regulate their own population. Alongside this, the problem of military 
behaviour created an uncontrollable situation in some respects. The next three 
chapters address two specific issues ordering the direct relationships between 
British men and German women, marriage and children, and prostitution. Order 
was also expected in these relationships but the CCG administrators and 
enforcers of the rules were not always successful in securing their agenda. One 
reason was lack of planning. The other reason was inability to control the troops 
who continually asked to marry German women and who made use of street 
prostitutes in spite of the administration's best efforts to prevent it. 
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Chapter 4: Regulating Marriage in the British Zone 
In May 1945, Grigor McClelland, a Quaker Relief worker in Germany, 
wrote: 
I suppose your Daily Sketch headline refers to the man who got three 
years for being in a boat on a lake with a German girl, a story much 
quoted here. 'He didn't get punished for fraternizing,' say the privates, 'he 
got punished for being caught'. And again: These ruddy Poles can walk 
around and do it quite openly. What's good enough for one man's good 
enough for another'.174 
This comment offers a snapshot of the complexity of the "rules of engagement" in 
the immediate aftermath of hostilities. The British occupiers were intent on 
maintaining an intricate balance in the immediate post-hostilities milieu, where 
different standard of behaviour were expected of different groups. What was 
allowed for civilian men, for example, was not allowed for those in an official, 
military or occupational role. The masculinity of the victors was assumed by 
many, and they were expected officially to be different than that of men in other 
categories. The victors themselves, that is the individual soldiers, actively 
contested this categorization. Ideas and assumptions about the character and 
roles of German women were also strongly contested. The comment of the 
soldier in the story above, for example, appears to contradict the notion that 
German women were throwing themselves at Allied soldiers; in fact, there 
appears to have been some competition for such women. While the 
administration may have seen them as a threat, the men on the ground did not. 
The comment also highlights a sense of war weariness and a desire for a return 
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to "normalcy" involving, in part, a re-establishment of prescribed sexual and 
gender norms. This put both men and women at odds with the military 
government whose determination at this point was to maintain separation 
between the male British occupiers and German women. The occupational 
bureaucracy and policy makers envisioned the victorious British maintaining 
physical and social separation for a much longer time than was actually the case. 
As we have seen in chapters two and three, it was impossible to maintain this 
separation and as early as October 1945, the Commander-in-Chief's (C-in-C's) 
office had received "several applications" for permission to marry enemy 
nationals.175 Nevertheless, the occupation authorities continued their efforts to 
regulate these relationships and prohibit marriage for as long as possible. There 
were a number of reasons for this determination ranging from negative public 
reaction at home to security threats in Germany, real or perceived. German 
women constituted one of the most significant perceived threats to security. 
Perceptions of Germans and German women based on a specific 
construction and understanding of gender and how these roles intersected with 
nationality, defeat, victory and occupation influenced how the issues of 
fraternization and marriage were approached by the Allies, although each within 
their own specific framework. The Americans, for example, prohibited marriage to 
German women for a longer period than the British because of segregation 
issues at home. The Soviet Union had its own unique perspective on identity and 
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property issues regarding marriage to Germans. The most persistent British 
attitude in this regard was that German women were motivated by a desire for 
British citizenship, rations and prestige and British men needed to be protected 
against them. Therefore, while marriage policy and law regulated a civil contract 
between men and women, in this case it also defined the "rules of engagement" 
between soldiers and civilians, and the victorious Allies and defeated Germans. 
In this way it reinforced British notions of both gender and national hierarchies. 
These perceptions of German women as the enemy continued long after the 
Anglo-German relationship had been repaired on other levels. Examination of the 
creation of policy in these areas is therefore important in developing a better 
understanding of the post-war experience of occupation for German women in 
the British zone. 
As in most post-war situations, the role of women was debated as a 
marker of normalcy by both men and women.176 In the context of post-war 
Germany, a number of historians have made it clear that peace for German 
women meant the ability to care for their families under normal conditions and 
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having the signifiers, as well as material conditions, of a normal life.177 Marriage 
was, of course, one of those signifiers and much has been written on societies 
where there is a "surplus" of women who will not marry and for whom society 
must accept or create alternate signifiers.178 For the women themselves, 
negotiating a socially legitimate life style was difficult within the new set of 
options. Was it going to be more acceptable, to them and to society, to marry an 
Englishman (or American) or be a spinster? What was marriage to an enemy 
occupier and foreigner going to mean? Research to date indicates that tens of 
thousands of German women married occupation soldiers.179 Some of these 
relationships were supported by the woman's family for any number of reasons. 
As well as sharing in the material benefits, family members also often expressed 
the feeling that women in some demographic groups had not yet experienced 
youthful romance. The German men returning from POW camps were not likely 
to be as physically or emotionally healthy or financially able to support a wife and 
family as an occupation soldier.180 Of course not all German families and 
individuals were supportive of these relationships. German women have often 
been portrayed as the embodiment of betrayal of the German men who were 
fighting for their country because they were in such relationships.181 
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The symbolism of women in war and post-war is a vast topic and cannot 
be covered here in any comprehensive manner. What will be discussed is the 
way in which German women were regarded by the BE of the CCG and will show 
how this created image intersected with policy regarding marriage. For example, 
the questions and examination deemed to be necessary to "clear" them as 
appropriate marriage partners for British personnel were not necessarily based 
on experience with German women, but rather on an imagined projection of 
them. The regulations and administrative barriers that were put in place by the 
Allied military command, the MG and than the CCG, all served the purpose of the 
victors and aimed to control the "predatory" actions of German women. The 
regulations also thus protected assumed-to-be naive British soldiers and 
CCG(BE) civilian employees who in fact were able to hide behind the regulations 
and leave the relationship without any consequences to themselves, even if the 
woman was pregnant or had already had a child in that relationship. 
An important first step toward prohibiting marriages between Allied 
soldiers and enemy aliens can be found in the discussion of a proposed SHAEF 
order in 1944 regarding the regulation of marriage generally, and specifically 
prohibiting marriage to German women. This proposed regulation, SHAEF 
Administrative Memo No. 59, was originally developed to cover members of the 
U.S. Forces who did not have a Foreign Marriages Act (FMA) as did the British. It 
was also intended to facilitate acceptable marriages and prohibit others, including 
inter-racial marriages. The memo was worded such that it also covered United 
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Nations displaced persons.182 The implications of the memo for the British were 
multi-faceted. To begin with, an examination of the discussion of the legal 
aspects of the situation shows the rivalry and confusion between the FO and the 
CCG (COGA). It additionally allows a view of the opinions of some of those 
involved in generating the legal restrictions and their perceptions of the social 
situation which they were attempting to regulate and control. The discussion 
concerning the legality of the SHAEF order and its implications for whom it could 
legally be applied, is representative of other debates that plagued the CCG 
administratively with regard to marriage through the whole of the interregnum. It 
also highlights the complex dialogue regarding marriage that characterizes the 
occupation period. 
Between October 1944 and January 1945 a number of secret memos 
circulated between various offices and officials in Norfolk House discussing the 
SHAEF order. In October the "ticklish question" of whether it was legally 
enforceable for both service personnel and civilians under military control was 
raised by Lt. Colonel Rootham of the Commissioner's Office, who asked for the 
opinion of the Legal Division.183 He was answered by the Assistant Chief of the 
Legal Division, Andrew Clark, who stated that a marriage contracted in Germany 
between a member of the British forces and a German woman in accordance 
with German law would be recognized as valid by an English court, regardless of 
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the fact that such action was in direct contravention of a Military order.184 Clark 
suggested that an order should nevertheless be issued by the Commander-in-
Chief (C-in-C) 21s t Army Group forbidding such marriages. He argued that such 
an order would be legal, both before and after surrender under the Army Act, 
since it related directly to performance of military duties. At the same time Clark 
suggested that the Commander should also forbid the German authorities to 
perform any such marriages. Prohibiting marriages for civilian employees of the 
CCG(BE) did present a different legal problem. Still, his opinion was that the 
Control Commission could nevertheless issue an appropriate order to German 
authorities and let civilians know they would be dismissed if they married a 
German.185 
Notwithstanding Clark's position, the FO was of the opinion that since 
Allied Commanders in Germany were only occupiers they could not legally 
control the actions of British civilians at that early date. After hostilities had 
ceased, however, Allied Representatives would assume supreme authority in 
Germany including, it was expected, the powers of the German government, and 
could certainly pass such a law.186 Other difficulties from the FO point of view 
included, for example, that the law as written referred to the AEF and its 
Supreme Commander, neither of which would exist very long after the German 
surrender or defeat. It is important to note also that the FO found the whole 
document rather inadequate noting that as drafted the law would prohibit any 
184
 Letter to "Secretariat (C)", reference HQ/1519 from Brigadier Andrew Clark, Assistant 
Chief, Legal Division, Room 118, Norfolk House, 24 October 1944. FO 1060/874. 
185
 Ibid. 
186
 Letter to "Dear Smith", War Office from G. O'Neill, Foreign Office, S.W.1, 21 
November 1944. FO 1049/58. 
87 
British or U.S. personnel marrying an English, American, French or Russian 
woman without the written authorization of the Supreme Commander whereas 
Germans were not mentioned in the document anywhere. In addition, it did not 
prevent such personnel from marrying Germans in Austria, the Netherlands, 
Belgium or France and it did not cover any of the women's services.187 
On 25 January 1945, in a memo to Sir William Malkin, FO, ("My Dear 
Malkin"), Clark set out what he (and others) saw as the major problems with the 
SHAEF order.188 His arguments here illustrate that while this order was regarded 
as necessary to restrain Allied soldiers it had unintended consequences for many 
others living in Germany and for the policy makers as well. One of the immediate 
public relations difficulties, for example, was that such an order would prohibit a 
marriage between any nationals of any UN nation if either of them were serving 
in the AEF. Clark found it difficult to believe that it would be a security threat for a 
French officer to marry a French woman who had been brought to Germany by 
the Germans and he noted that such a prohibition of marriages by an American 
C-in-C might cause unnecessary friction. Furthermore, he disagreed with the 
argument that it was necessary to reinforce the prohibition through declaring any 
such marriages null and void. This stance, he argued, could cause friction not 
only with other United Nations but most especially with the Catholic Church, 
which was viewed as an important contributor to the well being of German 
civilians.189 
Memo to Malkin from Clark, 25 January 1945. FO 1060/874. 
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Clark also questioned the legal implications. He reported that in his own 
discussion with the Attorney General, it was clear that the legality of the 
prohibition of marriage rested on the assumption that this was essential to the 
security of the Army of Occupation but that legally, this was a stretch. If this was 
not the case, the Attorney General felt post-surrender legislation might be 
necessary. This idea raised even more difficulties from Clark's perspective, 
particularly since it would have to be agreed upon at a quadri-partite level. His 
main criticism, however, was that it was "most undesirable to make laws of 
doubtful validity when one of our main objects [sic] is to restore the 'Rule of Law' 
to Germany". He feared repercussions during the Control Commission period 
and proposed discussing the whole matter with the U.S. Control Group with the 
aim of reaching an agreement on least an Anglo-American approach.190 
At this point there were, theoretically, a number of people or departments 
that could take charge and make a decision regarding the regulation of marriage 
between British and German nationals. Clark corresponded several times with 
Malkin in the FO in an attempt to control the outcome but was than effectively cut 
out of the process as the FO reasserted its authority. The FO made it plain in a 
letter to Kirkpatrick (head of COGA) that since 
the subject was raised at the Armistice and Post War Committee on 25th 
January, when it was discussing Mr. Attlee's paper on fraternization... the 
committee "invited the Service Ministers to "consider [sic] the question of 
89 
Anglo-German marriages and, "if [sic] necessary, to bring the matter 
before the "Committee" [sic].191 
The letter clarified the FO's position that the legal aspect of the question had 
already been dealt with by the Attorney-General and Clark's letters were actually 
raising points of policy. The FO representative, Troutbeck, stated that he was, 
consequently, taking over the correspondence and expected to be 
communicating directly with Kirkpatrick. The latter, he suggested, should simply 
give him "any observations the British Element may have to make" and he would 
than take them to the War Office.192 In this case, the legal, social and political 
implications of regulation were disputed among the various departments, 
highlighting the inadequate and confused bureaucratic situation. The CC and the 
FO were hardly working together although they both ostensibly had the same 
goal of preventing British personnel from entering into a marriage contract. 
The debate within the CCG(BE) concerning the approach to be taken 
regarding the regulation continued throughout the next few years. The ongoing 
discussion regarding marriage illustrates the continued objection on the part of 
some bureaucrats to Anglo-German marriage and the response of others that 
everything must be done with an even hand. Some took the position that 
anything could and should be justified with regard to army security because of 
the desperation and character of German women. Mr. King in Political Division, 
who eventually became HM Consul in Hamburg, expressed the belief that there 
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had been a considerable traffic in marriages after the Great War and "the 
undesirable women amongst D.P.'s not to mention the German population, who 
would now be glad to acquire British nationality, considerably outnumber the 
French and Belgian prostitutes of the 1920's."193 Legal Advice and Drafting (LAD) 
argued that it would be very strange if a marriage declared valid by both English 
and German law should than be "declared invalid by what is after all a temporary 
authority." If these marriages were going to be declared invalid, the mechanism 
to do so would have to be enacted through the British legal system and not the 
Military Government in the opinion of LAD, and the "cumbersome machinery" of 
enacting such a law was not obviously necessary to protect army security.194 
Although the order was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 14 
April 1945, it was not promulgated prior to SHAEF's dissolution, and it had than 
to be decided whether a version of the same law should be enacted for the 
British Zone.195 This was an important decision, and the British reasoning for not 
doing so is notable in understanding the complexities of the later circumstances. 
For one thing, London strongly objected to the voiding of marriages after the fact 
and therefore put a great deal of emphasis on regulations to prevent problems 
before the marriage happened. It was also decided, however, that Memo no. 59 
would simply complicate matters and that relying on German law was the most 
efficient manner of controlling the situation. German law allowed the marriage in 
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Germany of people whose countries did not object to their citizens marrying 
German women and allowed any country such as Britain to do the opposite.196 
Reliance on German law also appeared, at that time, to address the 
difficulties of the wider issues presented by Allied soldiers from Holland or 
Belgium, displaced and stateless people and other UN nationals who were living 
in the zone. Not only was it necessary to ensure that marriages within and 
amongst these peoples were legal; one of the main issues in this regard was the 
prohibition of movement of German women into an Allied country through 
marriage.197 In attempting to regulate on behalf of UN Allies or to assist stateless 
persons, British authorities often compromised German women who were directly 
affected as a result. A German woman who might have been expecting, because 
the war was over, to be able to marry a non-German with whom she had had a 
relationship, was not than able to marry a non-German for precisely the same 
reason. 
One of the main challenges with regard to complying with German law 
involved facilitating British forces personnel marrying each other or another UN 
national, while prohibiting or preventing marriage to Germans. Both of these 
objectives had legal and social obstacles that were not easily overcome. For 
example, while a Standing Routine Order (SRO) could be issued allowing military 
personnel to be married to each other "in the lines" by a Services Chaplain, this 
would not make the marriage legal in Germany. While British law required the 
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celebration of a church wedding, German law required a civil ceremony in a Civil 
Registry Office (Standesamt). In contrast, since a German civil ceremony was 
legally recognized by British law, the occupation authorities were challenged to 
prevent them happening. Furthermore, it was not clear that civilian employees of 
the CCG were governed by the SRO and it definitely did not apply to any other 
civilians who were in Germany. As it became clear that the non-fraternization 
order was preventing neither fraternization nor marriage proposals, 
administrators scrambled to put additional regulations in place. 
Inquiries into the practical details of arranging marriages between two 
British subjects revealed that when dealing with a marriage involving a non-
German subject, German marriage registrars were required to satisfy themselves 
that, according to the law of the person's own country, they were free to marry. 
Since German registrars were not able to do this research, the same law 
required the foreigner to submit a "no-impediment" certificate from his home 
country. Exceptions from this rule could be granted by the President of the 
Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal) in the district in which the marriage was to 
take place, particularly in cases of nationals from countries, such as Britain, that 
did not issue these certificates. Lastly, even if this rule was not followed, the 
marriage was still valid.198 An immediate practical concern was that the 
Oberlandesgerichte were to re-open in the near future and instruction was 
required for the Oberlandesgerichtsprasidenten whose offices were the main 
authority for waiving the "eligibility to marry" certificate (Ehefahigkeitszeugnis). 
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Consequently Legal Division issued an instruction to German registrars 
prohibiting them from performing these marriages and an instruction blocking the 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident's power to grant exemptions from having an 
eligibility to marry certificate.199 They were instructed to forward all such requests 
to the appropriate MG headquarters. By the middle of September the 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident in North-Rhine Province reported that he had 37 
such requests.200 
At that point, several other difficulties arose that required direction from 
the MG. The Oberlandesgerichtsprasident reminded the MG that when a couple 
wanted to be married and they both had the Ehefahigkeitszeugnis, he was 
required to contract the marriage immediately, in accordance with German law. 
Such cases were not within his control to prohibit despite requests to do so. He 
acknowledged that since many foreign states such as Belgium, France, and the 
USSR did not issue Ehefahigkeitszeugnis, or it was impossible to obtain one 
because of the non-functioning of the Postverkehr (mail service), he was often 
faced with a request for an exemption. He informed the MG that his policy with 
regard to exemptions had changed because of recent experience. On several 
occasions he had given such an exemption for the marriages of French or 
Belgian men and German women, but the authorities in these countries refused 
to acknowledge the marriage as valid. He had changed policy, and only carried 
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out these ceremonies if the applicants had a certificate from their own country 
(Heimatbehorde) stating that the marriage was approved, and that the German 
wife was allowed to live in the native country of her husband.201 The 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident suggested that the MG was probably not interested 
in prohibiting such marriages and inquired whether it was necessary to forward 
these applications of exemption as well. The North-Rhine legal section 
expressed the opinion that while the CCG(BE) may wish to control marriages, 
difficulties may arise concerning the question of legitimacy of any children and 
this would be best avoided. The Oberlandesgerichtsprasident was instructed to 
continue to perform marriages where he was satisfied the marriage would be 
accepted, thus reinforcing the status of German practice and control.202 
A more complex situation existed regarding many Poles in the zone who 
wished to marry. In the parts of Poland which before 1918 were included in 
Russia or Austria-Hungary, a marriage was required to be celebrated by a priest. 
In Western Poland, formerly a part of Germany, German law prevailed and a civil 
ceremony was required. This situation was further complicated by the fact that if 
two Poles from the first group married each other before a priest in Germany, the 
marriage would be considered legal. If a Pole from that region was married to a 
German by a priest in Germany, the marriage would not be legal. Furthermore, 
the Warsaw government had enacted new laws, the content of which was 
unknown to Polish DPs in Germany. A group of Polish officers who approached 
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the MG was therefore very anxious that legislation be introduced to give legal 
validity, in Germany, to the marriages of Polish nationals celebrated in the 
presence of a Polish priest.203 
An illustration of the problems caused by lack of clarity and 
communication involved a Polish woman residing at the DP camp at Bergen-
Belsen and a British civilian employed by the British Red Cross Society. They 
were married in September 1945 at the Standesamt, Bergen, Kreis Celle and 
than again by a Polish priest at Bergen-Belsen so that their marriage would be 
valid in both England and Germany. Both of these ceremonies were performed 
the same day and they had both marriage certificates. This came to the attention 
of British Interests Branch (BIB), Political Division, because the woman, 
Antonina, requested a British passport so that she could travel to England with 
her husband, Eduardo. British Interests Branch had two points of clarification that 
it wished to raise. First, it queried the validity of the marriage under English law, 
an issue that had already been successfully cleared up and second, it questioned 
how this couple was able to marry without the required certificate.204 The 
Standesamtbeamte replied that since this document was not available he 
demanded a declaration upon oath, which was sufficient according to the 
German law.205 Not surprisingly, this created additional administrative hurdles for 
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the occupation administration in preventing marriages but since the individual 
concerned was a civilian and not governed by either army or CC regulations, 
there was not much that could be done to legally challenge the validity of his 
marriage. 
Alongside the efforts of some officials to prevent marriages to Germans 
were the efforts of others to facilitate acceptable marriages between British 
subjects. A.H. King, in the Political Division, expressed his discomfort with British 
subjects being directed to the German Standesamt for a marriage ceremony and 
declared his belief that "there will be a natural repugnance among British 
subjects for years to come against being married by Germans in a country which 
we occupy."206 These sentiments prompted some officials to attempt to arrange 
civil marriages under the FMA of 1892. Under this act, British subjects could be 
married by a consular officer appointed by the C-in-C. In the case of military 
personnel, the appropriate forms were to be sent to the CO ahead of time so that 
the marriage could be approved.207 The FMA, however, had been developed in a 
colonial context in the late Victorian era and this made it difficult to simply apply it 
to conditions in Germany. For example, civilians were to apply in person at the 
consular office regarding permission to marry. Since the consular representatives 
were in Hamburg and Berlin and travel was heavily restricted, other methods of 
notifying the consul were considered. Eventually a "notice by post" procedure 
was accepted which, it was noted, had been "invented years ago by Swan in the 
206
 Letter to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, S.W. 1 
from A.H. King, British Interests Branch, Political Division, c/o Main Headquarters, 
Control Commission for Germany, (British Element), Lubbecke, BAOR, 11 October 
1945. FO 1060/875. 
207
 Letter from Andrew Clark, Norfolk House, 24 October 1944. FO 1060/874. 
97 
Congo," and a special telegraph code (IMPED) was sent in May 1946 from the 
British Embassy, Consular Section in Rome, in order that the consular office 
would be able to obtain the information required to give permission to marry. 
Both of these procedures required the express permission of the FO which was 
rather skeptical at the start of the process, even questioning the use of the title 
"consul" since Britain would not normally have a consulate or consular facilities in 
a country with which it was technically still at war.208 
Even after these obstacles had been overcome, difficulty in registering 
civilian marriages remained. Since marriages in this category were normally 
carried out by a consular authority, he simply kept a register of the marriages he 
performed and then sent copies of his registers to Somerset House on January 
1s t each year where they were then officially registered by the Registrar-General. 
When a couple in Germany were married by a Forces chaplain or in the 
Standesamt, although they would have a valid marriage certificate, if it was lost 
or stolen they would have no proof of a valid British marriage since the consul 
could not register a marriage he had not performed. Without proof of marriage, 
children involved would be declared illegitimate and deemed to have citizenship 
of the country in which they were born rather than that of their father. The wife 
also would have no proof of British citizenship.209 One example of the 
complications this could create involved Mr. Richardson, who married a German 
woman under the provisions of the FMA, but the marriage was not registered 
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with the Standesamt or performed according to German law. This was not a 
problem while they were residing in the UK. When she decided to return to 
Germany, ostensibly temporarily, she reportedly discovered that she was not 
married according to German law and married another, German, man. This, 
however, left Mr. Richardson in the position of having to obtain a divorce before 
he could consider remarrying since he was still married to her according to 
English law.210 
Control Council Law (CCL) No. 16, the official marriage law (Ehegesetz) 
for Germany was published on 5 March 1946 and was intended to clarify 
procedures regarding marriage in Germany. In the opinion of the Special Legal 
Unit, it was substantially a re-enactment of the 1938 law, "pruned of conspicuous 
Nazi doctrine".211 The administrative and legal debate concerning this Law 
revolved around two issues. Initially, the question arose as to whether or not the 
Control Commission should become involved in changing German marriage law. 
Some argued that it was a purely German affair. Others argued that Germany did 
not have a government and that the law had to be changed quickly because of 
the Nazi-inspired clauses.212 In addition, the British wanted to amend certain 
aspects of it so that their personnel could have a civil marriage by a consular 
authority, and have this marriage be legal in Germany.213 In the end, the British 
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disagreed with a number of aspects of the law and they sought to avoid its 
constraints. The two main sections of the law itself that were declared 
unpalatable covered adultery and a waiting period after divorce. The adultery 
provision provided that a person could not marry someone with whom they had 
committed adultery if that act had been the cause of divorce. The section dealing 
with a waiting period applied exclusively to women, stating the requirement of 
waiting ten months after a divorce before they could remarry unless they had a 
baby in the meantime.214 Since by the provisions of Ordinance 57 this was a 
German responsibility however, the British could not effect any change in the 
matter. 
Furthermore, the requested amendment for the provision of consular 
marriages for British subjects in Germany was problematic. The purpose of the 
amendment was expressly to permit Consular marriages between non-Germans 
to be celebrated in Germany. The passage of this amendment through the Legal 
Directorate took a year and the end result did not unequivocally validate consular 
marriage because of two objections by the Americans. The consular 
representative, A.H. King, found the American attitude difficult to understand 
since they had no Federal Marriage Law and were unlikely to be interested, then 
or in the future, in Consular marriages abroad. Nevertheless, their objections 
meant that although Consular officers in Germany who held marriage warrants 
could perform marriages, the marrying parties still had to be informed that their 
marriage would not be valid in Germany. In this case, since the British were 
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unable to by-pass German law, with the amendment, a second ceremony was 
still necessary.215 
The publishing of CC Law No. 16 did not clarify policy and procedure 
either, and confusion was widespread. In July 1946 a German pastor applied for 
information concerning procedure through Religious Affairs, regarding a couple 
who had asked him to marry them. This British Officer and his German fiancee, 
an interpreter, requested to be wed in church without the ceremony being 
preceded by a civil marriage. Their request was based on a number of false 
assumptions circulating at the time. Their first assumption was that, since the 
bridegroom was a British subject and the bride-to-be would soon become one, 
they could proceed on the basis of British law under which a church ceremony is 
sufficient. In addition they stated to the pastor that under British law even soldiers 
and officers were allowed to marry German women and the Forces Commander 
had unlawfully prohibited them. Since this ban was unlawful and not binding, a 
marriage contracted against this ruling would be recognized in England as legally 
contracted according to British law. They further stated that according to reports 
in the papers, many such marriages had occurred and the Commander had let 
this pass because he knew the order to be unlawful. Because the military 
authorities did not give soldiers certificates permitting them to contract marriage, 
neither British chaplains (who had to obey the orders of the high Command) nor 
the German registry office (because it was a state institution) could perform these 
marriages. The church and its clergy were claimed an exception to this because 
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they did not need the permission of the MG to perform their ecclesiastical 
duties.216 The reply to Religious Affairs confirmed that British officers could only 
marry in Germany "in-the-lines" under Section 22 of the FMA (which could be by 
an English pastor) or by civil marriage in accordance with German law and 
therefore at least implied that permission of the C-in-C was required.217 German 
authorities had other types of difficulties with the new law. 
The Oberlandesgerichtsprasident in Hamburg, for example, was 
concerned that jurisdiction for its administration was in Berlin. Those who were 
forbidden to marry due to adultery might seek a pardon and the jurisdiction, he 
argued, should be in the British zone if that was where they were seeking to 
remarry. Seeking a pardon from the judge who passed the original decree might 
be impracticable in the circumstances. He also stated his belief that he should 
have authority for those who did not have a permanent address but wanted to 
marry in the British zone. Furthermore, difficulties frequently occurred regarding 
situations concerning divorce decrees from countries other than Germany and 
whether or not to accept them.218 He suggested that this was further confused by 
the wording of the carrying-out law because jurisdiction was not clear. In some 
cases the British and the Soviets could both declare jurisdiction. The 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident was primarily concerned though regarding 
situations where the couple was Russian and had moved to the British zone and 
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where both governments denied jurisdiction.219 This of course would put the 
Germans in the position of being responsible for the outcome. The 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident suggested that decisions regarding this type of 
situation were often required quickly and should not be made in Berlin.220 The 
ACC did act on the recommendations of a committee of 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasidenten and effected the recommended changes.221 
All of these legal questions contributed to a complex situation, one in 
which it was then difficult to get married. On 10 September 1946, a German 
newspaper in Berlin announced that the "first" British marriage to a German 
woman would take place the next day when Captain John Downing would marry 
Fraulein Meuer. The article said that they had been married in the Standesamt 
on 7 September with the religious ceremony to take place on 11 September. This 
prompted an immediate investigation by HQ Berlin and it was determined that 
Downing was in fact a civilian employed by 135 Friends (Quaker) Ambulance 
Unit and was a Captain in the Church Army. The pre-arranged British pastor was 
ordered not to perform the ceremony and Downing was said to be attempting to 
arrange a German pastor instead.222 The civil ceremony was reported to have 
been performed on the production of a "no objection" certificate issued by British 
Interests Branch (BIB), Political Division, Berlin, on the recommendation of 
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Downing's superior. The Military Government stated that they had not issued a 
security clearance for Fraulein Meuer. The investigation showed that the Consul 
in Berlin had been asked by Downing for an "eligibility to marry" certificate as 
required by German law. The Consul told Downing that he was unable to do this, 
but that in certain circumstances could issue a "no objection" certificate and then 
Downing himself would have to satisfy the German authority that he was free to 
marry. Downing produced a questionnaire (Fragebogen) completed by Fraulein 
Meuer and "annotated by Special Branch P.S., HQ Mil Gov [sic] Berlin," which 
stated that their assessment would be one of "no objection." He also produced a 
letter of recommendation from his superior. The Consul added that two other 
Quakers whose opinion he trusted had stated that Fraulein Meuer was "of good 
character, that her intention in marrying Downing is honest, and that she is not a 
person from whom British nationality should be withheld." He added that both 
sets of parents approved of the marriage; the couple had met in May 1945 and 
had been engaged since January, 1946. On the strength of this information, 
Downing was issued a "no objection" certificate, the officials in the 
Kammergerichte satisfied themselves that both parties were free to marry and 
the marriage took place. Mrs. Downing was then issued a temporary British 
passport. It was the opinion of HM Consul that since Downing was a member of 
neither the armed forces nor the CCG, he was free to do what he did and that 
special powers would be required to limit the personal freedom of British civilians 
in Germany.223 
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The media coverage of the situation resulted in increased pressure from 
members of the Forces of Occupation and the CCG(BE), who were restricted in 
ways that civilians were not. It was immediately requested of HQ that the C-in-
C's directives on marriage be extended to all civilians. On September 19 officials 
agreed that in fairness to soldiers and CCG(BE) employees, British civilians 
wanting to marry German women ought to undergo a six months waiting period. 
They agreed further that this should be done by administrative means since a 
formal regulation would have to distinguish between various groups in Germany 
at the time such as employees of the Red Cross or United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and British citizens who were there for a 
range of private reasons. These were estimated to be a group of several 
hundred.224 It was thus agreed that further directives would be sent to the 
Standesamt with strict instructions concerning the new administrative path to an 
approved marriage. Unfortunately, this did nothing to make the situation any 
clearer for those attempting to provide the service. 
"Notes for the guidance of British Nationals (other than members of the 
Armed Forces and Navy Army Air Force Institute (NAAFI)) wishing to marry in 
Germany" gave the following procedure: the person concerned was to "make 
application for the publication of the banns of marriage to the German Registrar's 
Office (Standesamt) competent for the place of residence of your fiancee." This 
application would then follow a very circuitous route and be, 
forwarded by the German Registrar through various channels, German 
and British in order that it may be considered and decided whether or not 
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permission will be granted to the marriage.... If, and when, consent is 
given to, [sic] the marriage, authority will be given to the Standesamt to 
solemnize the marriage. The Registrar will inform you when he receives 
authority to perform the marriage ceremony...The only action to be taken 
by you is that detailed in para [sic] 1. above. The steps set forth in para.2. 
and 3. follow automatically without need of action by you. The above 
procedure [sic] must be followed and applicants must not apply in person 
to Legal Branch, H.Q. Mil. Gov. [sic] in an effort to short circuit the 
procedure.225 
The Regional Administrative Office (RAO) also requested to be advised on 
whether these rules applied to civilian staff of the CCG, since instructions had 
conflicted, in his opinion, and were sent from too many different departments. 
This confusion led to a variety of problems. One couple writing to the FO 
in 1946 had been advised by the consul in Frankfurt that they could be married in 
Germany, but he did not say that his personal attendance was necessary in order 
that the marriage be registered in England. This couple did want their marriage 
registered in England for the benefit of their children.226 Mr. and Mrs. Crichton 
were informed that there was no way of doing this. Since this couple had a copy 
of their German marriage certificate, their children could be proven to be British 
subjects, which was one of Mr. Crichton's goals. It still left them, however, with 
the stigma of a German marriage certificate, the authenticity of which was 
continually questioned by English authorities. This contributed to Mrs. Crichton's 
continual feeling of not being accepted as a proper English wife.227 An additional 
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example comes from a letter written by a civilian CCG employee. His fiancee was 
also British and also worked for the CCG but was stationed 200 miles from him. 
He was wiring to the FO because he had been told that there was "no machinery 
in the whole of the British zone to effect the ceremony which would be 
recognized by HM Government in Great Britain."228 
While these kinds of administrative problems existed for Brits and 
Germans alike, there were certain categories of hurdles that were faced primarily 
by German women. For example, restrictions on travel presented difficulties for a 
German woman whose fiance had already returned to England. In one confusing 
situation, Miss Kummerfeld and her fiance, Mr. Saunders, were advised that she 
should acquire a UK visa from the British Passport Control office in Liibeck 
where she lived. In order to get this, she should have a letter from her fiance 
saying that he had made preparations to marry her within two months of her 
arrival in England.229 A week later, Mr. Saunders was told by the FO that he 
could travel to Germany to marry his fiancee, but marriage in Germany was very 
difficult to arrange and it would be easier if his fiancee came to the UK on the 
same arrangements.230 A great difficulty for Miss Kummerfeld and other German 
women and their fiances was that they had to arrange their own transportation.231 
This was obviously challenging and very expensive in 1946. Women could not 
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take any family or friends with them and were at the mercy of their fiance's family 
in England. The "Foreign Born Wife" was met at the airport or port by someone 
from the RAF Transit Booking Office or Embarkation Authority and taken over by 
London District Welfare on arrival in London. She was met by the local police 
when she arrived at the final destination and was released to her husband or 
fiance or his family. In addition, accommodation in England had to be 
documented before she could secure transport to her final destination.232 
Carola Althoff and her fiance of 12 years, Mr. Williams, were confronted 
with similar obstacles. Mr. Williams had settled in Cologne with Althoff where he 
ran "The Great William's [sic] Circus Show" and they had three children born in 
1941, 1942 and 1945. They had not been able to marry because of the war but in 
1946 wished to do so and take their children to the UK. They soon discovered 
that this was almost impossible. Even though they could prove they had 
accommodation in the UK with Mr. Williams' father, they could not be married in 
Germany and, as the children were German nationals, they could not travel to 
the UK.233 
Even though Althoff's children had a British father they were illegitimate 
and therefore took the nationality of the mother under German law and were 
stateless under British law. Althoff was, of course, only one of thousands of 
women who had illegitimate children by British fathers. Some of those fathers, 
like Mr. Williams, were willing to support their children, others were not. This left 
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German women in difficulty in several ways. To begin with, they could not sue for 
support. Furthermore, if the British man did want to support the children, but not 
marry her, he could do this as long as he remained in Germany, yet he could not 
legally send money from the UK to provide such support.234 The legal argument 
from the British perspective was that affiliation and maintenance payments were 
intended to support the child. Illegitimate children of German mothers were 
German nationals and it was difficult for the British authorities to see why they 
should pay for these children. There were also two practical difficulties from the 
British point of view. Most of the British fathers were not going to remain in 
Germany for any extended length of time and it was thus impossible for the 
authorities to enforce maintenance orders against these men. Secondly, public 
scrutiny of these cases in court would be damaging to British prestige. In the 
opinion of the MG in Berlin, the Soviet press would have a "field day" and this 
would also leave British men vulnerable to the "possibility of blackmail and 
extortion at the hands of unscrupulous German women.235 
These British anxieties often left "unscrupulous German women" in a 
desperate position. For example, Elisabeth Judt wrote to the Foreign Office in 
May 1948 explaining that she had met David Brown in Liebenau in October 1945, 
where he was stationed until the following May. She became pregnant and had a 
child in October 1946. She stated that the father was aware of the pregnancy, 
had claimed he would return to Germany in August 1946, and that he would then 
234
 A. Michelson, for Chief Legal Division to P.W. & DP. Division, Zonal Executive 
Offices, 16 December 1947. FO 937/136. 
235
 Telegram from Berlin, HQ BAOR to Foreign Office (German Section) London, 13 
February 1948. FO 371/70845. 
109 
take her with him to Scotland. When he failed to return she wrote to his address 
in St. Andrews repeatedly, and received no reply. Finally she received a letter 
from his mother stating that he had moved to Canada. Through a firm of solicitors 
in St. Andrews, she was able to initiate a police enquiry through which she 
discovered that not only did he still live in St. Andrews, but had subsequently 
married another woman. She was now pressing the Foreign Office for 
information on how she could claim support.236 In a similar case, Mrs. Banck met 
Major P. while she was still married to her Austrian husband, but since the Major 
agreed that she should get a divorce, she had two children with him. When her 
divorce became final, Major P. disappeared. The FO reply assured Mrs. Banck 
that it was impossible for her to obtain an affiliation order in Germany that would 
be enforceable in England. The FO letter also revealed that, because there were 
so many of these cases, the issue was now with the United Nations 
Organizations and was the subject of international agreements.237 
There were, of course, some British personnel who were willing to take 
responsibility for the support of their children even though they did not expect to 
have a long-term relationship with the German mother. Letters from these 
fathers to the FO inquiring as to how they could provide support to their children 
were met with similarly unsatisfactory replies. For example, Mr. Cook, a sapper in 
the BAOR, was told that his child was the responsibility of the German authorities 
and both the FO and the CCG(BE) were powerless to assist him. Mr. Cook had 
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heard through the CO of his regiment that the child was suffering from 
malnutrition. The FO suggested that the only action he could take was to use his 
UK family rations for medicinal items such as cod liver oil which could be sent 
through the regular Post. Mr. Cook was also informed by the WO, mistakenly as 
it turned out, that volunteer organizations were also powerless to help in this 
situation.238 In fact, one organization, with the unlikely name of the National 
Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child, had money entrusted to them 
by British fathers of German children. This organization, after great difficulty, 
negotiated with another relief organization, Save Europe Now, to handle these 
funds for many British fathers seeking to give such support for their children.239 
Child support was only one more problem German women faced in a long 
list of complex issues. Many aspects of their relationships with men were 
unstable and unpredictable, as conditions changed in the post-war period. Along 
with the dilemmas of relationships with British men, many faced uncertainty in 
their relationships with their German husbands. Many women sought divorce or 
were faced with the presumption of death of a husband. The occupation 
administration had some role to play regarding all of these issues, each of which 
potentially limited a woman's ability to move on and make a new life. Divorce and 
presumption of death were handled by the German central Legal Office with the 
authority of the MG. The new fledgling German government had its own internal 
issues to work through in developing these laws. It is difficult to ascertain, in this 
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particular situation, how much autonomy the German legal office had and how 
much authority the MG asserted without an in-depth analysis of the development 
of this law. The outcome, however, and its effect on German women was clear 
enough. German courts were able to make a presumption of death one year after 
the husband was known to have been in danger, either through war or 
concentration camp incarceration. Where there was any doubt as to the exact 
date, 8 May 1945 was to be used. Again, however, the technicalities were 
tremendously complex and political. The main issue was that where the first 
husband reappeared after a second marriage and the husband was a German 
national, German court judgments applied. Where the husband was any other 
nationality, English law applied. This meant that in the first scenario, the first 
marriage was dissolved while under English law the second marriage was 
dissolved.240 
The ruling allowing for presumption of death was a benefit to German 
women who wanted to move on with their lives. The process remained difficult 
and lengthy, however, and not everyone was content to work their way through it 
legally. There were, of course, cases where German women attempted to 
circumvent the necessary forms and regulations. One example concerned Leni 
Wittman [sic] who produced a presumption of death certificate in order to marry 
James Diplock. Eventually it was discovered that she had forged various 
documents, her previous husband was in fact still alive, and she was pursued 
240
 Letter by A. Michelson, Chief, Legal Division, Z.E.C.O., Herford, to A(P.S.1), 
Headquarters, BAOR, 4 December 1946. FO 1060/889. 
112 
and prosecuted by the Special Investigations Department. Another instance 
included two couples who were married by Army Chaplains in Liibeck in June 
1947; the women claimed, in both cases, that their former husbands were dead. 
This was subsequently found to be false information. One of these men had been 
a POW in Russia, but had returned to Germany, and the second was a POW in 
Yugoslavia who had written to the MG on several occasions. The women 
concerned had claimed to be Brazilian and Polish since at that time British men 
were forbidden to marry German women. PS Diisseldorf was investigating 
whether charges would be laid. Interestingly, the writer of the preliminary report 
suggested that this situation "emphasized] again the prevailing need for an early 
change of the marriage procedure for members of H.M. Forces."242 On the other 
hand, there were situations where a woman had remarried on what she believed 
was authentic information concerning the death of her previous husband. Mrs. 
Rennie discovered that her first husband was still alive in 1949 when she had 
already moved to Scotland with her new husband. Although her marriage to John 
Rennie was declared valid by British law, the two had been married at a Catholic 
Church only, and in 1946, when marriage of CCG personnel to German women 
had not been sanctioned.243 
Letters between the British Consulate-General, Headquarters, CCG (BE), Berlin, 
BAOR 2 and Personnel Branch, Administrative Staff, Headquarters, control Commission 
for Germany (BE), Berlin, BAOR 2, 3 December 1948 to 27 May 1949. FO 372/6747. 
242
 Report from Land Legal Department, HQ Land North Rhine/Westfalen, Dusseldorf 
[sic], 714 HQ, CCG (BE), BAOR to Legal Division, Zonal Executive Offices, CCG, 
Herford, 65 HQ CCG, BAOR, 12 November 1947. FO 937/120. 
243
 Letter from the British Consulate-General, c/o Commissioner's Office, Hansestadt 
Hamburg, BAOR 3 to Treaty Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.14 November 
1949. FO 372/6748. 
113 
Modifications to divorce procedures also benefitted German women, often 
allowing remarriage more quickly. Women who were attempting to get divorced 
and those who had already managed it both faced a number of obstacles. Until 
1948 divorced individuals were required to produce a complete official "long 
certificate" of the divorce decree with their application for marriage banns or 
marriages. This was sometimes impossible in the post-war confusion since this 
type of certificate could only be issued after the fact by a government registry 
office. This regulation was finally amended so that the person concerned could 
appear with a "short certificate", the record that is given to the individual at the 
time the divorce is granted. This still had to be made out by the Registrar of the 
court, "who must belong to the higher grade of the legal civil service," and it was 
required to show "whether any and if so which persons are prevented from 
contracting the proposed marriage on account of sexual intercourse or 
adultery."244 If the certificate presented did not contain this information, the 
reasons for this were considered, in case it was impossible to obtain the 
information.245 
Divorce presented other categories of problems as well, for both officials 
and divorcees. One major problem, as stated by the President des Zentral-
Justizamts fur die Britische Zone, was the negotiation of "recognition of foreign 
judgments in divorce cases and exclusive jurisdiction of German courts in 
"Certificates in divorce cases for banns proceedings before the Registrar, General 
Instruction of the President of the Central Legal Office" 8 June 1948, Bundesarchiv, Z1 
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matrimonial cases." From the perspective of the German courts, it needed to 
be clear that provision had been made for the protection of the German party 
concerned. The other significant problem for the courts was the requirement of 
reciprocity which was lifted in 1948. This meant that nationals of foreign countries 
could subsequently sue for divorce in Germany, making it easier for German 
women to divorce nationals of countries such as Austria, Holland or Poland.247 
This is significant because a remarkable number of divorces in this period were a 
result of marriages in the immediate post-war, which in all likelihood were not 
between two Germans. In Hamburg in 1951, 1,628 of 4,109 divorces were of 
post-war marriages. 
A significant obstacle to divorce for German women, as well as those of 
other nationalities, was the incarceration and thus inaccessibility of the men they 
wished to divorce. In January 1947, the Justizinspektor in Hamburg, Dr. Hopfner, 
wrote to the MG recommending a new ordinance regarding serving documents to 
internees in civilian camps.249 This had not been allowed, with only a few 
exceptions in Hamburg and Hannover, which Dr. Hopfner reported as "rare and 
inconsequential." He suggested that, after the first delivery of a document, the 
internee could appoint someone outside the camp to represent him and thus 
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many divorce cases could be initiated or completed. Since civil legal concerns 
passed to the authority of the German legal department with Ordinance 57, 
divorce became a strictly German matter. The difficulty was that many of these 
men were arrested on criminal charges and remained incarcerated and under the 
control of the British legal authority. 
In the wider picture, marriage in the zone was characterized by the British 
struggle with internal administrative issues. For example, many British subjects 
wished to marry in a Standesamt and have their marriage registered in the UK. 
Mr. King, the newly appointed Consul, was intent on maintaining his notion of 
British superiority, however, and refused to even attempt to attend marriages of 
British subjects at the Standesamt, which would have allowed them to be 
officially registered at Somerset House. He stated that he did not, 
propose to kick my heels in a scrubby German office just because a 
British subject wants to be married to a German woman...he can get 
married legally, without my presence, and he will just have to do without a 
lex loci [sic] registration.25 
This obviously did not do much to improve relations with Germans. Dunbar of the 
FO was careful to appreciate the "unseemliness" of the inconvenience of having 
to attend at a Standesamt, but encouraged King to be cognizant of his position 
as relations with the Germans returned to normal. Furthermore, Dunbar did not 
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want the situation to occur where a member of the CCG(BE) took this to mean 
that the marriage was not valid.252 
King was also specifically set against the approval of marriages of British 
subjects and Germans at the Standesamt because he believed that this would 
inevitablylead to a significant problem concerning marriages of convenience. He 
reiterated his belief that "there are a good many women in Germany at present 
who would be prepared to pay a British subject £50 in order to get a British 
passport."253 The underlying assumption is that the same number of British men 
would be willing to take the £50. For this reason, as well, King wanted to maintain 
the necessity of the certificates of no impediment. This required the applicants 
giving notice to the Consul after the residence qualifications of the Marriage with 
Foreigners Act of 1906 had been met and satisfied.254 This involved about six 
weeks delay and the FO felt that "the parties are apt to feel that their marriages 
are unnecessarily postponed by what appears to them to be gratuitous 
interference by the British authorities." Dunbar, at the FO, insisted that this was 
both very unpopular and that it was very unfortunate that part of the procedure 
for waiving German marriage requirements was the same certificate from British 
authorities.255 To underline the point, Dunbar included, with his own letter, a letter 
from a civilian employee of the CCG expressing irritation against the existing 
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restrictions on marriage. Dunbar feared that, when the restrictions were removed, 
"it will be unfortunate if the benefits to British subjects should appear to be 
whittled down by a formality which it is the ostensible purpose of the new 
instructions to eliminate."256 
King's sensibilities were only one element of the many obstacles involved 
in regulating marriage in the British zone. Providing facilities for legal and 
acceptable marriages was a challenge, given the tension between the official 
agenda and the actions of British personnel on the ground. Much of this tension 
remained into the 1950's because German women continued to be viewed 
officially as a security threat and although the MG did its best to keep the two 
groups separated, it could not prevent British men from marrying German 
women. Some of the restrictions were therefore eased. The most significant 
change for German women was the lifting of the ban on marriage between British 
subjects and "ex-enemy aliens" in March 1947. Even though this made marriage 
possible, many restrictions remained in place and German women continued to 
experience a number of security barriers. Changes to the FMA, for example, 
resulted in Anglo-German marriages where the German wife did not any longer 
automatically acquire British nationality. This created some dilemmas for her 
regarding her status as a "foreign-born" wife with German children. The next 
chapter will examine the evolution of marriage regulations after the ban was lifted 
in 1947 and the impact of the changes on the lives of German women and their 
families. 
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Chapter 5: Marriage to Ex-enemy Occupiers 
If a woman of German nationality marries a foreign national or a stateless 
person her attention must be drawn to the fact that she loses German 
nationality on her marriage if she acquires a foreign nationality. 
-Excerpt from the Ministerial Gazette for Land North-Rhine Westphalia257 
In the first two years of occupation MG and CCG(BE) officials 
implemented and then adapted many different policies, some of which were 
intended to prevent Anglo-German relationships. Initially, policies of this kind 
were meant to prevent social contact of any sort between the two populations. 
Later, after the fraternization ban was lifted, its purpose was to prevent specific 
types of relationships such as sexual affairs or marriage. As it became more 
apparent that such marriages could not be prevented, regulations were 
implemented to control as many aspects of the process as possible. From the 
point of view of a German woman, these regulations made marriage to ex-enemy 
soldiers or civilians a complicated and public affair. Her character was officially 
questioned, her motive for marriage brought under suspicion and her children, if 
she had any, were only partially accepted. Although by 1947 relations between 
Britain, the U.S., and the western zones of Germany were being repaired in 
important ways, as Germany became the main battleground of the cold war, 
German women remained enemies in the eyes of the occupation bureaucracy. 
During 1947 and 1948 the British made two significant changes to 
marriage regulations, both of which affected German women directly. The first of 
these was the lifting of the ban on marriage to "ex-enemy aliens." The second 
257
 "Extract from Ministerial Gazette for Land North-Rhine Westphalia, No. 77, 28 
September 1949," FO 372/6748. 
119 
involved changes to the Nationality Act. Although the lifting of the ban made 
marriage between British men and German women officially possible, it did not 
make it easy to accomplish. Many regulatory obstacles were put in place to 
safeguard British interests. Similarly, the changes to the Nationality Act 
prevented foreign-born wives from acquiring British nationality. There were no 
doubt many objectives influencing this decision; to begin, it also safeguarded 
British interests by preventing large numbers of Poles or DP's from acquiring 
British nationality through marriage. Nevertheless, it is likely that German women 
were the most significant target. 
Elizabeth Heineman has recently examined the role of marital status for 
German women in Nazi and postwar Germany and asked the question "What 
Difference Does a Husband Make?"258 In exploring this issue she examines the 
lives of single, divorced, widowed and married women and the different types of 
problems and status issues each group experienced. She found that, at several 
points in the immediate postwar, a great deal of support existed for single women 
to remain so and live happy lives. Despite this, there were obviously many 
women for whom marriage and family were preferable. The difficulty was lack of 
marriage partners. It is clear that British personnel, soldiers and civilians, were 
acceptable marriage partners and were even more attractive than German men 
in some ways. However, a relationship with a British man was no guarantee of 
security, given the early regulations against fraternization and marriage, the anti-
fraternization movement, and the possibility of being left with a child and no 
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support at any time during the occupation but particularly before marriage was 
allowed. 
Furthermore, the barriers put in the way of German women marrying 
British personnel were so numerous that the couple concerned must have been 
quite motivated, and having a husband must have made a great deal of 
difference to some German women. German women were treated as security 
risks during both engagement and marriage, affecting both their husbands' 
careers and their potential standard of living. The husband could be transferred 
to a lower grade or even discharged from the CCG as a result of marrying a 
German. Access to material resources after marriage was somewhat restricted 
depending on her exact situation and this also potentially affected her family's 
standard of living. Although some amenities such as married quarters, were 
potentially available, clothing for children was not. In addition, after 1 January 
1949, even when German women had cleared the security barriers, they did not 
acquire the nationality of their husbands. Therefore, marrying a British man did 
not mean an immediate change for the better in terms of her material resources. 
If this was the only reason that German women were pursuing British men, they 
were in for some disappointment. 
The announcement and communication of regulations to allow the 
possibility of marriage between British subjects and ex-enemy aliens came in 
March 1947.259 Although very officially worded, the tone of this document was 
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rather stem reminding applicants several times that no exceptions would be 
made for any reason and that applicants should not attempt to short-circuit the 
process. Given the time and effort it likely took to fulfill the requirements, it is not 
surprising that people attempted to bypass some of them. The regulations were 
onerous and specific and were clearly designed to preclude any regulatory 
difficulties or security concerns. The most prominent concern was apparently the 
vulnerability of certain departments within the CCG(BE) and the organization's 
ability to withstand an assault by unscrupulous German women. Consequently 
waiting periods, screening mechanisms and character references were all part of 
the process of safeguarding the system. The instructions began with a 
notification that the six month waiting period would continue, unless the applicant 
was leaving the CCG(BE), and then proceeded to list the various responsibilities 
of each party.260 This was not always observed, and many marriages took place 
without the six-month certificate. The Treaty department maintained that these 
were valid marriages and the wives were entitled to a British passport.261 
Assuming the employee planned to remain in the employment of the CCG, 
he first applied on Form BAOR 120, "in duplicate and suitably adapted" to the 
relevant Regional Administrative Officer (RAO). The RAO determined whether or 
not the applicant could remain at his current position or would need to be 
transferred for security reasons. In all cases, a "certificate of good character" of 
the prospective wife from the Oberburgermeister of the Stadtkreis where she 
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lived, (or alternatively the Landrat of the Kreis or their equivalent in large cities), 
as well as from her Priest or Minister, was required with the application. Both of 
these letters were to have "certified translations" attached. The woman 
concerned had also to include two copies of a questionnaire {Fragebogen). 
When all of this was reviewed and provisional approval given, the 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident could be approached for the "eligibility to marry" 
certificate or an exemption from it. When the exemption was received the RAO 
sent an instruction for the applicant and his fiancee to go to the consulate office 
in Hamburg or Berlin for "completion of the formalities under the Marriage with 
Foreigners Act 1906." Normally, this could be done more than two months 
ahead of the date of marriage. Permission to make such a journey also had to be 
acquired from the superior officer.262 And, although not stated in the instruction, 
the woman concerned might have to have leave from work, arrange to have 
children or other dependents cared for or make any number of other 
arrangements so that she could make this trip. Her absence from home and work 
may have been a serious obstacle. All applicants were instructed to note that no 
exceptions to the procedures would be made on account of pregnancy or if the 
couple had already been married "in the lines," but still required the German 
ceremony at the Standesamt. In addition, anyone who had applied prior to 20 
March 1947 was required to apply again according to the new instruction. The six 
months waiting period, however, would be taken from the date of the first 
application.263 Since it is feasible that it could take months to meet the entire list 
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of requirements, this was probably a benefit. It was also pointed out that the 
Standesamt would not normally take a notice to marry longer than one month 
ahead, but notices to marry could be renewed after the dispensation from the 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident was received.264 It is difficult to imagine the 
emotional toll that all of this took on the couple concerned. 
It was likewise a significant undertaking for the CCG(BE) personnel 
involved in the scrutinizing and processing of the documentation and many 
problems occurred. Although the whole procedure was laid out in the Zonal 
Executive Control Office (ZECO) document, instructions were not always heeded 
and were often misunderstood. From a bureaucratic point of view, the application 
was required to be processed through the applicant's Division, Intelligence 
Division, Public Safety and HQ which entailed a good deal of "paper shuffling." 
Parts of the documentation, the Fragebogen and character statements as well as 
Form BAOR 120, were gathered at the RAO to be forwarded to Intelligence 
Division. The RA officer arranged for the prospective bride to be medically 
examined by a British doctor to ensure that she was free of VD and tuberculosis 
and that there was no other medical objection to the marriage. When Intelligence 
received the two copies of the Fragebogen they were instructed to forward one 
copy with the "certificate of good character" to a PS Officer (Special Branch). In 
any "doubtful cases," HQ Intelligence Division should be consulted. In all cases 
the woman's name was checked against a list received from HQ "of the certain 
classes of German women who, by reason of their past political associations, 
must be considered to be automatically banned from marrying CCG 
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personnel."265 When the woman concerned had been cleared by Intelligence and 
PS, the paperwork could all be returned to RAO. The Division official was then to 
let the couple know that provisional approval had been given and that final 
approval could be given six months later. Division personnel were instructed to 
countersign Form BAOR 120. Everything could be sent to Regional HQ at the 
expiry of the six months and notice of final approval given to the applicant. 
Application could at that point be made to the local Standesamt for the 
appropriate certificates. If anything was found to be unsatisfactory at any point, 
everything should be sent to ZECO.266 
The monthly reports from the Chief Legal Officer in Niedersachsen to 
Legal Division, ZECO, indicate that there were a substantial number of 
applications to marry in the second half of 1947.267 In July for example, the Legal 
Office handled a total of 994 applications from the Standesamt and 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident.268 For the same period the legal office received 
only fourteen from the Consul. Furthermore, of the applications from British 
personnel, most were from the military. This is particularly surprising given the 
overwhelming number of CCG(BE) civilian employees in the zone at that time. 
From July to December, 53 civilians and 512 military personnel applied to marry 
a non-British person. These figures also reveal that a vast majority of the total 
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applications were from Poles (675 in July). Of the additional applications there 
were 18 non-British nationalities in all.269 
There were a number of glitches in the system. Some were bureaucratic 
and some were the responsibility of individual applicants. Legal Branch in 
Hamburg complained in June that it was receiving papers related to marriages of 
CCG(BE) personnel and requested clarification of the procedure.270 By 
September it appears that all the Divisions concerned were sending the 
applications to the RAO as per instruction. The Legal Branch continued to 
receive applications directly from individuals however.271 In 1948, individuals 
arriving at the Consulate in Hamburg continually did so without a letter of 
provisional approval. The RAO Hamburg stated that it was always given to the 
applicant and could not, according to procedure, be sent to the Consulate 
instead. The Consul was therefore, required to delay the marriage while another 
copy of the security clearance was obtained.272 
By early 1948, the officials responsible for handling the applications were 
looking for means of streamlining the process. The Intelligence office in Hamburg 
requested that "in order to save time and for the convenience of all concerned," 
the applications of military personnel should be forwarded directly from the unit to 
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PS. Intelligence Division required only the name and date of birth of the woman 
concerned in order to clear her. It was suggested that a written confirmation 
could be sent as follow-up.273 PS approved of this new procedure and suggested 
that it should apply to all CCG employees as well.274 With the approval of PS, 
Intelligence sought agreement with the RAO adding that the routine work of 
security clearance took only a few minutes and the handling of such a large 
amount of documentation seemed quite unnecessary.275 The RA Officer agreed 
with the proposed procedure but emphasized at the same time that it was not the 
practice of his office to forward any documents to Intelligence Branch. He was 
somewhat unclear as to exactly which documents were under discussion.276 The 
Regional Intelligence Officer (RIO) then circulated a letter he had just been 
forwarded from PS Biinde stating that since very few objections had arisen to the 
women being checked, it had been decided to discontinue the bulk of 
enquiries.277 Assumptions made at the time of the original regulation concerning 
the risk of German women to the British establishment had proven to have little 
substance. Many marriages were, however, no doubt delayed due to this whole 
process. 
273
 Letter from 16 (Hamburg) Intelligence Office, BAOR 3 to Public Safety, 609 HQ CCG 
(BE), BAOR 3, 3 March 1948. FO 1014/325. 
274
 Letter by Public Safety (Special) Branch, HQ Hansestadt Hamburg, 609 HQ CCG 
(BE), BAOR 3 to R.I.O., 16 (Hamburg) Intelligence Office, Hansestadt Hamburg, BAOR 
3, 5 March 1948. FO 1014/325. 
275
 Letter from 16 (Hamburg) Intelligence Office BAOR 3 to Regional Administrative 
Officer, 609 HQ CCG (BE), BAOR 3, 23 March 1948. FO 1014/325. 
276
 Letter from Regional Administrative Office, HQ Hansestadt Hamburg, 609 HQ CCG 
(BE), BAOR 3 to Regional Intelligence Officer, 16 (Hamburg) Intelligence Office, BAOR 
3, 3 April 1948, FO 1014/325. 
277
 Letter from 16 (Hamburg) Intelligence Office, BAOR 3, to Regional Administrative 
Officer, 609 HQ CCG (BE), BAOR 3, 3 April 1948. FO 1014/325. 
127 
At the same time, the administration appears to have been concerned with 
the number of ex-enemy women who were acquiring British nationality through 
marriage. The WO reported that 95% of marriages had proceeded under the 
FMA and suggested that this "gap in defences" be closed.278 While it appears 
that some of the foreign-born wives were of east European origin, they were 
primarily German. A list of personnel in Education Branch and Cultural Relations 
Branch with wives of German or East European origin indicates of total of 20. Of 
these foreign-born wives 16 were German, one Italian, one Austrian, one Czech 
and one Polish. All but one of the employees listed were temporary civilian 
employees.279 The Nationality Act was therefore changed in 1948 and the 
changes became effective on 1 January, 1949.280 The amendments prevented 
any foreign-born wife acquiring British nationality by marriage. Instead, after the 
marriage was completed she could apply to be registered as a citizen of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies at any Consulate office and take an Oath of 
Allegiance. This conferred on her the status of a British subject. She could also at 
that time apply for an emergency certificate if they were travelling to the UK 
immediately. She could not apply for a passport until she received her 
registration certificate.281 
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Judging from correspondence soon after this announcement, it appears 
that there were a significant number of couples requesting that their applications 
be fast-tracked since the women concerned were pregnant. In these cases the 
couple wanted their marriage to occur under the old rules so that the child would 
automatically have British nationality rather than having to apply for it later.282 
This was approved in some cases but with the proviso that although the date of 
marriage was moved forward, the application for married quarters was not so that 
they did not have any advantage over other applicants.283 There appear to have 
been an equal number requesting some modification of the waiting period 
because of the length of time they had already been waiting and they simply 
wanted to be married under the old law.284 
At the same time as regulations were established for British-German 
marriages, the CCG(BE) moved to deregulate the marriage process for non-
Germans. CC Law No. 52 superseded CC Law No. 16 and stated that a marriage 
celebrated between two parties, neither of whom was a German national, would 
be valid if performed by an official of a country of which either was a national.285 
This allowed British couples, British and non-German persons and those from the 
East of Poland, to be married by a priest only for example. The recording of 
282
 Memo by Personnel Branch P.1., Office of the C.A.O., Zonal Executive Offices, 
Liibbecke [sic], 60 HQ CCG BAOR 1 to Governmental Structure Branch, Berlin, HQ 
CCG (BE), BAOR 2, 16 June 1948. FO 1049/1224. 
283
 Personnel Branch Instruction No. 15, 28 September 1948 "Marriage with Enemy & 
Ex-Enemy Nationals", FO 1014/325. 
284
 "The Foreign Marriage Order in Council, 1947, Section 2", FO 1014/325. 
285
 "Consular Marriages under the Foreign Marriage Act 1892" as attachment to a 
covering letter from the British Consulate-General, Hamburg, c/o 63 HQ CCG, BAOR to 
Secretariat, HQ CCG (BE), 609 HQ Mil Gov [sic], Hansestadt-Hamburg, 22 August 
1947. FO 1014/325. 
129 
these ceremonies was not automatically carried out, however, and individuals 
were directed to obtain a certified copy of the marriage for the German register, 
"duly authenticated by the proper authority."286 The German Legal Office raised 
the issue of the verification of such certificates but it does not appear that this 
was a huge obstacle despite the fact that the list of possibilities was potentially 
endless.287 Where a British citizen was involved and wanted the marriage 
registered in England, a listing of "proper authorities" from whom a certificate of 
marriage could be obtained was attached to the instruction as was the consular 
fee and instructions regarding the English translations which were required with 
the British registration request.288 In order to authenticate the marriage 
registration certificates for British purposes, the Consul requested the legal 
signatures of the proper officials in each Land.289 This registration of marriages 
clearly benefitted German women who would now have a more secure record. 
The securing of a record was an important part of the process from which 
German women benefitted in unpredictable ways. The proper recording of a 
marriage contract did mean that the marriage was carried out according to the 
prevailing law. It is remarkable how many examples exist of couples who did not 
marry according to regulations only to find later that their marriages were not 
valid in some way. Elfreda Lopatta married J. Richardson in November 1947 at 
the Church of England Garrison Church at Celle, but not also in a Standesamt. 
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The ceremony was performed by an R.A.F. "Padre" who may not have realized 
the legal difficulty in which Mr. Richardson was putting himself. Given the number 
of changes to the significant number of marriage regulations over a short period 
of time, it may well be that even the officials performing the marriages could not 
keep up with all the legal aspects. When Elfreda decided to return to her life in 
Germany in 1949, she could do so as a single person. Mr. Richardson, however, 
had to sue for divorce because his marriage was legal in England.290 
In spite of the ongoing suspicious attitude to German women on a 
bureaucratic level, British personnel continued to contract marriages that were 
approved despite the barriers. This did not mean that the situation was suddenly 
more open or the bureaucracy necessarily more accommodating. The view that 
"things were changing" or that German women were becoming more accepted 
must be balanced with the list of instructions and restrictions officially detailed for 
"families of all ranks after their marriage to enemy or ex-enemy nationals in 
BAOR."291 These instructions stated that the official intention was to address both 
the status of these families as well as their living conditions. In doing so, 
however, it is clear that the underlying purpose was to ensure that these families 
took their proper place relative to the families of British-born wives. 
The instructions address several topics under the scheme of Operation 
Union, including the definition of a family, privileges accorded to that family and 
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travel to the UK. The instructions for personnel married to or planning to marry 
enemy or ex-enemy nationals were intended to ensure that British-born wives 
were able to access the resources they were entitled to and that foreign-born 
wives were not able to have any advantage. The fact that the foreign-born wives 
were already in Germany with their husbands, for example, could be perceived 
as their having more urgent need for married quarters. The intention of avoiding 
any advantage was made explicit in several ways. To start with, the requirement 
of the year's expectation of service was to begin from the date of the application 
to marry but application for married quarters could not be submitted until after the 
marriage took place. In addition, those who did not qualify under Operation Union 
could not marry until they were within six weeks of the husband's departure from 
employment with BAOR. This also meant that the family did not qualify for any 
Operation Union privileges except for "Short Leave" sleeping out passes. The 
reason that the family could not receive privileges under Operation Union was, 
because the permission to marry is only granted so that it may be easier 
for the husband to take the family to [the] UK and, if they were granted the 
privileges, the husband would have advantages over other Officers and 
OR married to wives of British origin, who are only able to have their wives 
and families in BAOR under strict Operation Union rules.293 
To the German woman's advantage, "family" was defined as including wife 
and children even if the children were from a former marriage or born "out of 
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wedlock", at least for the purposes of accommodation. The children of former 
marriages were not, however, awarded the same privileges as British children 
and, in fact, a good deal of the initial part of the instructions dealt with the 
definition of the status of the many categories of children. For example, 
illegitimate children born to a German mother of a British father were categorized 
one of two ways. If the couple had been free to marry when the child was born, 
then their subsequent marriage legitimized the child.295 However, the child was 
only considered legitimate from the date of marriage and retained the nationality 
of the mother at its birth. These children therefore remained German. If the 
couple had not been free to marry then the child did not become legitimate.296 
The difference was significant because only legitimate children could apply for 
British nationality. This was particularly relevant if the husband was trying to 
move his family to the UK. Visas for illegitimate children and children of German 
nationality, even if legitimate, were difficult to arrange. Obviously children of 
former marriages retained their original nationality and presented the same 
difficulty with respect to travel arrangements.297 
If the husband elected to remain in Germany and continue in his 
employment with the CCG, two separate matters needed to be addressed. First, 
his position within the CCG(BE) and second, his eligibility for married quarters. If 
he was employed in certain categories or departments of the CCG (BE) then his 
marriage to a German woman was considered a security risk and he was 
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transferred to a less sensitive position. The basic issue was whether or not the 
individual concerned was in a position to influence policy or would be dealing to 
any appreciable extent with secret or confidential material. The list of these was 
significant and "most officials at CO I and above in all offices, Divisions etc." were 
likely to be included in this group.298 Also included were those employed in 
"Secretariats, Message and Mail Centres, Planning Staffs, in work on security 
and defence schemes, Public Safety, British Civil Police, Note Printing Section of 
Finance Division, etc., etc."299 The last group was comprised of anyone working 
on the Military Security Board, in Intelligence Division or "certain grades and 
appointments in Political Division."300 In order to remain with CCG(BE) in any 
capacity, the employee concerned had also to provide certain assurances in 
writing. To start with, an advance statement was required from the fiancee stating 
that she intended to apply to become a British subject immediately after 
marriage. The next requirement was written confirmation from the Consulate 
office that she had applied for citizenship. Lastly, the RAO was to be notified as 
soon as she received her passport.301 It was expected that the length of time 
between the date of marriage and the "final evidence of registration" would not 
normally exceed two months. This was followed by a warning that without the 
advance assurance, it would not be possible to approve his retention in CCG and 
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that "failure on the part of the wife to implement that assurance" would result in 
termination and interim privileges concerning accommodation and rations would 
not be given.302 
Those who remained in Germany, and remained safely employed with the 
CCG, were next faced with finding living quarters and arranging rations, ID cards 
and other identification documents. Eligibility for married quarters was a sensitive 
issue because housing was in short supply and British-born wives who wanted to 
join their husbands in Germany did not want to be denied this opportunity due to 
housing being given to German-born wives.303 If there was no officially 
requisitioned housing available, the employee could apply to the RAO for 
permission to live in a German household on a "sleeping out" pass. This was 
normally granted on a monthly basis if the quarters his wife was living in were 
deemed to be acceptable to both his CO and the Unit Medical Officer. However, 
the husband could also not displace a German person to obtain this living space, 
cause over-crowding in the German house nor get preference or priority over a 
German civilian. The employee also had to apply for papers from the RAO or 
RAC certifying that the marriage had taken place and outlining the couple's 
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circumstances. Furthermore, such quarters were to "conform to standards which 
are normally associated with the applicant's rank."304 No exact specifications 
were given, which may mean that some flexibility existed. The applicant had also 
to be able to get to and from barracks on time and without using government 
transport.305 While this list of requirements was no doubt necessary, they made 
living together after marriage a challenge for such couples. 
The main difficulty in this situation appears to have begun with finding the 
accommodation in the first place. The shortage of housing meant of course that 
the German authorities were struggling to provide safe accommodation as well 
and did not want to be in the position of giving some of it away to non-Germans. 
Until married quarters were available, however, the wife remained the 
responsibility of the German Housing Authority.306 Not surprisingly, perhaps, 
women in this situation frequently met with discrimination. They were reportedly 
turned out of rooms they already occupied upon their marriage or were refused 
alternate accommodation. If the husband's unit moved and she then required 
housing in the new location, she was frequently denied it.307 The British 
authorities claimed they were seeking to ensure her "correct priority in 
accordance with the German Housing Authorities procedure" and when this did 
not happen, her husband should inform his CO.308 
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The German-born wife and her husband, and possibly their children, 
needed resources such as clothing and food as well as housing, and the 
provision of these were covered in the same document. Rations and solid fuel 
were granted to foreign-born wives and children on the same basis as British-
born wives with the important exception of children who did not have British 
nationality.309 If the family was unable to live together because of lack of housing 
the RAO issued authority for the wife to draw rations, NAAFI supplies and fuel on 
repayment by the husband. The Local Administrative Unit (LAU) submitted the 
names of these wives and children to the Regional Food Office so that their 
German rations cards could be withdrawn. When the husband and family were 
separated temporarily by transfer, the family could be attached to the closest Unit 
for purposes of rations. If the husband was discharged and the family was 
waiting to follow him to the UK, they were allowed to stay on rations but he was 
required to repay in Sterling and this was deducted from his final settlement.310 In 
substance, the foreign-born wife did acquire some of the material status of her 
husband which may have been greater than what she had access to as a 
German. This was not always clear, however, as there were many complaints 
about availability of some resources. 
In fact, a main issue of concern reported by RBs over this period was the 
difficulty British families had with the cost of living and acquiring sufficient food 
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and clothing. By March 1948 it was reported that "the attitude of German born 
wives in NAAFI shops does not enhance the German in the eyes and hearts of a 
large section of the British Married Community."311 It was suggested that 
complaints by German born wives regarding the quality and quantity of goods 
available to them as wives of British subjects were not appreciated.312 
Particularly after the currency reform in June 1948, shortages gradually ceased 
to be as prominent a problem for Germans but the British standard of living 
remained the same. In March 1949, British rations were still drawing a significant 
number of complaints. The British were forbidden to purchase food in German 
markets which in some areas had fresh fruit and vegetables that were not 
available in NAAFI shops. NAAFI supplies were much restricted in comparison 
and prices were higher.313 
In other areas of life, foreign-born wives found that while many benefits 
accrued to them as wives of British subjects, this was not true across the board. 
For example, welfare, canteens, clubs, leave centres and messes were available 
only to relatives and friends of British nationality. On the positive side, 
recreational transport was available to all new families on the same basis as 
those already under Operation Union and families of any sort were eligible for the 
use of Operation Union educational facilities whether living in quarters or not. 
This was decidedly an advantage for German women and their children for whom 
educational facilities through the German system were still extremely limited. 
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With regard to the employment of enemy or ex-enemy wives, if she had been 
employed before marriage by any German civilian firm, she must stop upon her 
marriage. Children of such a wife who were not of British nationality could 
continue to be employed in such circumstances, their social insurance and 
accident insurance would continue to be paid, and they would continue to have 
access to Service medical treatment. Clothing coupons were available to foreign 
born wives after they had received their British passport which was a rather 
longer period of time after the implementation of the 1948 Nationality Act. 
Children of British nationality were eligible for clothing coupons, others were not 
(illegitimate children or children of previous marriages).314 Clothing was a 
sensitive issue because it was in short supply especially for children and babies. 
The forbidding of a clothing ration to children of former marriages clearly created 
divisions between groups. Lastly, identity documents were issued in the case of 
the wife, but not the children. The children continued to use their German identity 
documents (Ausweis) which were endorsed (in both English and German) by the 
CO and identified the father's rank and serial number. The wife's illegitimate 
children or those of former marriages had to be verified with a Birth Certificate.315 
The same pattern applied to claims of marriage allowance and children's 
allowance. Although a wife became immediately eligible for marriage allowance, 
the method of payment of these allowances depended on the specific 
circumstances of the officer or soldier and his wife: whether or not she was able 
to get NAAFI supplies, and where she was living including in what country, with 
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him or not, or at his duty station or not. Children of the British father were eligible 
for allowance but the question of whether or not children of a previous marriage 
who were not British subjects would be covered had been referred to the WO. If 
the husband had been discharged and gone ahead of her to the UK she could 
continue to get marriage allowance for the same six weeks as rations. Payment 
for the non-Operation UNION people was made in Reichsmarks and 
Deutschmarks after June 1948 since these wives were not eligible for NAAFI 
shops. Remittances in cases where the husband and wife were legally separated 
were the same for Operation Union and non-Operation Union although they were 
exceedingly complicated depending on whether he was an officer or an OR and 
whether or not he had been discharged and returned to the UK. This no doubt 
made for a lengthy process of sorting through what resources she was going to 
have to support her family. If the husband had been discharged, neither he nor 
his family was any longer the responsibility of HM Government which left the (ex) 
wife unsupported since there was no means of sending money to Germany.316 
Redundant members of CCG were permitted to stay in Germany until their 
marriage had taken place, provided that this did not delay their return to the U.K. 
past the date of final termination and this could not be changed for any reason. 
This was the case no matter whether the application to marry was made before 
or after the notice of redundancy. They were assured, however, that every effort 
would be made to ensure that the process was carried out as speedily as 
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possible.317 Again, this potentially created many daily difficulties for the wife or 
fiancee if she remained in Germany. Although it was policy to send wives to the 
UK with their husbands on his discharge, there were sometimes personal 
reasons such as aging parents that were dependent on her or children who could 
not easily obtain visas.318 If she remained in Germany she reverted to the 
German civil economy and became the responsibility of the German authorities. 
This in itself created potential problems for her as cases were reported where the 
German authorities had refused food and accommodation to women in this 
situation.319 
We do not know exactly how many women experienced these kinds of 
difficulties because the surviving documents are so inconsistent. What does 
remain allows some glimpses into their situation. In Niedersachsen in the first six 
months of 1948, again most of the applications to marry came from service 
personnel rather than civilians although it is important to note that not all 
marriages that occurred were officially approved. A total of 227 service personnel 
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and only 82 civilians applied to marry German women. In the situations in 
which a marriage was not officially sanctioned, the marriage was often not legal 
or presented some other difficult circumstance for one or both of the persons 
concerned. Mrs. Elizabeth Sandy discovered two years into her marriage, and 
after she had moved with her husband to Nottingham, that her marriage was in 
fact invalid. She and Joseph Sandy were married in August 1947 by Major D.W. 
Basset even though the proper forms were not completed. What Mrs. Sandy 
thought was a marriage certificate was actually a form used by appointed 
Officers to notify HQ 2nd Echelon of any marriage which they had performed, and 
was also incomplete. Nevertheless, Private Sandy had been paid married 
allowances up to his demobilization. Mrs. Sandy was compelled to look into the 
situation when her husband informed her that the ceremony was invalid and he 
proposed to marry another woman.321 
In another, similar situation, a Mrs. Elizabeth Henton was married to 
Kenneth Henton on 29 November 1947 by a British Chaplain at the Protestant 
Church in Bonn under the FMA. He returned to the UK in January 1948 and she 
followed him on an Emergency Certificate from the Consulate in Hamburg. She 
was subsequently given a British passport. On the 14 August 1948, Mrs. Henton 
returned to Germany "for compassionate reasons" on a Military Entry Permit that 
expired on the 3 September. Mrs. Henton apparently did not plan on returning to 
England and married a German man on 2 October. Since her first marriage was 
320
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not performed at a Standesamt, it was not legal in Germany and she was free to 
remarry. From the perspective of the Legal Department, once she was remarried 
she was again a German national (in fact she had not ever ceased to be) and 
she could not be prosecuted for remaining after her entry permit had expired 
(illegal residence in the British Zone) nor for giving false information when 
applying for her second marriage (she described herself as single and used her 
maiden name). Mr. Henton's only recourse was to apply for a divorce.322 
Issues surrounding German women marrying British personnel remained 
into the 1950's, although the political focus was slightly altered. When the 
CCG(BE) became officially the High Commission for Germany at the passing of 
the Basic Law, the whole bureaucracy had shrunk to the point that there were 
many fewer positions where employees married to foreign-born wives could be 
accommodated.323 Furthermore, after May 1950, no candidate was posted to the 
German Section (FO) or the Commission if they were married to a woman of 
German, Austrian or "of certain Eastern European origins."324 It is not entirely 
clear why this position was taken. As one official in the COS noted, this seemed 
to conflict with the High Commissioner's latest view that "all of us here should 
begin to regard the Germans as potential allies."325 Warning was also given to 
existing permanent civil servants that they would be moved to another 
322
 Report by British Consulate-General, Diisseldorf, 14 February 1949. FO 372/6747. 
323
 Personal Administration Branch Instruction No. 75, 20 March, 1951, "Marriage of 
CCG Civilians to Persons of other than British Nationality at Birth," FO 1035/22. 
324
 Letter by W.H. Hornby, Official Side Secretary, Foreign Office (German Section), 
Norfolk House, Room 608, St. James's Square, SW 1 to "Mr. Chandler", 4 May 1950. 
FO 1014/325. 
325
 Letter by L.L. Wansbrough-Jones, Office of the Chief of Staff to G.D. Kirwan, Foreign 
Office, Norfolk House, London, 11 October 1950. FO 1035/22. 
143 
Government department if they chose to marry a woman of one of these 
nationalities.326 Permission for exceptions was given in some cases and 
redundancy pay given in others. Some officers resigned freely and others were 
dismissed.327 In contrast, in cases where marriages to "Germans and other 
foreigners" were approved, it was agreed to discontinue medical and security 
clearances except in special cases.328 The COS's office was particularly keen to 
publish the instruction to this effect to decrease the amount of work required of 
the Legal staff but also to stop the use of "such terms as "enemy" and ex-enemy" 
which, even if legally correct, are no longer appropriate."329 Unfortunately, not 
everyone agreed. 
The positions within the High Commission/Control Commission that were 
excluded were often controversial. For example, the British Civil Police was one 
of the excluded positions and Police Constable Hinkinson wrote to the CAO in 
February 1951 to request that this be looked in to. He stated that he had been 
"engaged to a very fine German lady, for a period of almost 5 years, and 
naturally, both my fiance and myself, think it about time we were getting 
married."330 He pointed out that other temporary civil servants who he felt were in 
more responsible positions had been allowed to marry Germans for some time. 
As examples he cited "Mail & Message, and Central Registrys [sic], both 
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Unclassified, and Classified" and compared these to his own position which he 
stated was that of a building security guard.331 
The situation of female members of the CCG(BE) was different than their 
male counterparts. Women who wished to marry a person of enemy or ex-enemy 
nationality or birth were always required to leave the CCG(BE) no matter their 
position by the date of marriage. If the woman concerned wished to continue to 
be employed, she could be returned to the Home Civil Service not later then the 
date of marriage. It was recognized that she might also wish to resign and remain 
in Germany. Temporary employees who wished to resign on marriage were to 
give at least a month's notice. If this was not done, they would be terminated as 
of the date of marriage "or from such date as the marriage is reported or [came] 
to light." If they wished to stay in Germany after marriage and to continue to be 
employed by CCG, they would have to do so under the "conditions applicable to 
the employment of German nationals," and would apply through the local Civil 
Labour Employment office. It was sometimes possible to transfer from the "British 
Establishment" to the "German Establishment" and arrangements were made 
through Establishment Branch. If these women wished to return to the UK 
immediately they were entitled to a free passage on the same basis as 
discharged men. If they elected to remain in Germany they relinquished "all claim 
to repatriation at public expense."332 
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Two additional issues that remained for German women marrying British 
men involved the order of marriage ceremonies and the retention of their own 
nationality. The arguments concerning the order of the Standesamt and religious 
ceremonies was a purely legal concern but created more difficulty and stress for 
those who were attempting to be married. The more serious issue for the women 
was the confusion centering on her nationality after marriage. Changes to the 
British Nationality Act (BNA) and the subsequent implementation of the Basic 
Law meant that at times, her nationality was at question. These two matters were 
also connected, creating even more confusion for the marriage participants, 
particularly the German woman. 
The question of the order of ceremonies was debated throughout 1949, 
1950 and 1951. One predominant legal opinion stated that since a marriage 
celebrated under the FMA 1947 was not one that would be valid in Germany, the 
German civil marriage must occur first.333 A Standing Order (SO) to this effect 
was issued in January 1950.334 Unfortunately, many Standesamt officials refused 
to solemnize such marriages on the grounds that they were not permitted to 
marry members of BAOR and Germans until the marriage had been solemnized 
by a British authority.335 In contrast, other marriage ceremonies appear to have 
taken place before the correct documentation had been received by the 
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applicants. This was done reportedly with the intention of preventing any record 
of illegitimacy of children since it was apparently very difficult to have a child re-
registered as legitimate.336 In yet another scenario, although by 1950 German 
women were no longer required to have security clearances, they were still 
required to arrive at the Consular ceremony with a "Free to Marry" certificate from 
the Standesamt. As the Legal Advisor to the Commissioner commented, while 
this regulation may have been justified when the British ceremony occurred first, 
by June 1950 "it [seemed] rather idiotic to demand a "Free to Marry" certificate 
from a person who can produce a Marriage Certificate."337 This was made all the 
more confusing by the fact that the WO had apparently issued an order in July 
1949 stating the necessity of ensuring that the German ceremony was performed 
first and that the re-marriage at a Consulate was clearly not legally necessary.338 
Consular re-marriages remained available for religious reasons and to facilitate a 
marriage by a British authority.339 This procedure was also believed to allow 
easier registration of the marriage in England, even though this could 
theoretically be done at that point with a copy of the marriage certificate from the 
Standesamt.340 Although the occupation bureaucrats did their best to put a 
standard in place that everyone would follow, many couples found their way 
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around the regulations. It seems clear that there was no standard of marriage 
between British men and German women and many different circumstances 
dictated where and how a marriage ceremony (or two) may have taken place, 
and how it was registered. 
Further debate centered on whether the British consul was even legally 
able to marry the couple after they had first been married in the Standesamt. 
During 1948 German women lost their German nationality on marriage, but they 
did not automatically acquire British nationality and were actually stateless for a 
period of time. Their status was determined by the marriage certificate and 
application forms for UK citizenship. After the German Basic Law came into force 
on 23 May, 1949, the woman concerned did not automatically lose her German 
nationality.341 At that point, she actually had a choice. During 1949 the Germans 
did not yet have a mechanism in place to ensure that women knew about this 
situation and so the FO took steps to make it part of the marriage in the 
Consulate. Consuls were directed to explain the position with regards to 
nationality to the woman before celebrating the re-marriage and ask her to 
declare whether or not she wished to lose her German nationality. If she chose to 
keep her German nationality, the re-marriage could not occur because Consuls 
were not allowed to marry a British national and a German national.342 If she 
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chose to apply for British citizenship the re-marriage could occur after she had 
been registered as a British subject.343 
In the end, the ability of German women to remain German and still marry 
a British man was no doubt a benefit. It is doubtful that this was the motivation for 
these changes. In fact, all of the constrictions regarding marriage, children, 
families and rations, appear to have had the purpose of simply doing what was 
possible to regulate these areas of people's lives. The attempt to control private 
space by administrative means, combined with the vagueness of the structural 
developments of occupation, created some very unsatisfactory situations. The 
rules of engagement and marriage were created so haphazardly at times that 
they contradicted each other. In addition, in a world where cold war issues were 
linking the western allies, German women continued to be treated as enemies. 
While it is clearly the case that by 1949 the Federal Republic was becoming 
increasingly independent, the occupation was still very much in evidence. The 
relationship between the two could not be predicted on the ground level any 
more then it was on a diplomatic level. While the direction and growth of the 
Federal Republic was controlled and directed as much as possible and to a 
significant degree by the victors, it was not a well-planned process. Furthermore, 
the degree to which many social issues, such as marriage, were determined by 
legal experts is remarkable. The British bureaucracy that saw German women as 
enemies did its best to work within the confines of the German legal system and 
used German resources such as legal and civil services and the police to assist 
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in the regulation of marriage. Other German resources such as the police were 
used to control more public areas of life as well, as will be made even clearer in 
the next chapter. 
The political and social tensions created by the effort to enforce the many 
marriage restrictions were symptomatic of the relative position of German women 
and British occupiers. Although marriage to Germans was eventually approved, 
despite the remaining enmity between the two groups, the rules proscribing such 
marriages were a product of a British perception of gender as it related to the 
defeated Germans. The next chapter will illustrate this as well in a discussion of 
the many ways that German women were labeled and treated as prostitutes. The 
extraordinary degrees of invasiveness to which German women were subjected, 
including a medical examination regardless of age or sexual history is 
remarkable for what it indicates concerning women's experiences in the 
movement from war to peace and the social markers of that process. 
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Chapter 6: Venereal disease and the "promiscuous patronage of street 
prostitutes" 
In November 1944, when plans were made for the movement and control 
of Allied troops into Germany, a number of regulations were made concerning a 
ban on any contact with the defeated German population. At that time, Andrew 
Clark in the legal division of CCG(BE) expressed his opinion that "a large body of 
troops and civilians cannot be expected to live a life of enforced celibacy and 
unless some arrangements are made to address this issue the result will be the 
most dangerous of all forms of fraternization, promiscuous patronage of street 
prostitutes."344 Clark was addressing an already heightened concern regarding 
the increasing rate of venereal disease (VD) among the troops and, although 
prostitution remained a central focus, there were many factors that contributed to 
this situation. As the fraternization ban failed socially and politically so it also 
failed to have any impact on the VD rate, which continued to climb through the 
first years of the occupation to reach unprecedented levels. The British 
occupation was characterized by a perceived need to protect British personnel 
from VD. This attempted protection took several forms, the most prominent of 
which was directed at controlling the actions of German women. There were 
several groups involved in the attempt to control the situation and the women, 
including lawyers, doctors, CCG authorities, the German police, and the British 
army. 
The image of German women as "Veronika Deutscher" does not appear to 
have been as well established in the British popular imagination as it was in the 
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American. Advertisements depicting naive American soldiers and worldly, 
seductive, "evil" German women waiting to take advantage of them are 
overwhelmingly familiar. Although this image was constructed slightly differently 
for British soldiers it was still intended to make German women look evil and 
dangerous. These images changed slightly in the post-hostility period, 
particularly after the fraternization ban was lifted, but the "Veronikas" have 
attained the status of mythologized sex fiends. The reality of the occupation was 
quite different. It was not a sex fest for well-fed, big-bosomed women "on the 
make" for attractive occupation soldiers. There was a significant amount of 
prostitution, but it was not glamorous and it was not a game. Many women's lives 
and the well-being of their families depended on their relationships (of whatever 
sort) with the power holders. Furthermore, some of what was considered immoral 
behaviour by prudish British and American standards was socially acceptable by 
European standards, though it created conflict between the groups. MG (Military 
Government) commanders complained that German girls were bathing in the 
rivers in hot weather, some topless. In addition, the women apparently chose "the 
same time and place to disport themselves on the riverbanks in bathing 
costumes." This was considered to be a "direct challenge to the resolve of British 
soldiers" and methods of restricting this behaviour were being considered.345 
Since many people were still living in places without water, bathing in a river was 
a fairly obvious alternative. The fact that the women were not clothed according 
to military preference no doubt created difficulty for the authorities who were 
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trying to keep the populations apart. It is interesting that the suggested solution 
involved making the women change their behaviour rather then expecting the 
men to be able to control themselves, speaking once again to gender 
i 
conventions. 
The pursuit of women infected with VD was expected by the authorities to 
follow known methodologies including "identifying and disposing of GERMAN 
i 
[sic] women."346 This did not, however, work as intended since any number of 
i 
the women concerned were relatively or absolutely homeless and may or may 
not have been living in something that qualified as a building corresponding with 
an address where they could be found. It is difficult to know how they were to be 
tracked down or what punishment was related to. Nevertheless, if they had a 
venereal disease they were considered a danger to the troops. In fact, the 
treatment and welfare of these women was delegated to the German authorities 
who were predictably short of money, drugs and facilities. Concern for the army 
and the performance of soldiers was understandably the British priority and, 
while it would have been very difficult to make an argument for British financial 
support of VD treatment for German civilians, this situation did leave the British in 
a position where they were relying on the Germans to assist in protecting British 
personnel. German authorities no doubt had their own reasons for wanting a 
healthy population and it is also the case that treatment of tuberculosis and other 
diseases required an equally significant effort. 
The basic administrative structures regarding Public Health (PH) and VD 
were in place when the BAOR moved into Germany as the problem of troop 
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behaviour regarding prostitution was more clearly anticipated than other issues 
such as marriage. The central structure involved PH acting as a technical advisor 
to Public Safety (PS) with regard to prostitution and having general supervision of 
civilian VD clinics.347 Once again, however, the enormity of the task in a 
completely destroyed Germany had not been realistically anticipated and coping 
with the situation became a much greater problem then anyone wanted. 
Controlling prostitution, for example, was expected to be a police responsibility 
but it had not been anticipated that the German police would have to be 
completely rebuilt and were not able to undertake this task immediately. Given 
the destruction and the difficulties faced by both the German police and PS as 
described in chapter one, it is clear that controlling prostitution was going to be 
an enormous task. Additionally of course, prohibiting prostitution had the same 
effect as prohibiting fraternization and since the troops and employees of the 
CCG refused to acknowledge and obey the prohibition, it was largely ineffective. 
Procedures regarding reporting both prostitutes and VD were in place but the 
volume of cases appeared to the MG to require extraordinary measure at some 
points. 
The pattern of identification, treatment and punishment of infected women 
was set out in May 1945 and medical officers identifying VD cases were 
instructed to follow the same procedures as had been used in Belgium. 
Appropriate forms were to be filled out and forwarded to the mayors 
{Burgermeister) who were to be responsible for controlling their own populations 
and were expected to treat the women, report them to the MG, which would 
347
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charge them if appropriate, and remove them "from the district to an area not 
frequented by troops." It was noted that under German law, "it is illegal for a 
woman to act as a prostitute unless she is registered as one and undergoes 
regular medical inspections." In contrast, soldiers were guaranteed that no 
action would be taken against them, even when it was clear that they had been 
exposed to infection from more than one woman. This was considered "essential 
to ensure that pro-formas are truthfully completed." It was noted, however, that a 
soldier could still be charged with fraternization if there was evidence from other 
sources.348 An attempt was made to control troop behaviour by putting brothels 
out of bounds and announcing that any British troops found in them would be 
arrested. Brothel areas were to be patrolled by both Provost and German police 
and the Provost was to take action against any British offenders. Senior Military 
authorities were to form "Watch Committees" to patrol public areas and deal with 
prostitution with the Burgermeister as well as local German police in attendance 
if required. The Watch Committees were to use their discretion to decide whether 
or not to establish them in areas frequented by displaced persons (DP's).349 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1945, PH and Public Safety (PS) 
struggled with the situation. In Berlin, which no doubt suffered the worst situation 
due to destruction and lack of security, it was estimated that there were 
approximately 10,000 registered prostitutes. It was thought that about 3,000 of 
these were having regular medical examinations and the other 7,000 were not 
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thought to be regular "street walkers" and were examined only periodically. This 
was the group that both the regular prostitutes in the town and the civil police 
wanted to get under more control since they were likely to be more diseased. It 
was noted in this PH report, in rather typical British style, that the "whole position 
as regards prostitution is somewhat out of hand at the moment." The situation 
was not likely to change, it was noted, until better police supervision occurred.350 
Also in July, PH noted that VD was rising despite a "generous issue of condoms 
and E.T. packets" and there was a shortage of drugs to treat it.351 
At that point, it was ordered that German women reported to have infected 
British personnel be admitted to a German VD hospital and to remain until testing 
and treatment was completed. The German Vice Squads were instructed to send 
women when picked up to be examined by the proper Health Authority and 
hospitalized if found infected. Further, "in cases of doubt, they are held in hospital 
for a period of 8 days and re-examined frequently. Thereafter being handled in 
the same way as those found infected in the first case. If found uninfected, they 
are turned loose." Repeat offenders were to be handled with special regulations 
since "it [was] an offence under German law for a woman who knows she is 
diseased to have connection with a man."352 Such a woman was tested daily for 
a week, and if her tests were all negative, she could be released. If the test was 
positive, she was forced to remain until treatment was completed. If the woman 
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had been identified by more then one soldier, even if her tests were negative, 
she would be treated as a clinical case.353 
Two examples of the types of detention facilities used were an asylum in 
Bonn and a reform school in Diisseldorf. In Bonn, a facility was required to hold 
and treat one hundred women and while it was stated that imprisonment was not 
the intention, it was considered absolutely necessary that the infected women 
had to be kept away from British troops. Unfortunately the only medically 
appropriate space available was a disused wing of local "lunatic asylum" and 
since even those only suspected of infecting British troops could be detained for 
ten days or so (until they had two negative smears and one negative Kahn test) it 
was no doubt traumatizing for many women. This "special wing," it was 
emphasized, was expressly for women who were known or suspected to have 
infected British troops and was not for all DP's or German women. Its stated 
purpose was to "safeguard British troops" and to discourage women from 
infecting the troops.354 
A report was also submitted on a visit to a reform school in Dusseldorf, 
called Christihilf. This school took girls ages fourteen to eighteen who were either 
Catholic or Jewish; it was noted that Protestants were sent to Dorotheeheim. 
Christihilf accommodated 160 girls, including 60 beds for VD patients. Twenty-
two of the beds were occupied at the time of the report. All of the girls were sent 
by the local PH office to which they were reported by the police. They were 
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examined on their arrival and if found to have VD, they were treated. The final 
test of cure was by spinal fluid. The education of all of the girls lasted two years 
at which time it was found that 60% had "improved". The remaining girls were 
sent back to their parents if possible or on to supervised employment. About 5% 
were found to be mentally ill and sent to hospital.355 There were in addition 15 
clinics aside from Christihilf and Dorotheeheim treating VD in Diisseldorf.356 
A memo from PH in August 1945 noted both a continuing shortage of 
medical supplies for civilians and the difference in treatment between German 
civilians and British personnel. Germans were treated for syphilis with salvarson 
bismostab preparations which required a 33 day stay in hospital and had a 12% 
relapse rate. British soldiers were treated with penicillin which required a 7 day 
treatment period with no relapses. Germans with gonorrhea were treated with 
Elindon, Ulivan or sulpha thiazole for 24 days in hospital and had a 12% relapse 
rate. British personnel were treated with one dose of penicillin and did not 
relapse.357 This was particularly relevant given that, in the same month the 
Oberprasident in Diisseldorf reported 401 new cases of VD, 89 men and 312 
women, mostly cases of gonorrhea.358 Added to this was the fact that treatment 
was more difficult for "patients who contracted gonorrhea in France since 
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Sulphamonide preparations are available over the counter and consequently this 
has become sulphamide resistant."359 
Although military commanders acknowledged the shortage of drugs and 
condoms, they continued to insist that infected women were not being "rounded 
up in anything like sufficient numbers" and that it was particularly important that 
infected women should be isolated and treated as quickly as possible.360 Major 
Keene, the Public Safety Officer (PSO) in Dusseldorf expressed some concern 
about the apprehension process and what he saw as the duties in this regard of 
the German Vice Squads. His view was that the most important fact to be 
considered in the control of the situation was the speed at which a report given 
by an infected man reached "the parties responsible for tracing and segregating 
the women...Every office through which a venereal disease proforma goes, adds 
to the delay and makes it more difficult to identify and apprehend the woman." 
He was additionally frustrated with the uncooperative attitude of the soldiers who 
in many cases did not seem to be able to give any detail as to "the appearance of 
the woman concerned." Added to this was the "apparent ignorance of the 
soldier in most cases of the place where the cohabitation took place and the 
name of the woman with whom he cohabited." He suggested that Units be 
lectured by their MOs as to the importance of this information so that the 
"offending woman may be picked up as quickly as possible." He remarked that 
this worked very well in Belgium and resulted in a "very large increase in the 
359
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number of women identified and treated." He therefore proposed a more 
streamlined process by which the identifying information could be handled more 
efficiently. 
One such measure was that the German Vice Squads should submit 
weekly reports to their Military Government Detachments (MGDs) and then the 
Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal (DAPM) would forward a detailed report giving 
the woman's aliases, her proper name and address and identity card number to 
the Assistant Provost Marshall (APM). He would maintain a card index and thus 
be easily able to identify repeat offenders.361 Although this appeared to be a 
rather lengthy bureaucratic path, it did cut out the necessity of the Vice squads 
reporting to PH and then the MGDs. 
By August, 1945 Major Keene was only one of many concerned about this 
issue. Public Health issued a long document to all MGDs confirming that the 
increase in the incidence of VD was "heavy" and necessitated "the strongest 
possible action." A new scheme had recently been prepared that addressed 
several ongoing issues. It began by reinforcing the need for forced hospitalization 
of offending women and included more specific treatment details including the 
prohibition of vaginal douching while testing was undertaken (a practice at the 
time for preventing pregnancy). PH reiterated the fact that the pro-formas were a 
particularly important part of the process but had nothing to say concerning how 
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to motivate the soldiers to report. PH planned to rely more heavily on the German 
Civil Police for apprehension of suspected women.362 
One of the more prominent difficulties with motivating soldiers in this 
respect was imbedded in army regulations quite apart from the specific situation 
in Germany. When a soldier was identified as having a venereal disease, his pay 
was reduced. The immediate result was that his condition became common 
knowledge but it also affected his family since it meant a reduction in the amount 
paid to his wife. It was understood that the reduction in pay reflected the soldier's 
reduced ability but it remained a controversial element, particularly for the officers 
commanding units who routinely disagreed with the procedure.363 This penalty 
was eliminated in 1947 after an official paper was produced on the subject and 
for a number of reasons, including bringing the army in line with other services. It 
was also considered unfair to punish soldiers in this manner since "quite a 
number of soldiers join the Service already infected and it is regrettable that a fair 
number have caught the disease from their wives."364 The misogynism in this 
statement is striking in the absence of any hard evidence. 
Notwithstanding efforts taken to increase reporting by British personnel, 
pressure continued on German authorities to increase efforts to identify the so-
called amateur prostitutes and stop them. German health officials for their part, 
held their own conferences and took measures to treat their population. For 
362
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example, a conference of German government officials held in Diisseldorf in 
September that included the Regierungsprasidenten from Aachen, Diisseldorf 
and Cologne, delegates of the Landsversicherungsanstalt Diisseldorf, and 
representatives of the Landesfursorgeverband confirmed many of the British 
operating principles. It was recognized and agreed for example that the 
Gesundheitsamt (Health Office) was the "statutory health authority" in the fight 
against VD and was also the "advisory bureau" (Beratungsstelle) for VD. The 
other important agreement was that this aspect of the work of the 
Gesundheitsamt was recognized as central and important to the 
Landsversicherungsanstalt (State Insurance Agency). No doubt its resources 
were insufficient and tuberculosis and other diseases were just as high a priority 
for the German population and killing more people365. 
They also felt compelled to insist that their experience had shown that 
successful tracing of subjects could only be maintained if professionalal 
confidentiality was maintained. They observed that, at that time, tracing of 
sources was at 15%, but that it could be raised to 40% with "suitable 
organization." One organizational change recommended was that the 
Beratungsstelle be organized at the district (Kreis) level rather than larger, more 
centralized arrangements, which had been found to be ineffective. 
More importantly they insisted that information concerning the illegal 
prostitution of so called respectable girls, citizens or housedaughters could not 
be obtained. The German committee members described the situation in terms of 
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"constantly changing sex relations reminding their occupiers that the social 
situation was more complex than straight forward." They saw its cause as 
"sometimes economic need, usually however it is the desire to obtain luxuries 
such as good food, cigarettes, tea, coffee, chocolate etc." This was therefore not 
prostitution in their view. It was their opinion that therefore no success could be 
seen from police raids and that detailed careful inquiry by the health officers 
would be more productive. They recommended that lists of infected people from 
the hospitals and doctors should be forwarded to the Beratungsstelle on a weekly 
basis so that appropriate action could be taken in a timely manner. The reporting 
form was to continue to give as much detail as possible including a 
comprehensive physical description, particularly where the patient refused to give 
a name. In addition, information was requested from the patient regarding the 
place, time and circumstances of the act of intercourse, and the profession or 
other identification of the person responsible for the source of infection.366 
It is notable that statistics received by the military government show that 
the numbers of women charged with prostitution were relatively low compared to 
the number of women identified with the disease and the statistics were 
sometimes misleading. For example, in the week ending 27 October 1945, 44 
pro-forma were received, 43 persons were traced, 41 persons were sent to 
hospital and only 1 was charged with prostitution. For the week ending 29 
September, 34 pro-forma were received, 39 persons were traced and 40 sent to 
hospital, suggesting some overlap with previous weeks in terms of tracing and 
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hospitalization. During that week only 10 women were arrested for prostitution. 
That is the highest number in any week from 22 September 1945 through to 1 
April 1946. The average number per week, according to this report, was 4.4.367 
This is particularly remarkable given the continued insistence on prostitution as 
responsible for the infection of British personnel. 
The number of persons identified with the disease also requires 
examination. "Relapse" for example, was found to be a somewhat inaccurate 
category, since in many cases no test of cure was performed. Public Health 
confirmed in September that tests of cure were confined to a "limited sector of 
the community", those who were "social insurance cases." It was also noted that 
prior to the MG taking over, private practitioners were only required to report 
cases of VD which were known if the person had not appeared for treatment. The 
MG changed this law, however, so that all cases were to be reported at 
identification. Since "cures" were still not reported by private practitioners it was 
acknowledged that the increased VD rate "must to a certain extent be regarded 
as apparent rather than real, due to improvements in notification."368 
Despite this analysis on the part of PH, German women continued to be a 
focus of complaint for the military. In November 1945, 30 Corps published a 
notice referencing "Ordinance 1 Sec. 43" stating: 
It is an offence to communicate any Venereal Disease to any 
member of the Allied Forces. 
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A woman who commits this offence is liable to be prosecuted under 
Ordinance 1 Sec. 43. The maximum punishment is imprisonment for life. 
BY ORDER OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT.369 
The notice was issued by 30 Corps apparently without consultation and caused 
"innumerable queries and objections" by both Legal and PH. This was in part 
because PH's job was the control and treatment of VD among the German 
population as the occupying forces were the responsibility of the Army. This 
action by 30 Corps brought the two factions into the now familiar pattern of 
conflict regarding the resolution of issues affecting both parts and determining 
the style of the occupation. The concern of the legal division in this instance 
involved the discrepancies between regions since each one had its own military 
commander which Legal was working to bring into line with zonal policy. The 
specific legal issue was very narrowly defined and concerned whether or not 
knowledge of having the disease was relevant in such cases, and since the 
ordinance did not forbid the act of intercourse, could a woman be prosecuted if 
she knew she had VD but did not give it to the soldier. Furthermore, it was 
difficult to imagine how a conviction would be secured without calling the soldier 
to identify the woman and stating that he himself had VD which violated the 
confidential character of the treatment program.370 PH particularly objected to this 
implication because they were experiencing difficulty with the pro-formas in any 
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case and additionally supported the Legal Division's objections since their job 
was made that much more difficult when zonal policy was undermined by 
regional variation in policy. 
PH was also satisfied with existing German law which provided for 
prosecution if the woman knew she had VD and covered anyone who was 
ordered to undergo treatment and did not.371 Legal division pointed out that it was 
possible to punish women for the communication of VD in any case since Sec. 
43 stated that anyone could be prosecuted who had committed "an act to the 
prejudice of good order or of the interests of the Allied Forces or any member 
thereof and that while the notice of 30 Corps was "correct," the court might well 
require proof which again violated zonal VD policy. Apparently the main 
difference between 30 Corps' notice and German law (section five of the Gesetz 
zur Bekampfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten 1927) was that under German law 
prosecution could only be initiated on the complaint (Antrag) of the person who 
contracted the disease.372 
The final word was given by Health Branch, IA&C division, whose opinion 
was that the Ordinance would fail for several reasons. First, it was inequitable, in 
that it sought to heavily punish one party while the other, the British soldier, "is, 
as a matter of policy exempt from any punishment." Further, British troops would 
371
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be reluctant to give any knowledge of their partner when they knew she would be 
so severely punished. Most importantly, it would undermine the "already shaky 
foundation in law of the proforma system" since in the end, it is his word against 
hers." According to Health Branch, the rules of British public health law had 
already been "undermined" in Germany since in Britain, the Medical officer of 
Health was required to have two identifications of a person before treatment 
could be ordered and even then the order required the signature of a VD 
specialist, if it concerned a member of the Armed Forces. Because of the 
situation in Germany, this had been amended but "invidious comparisons" 
between CCG policy and that of H.M. Government at home were thought best 
avoided by any attention to the matter. Policy in Germany, it was suggested, 
might not "stand critical scrutiny at home." lA&C's conclusion was that 30 Corps' 
notice had to be repealed and they were satisfied that in view of the "recently 
issued Instruction No. 11 Mil Gov [sic] ordering the reporting of fresh cases and 
notification of name of sources of infection and defaulters from treatment, 
together with administrative measures shortly to be issued in consultation with 
the German Advisory Committee on Public Health...there will be no necessity for 
any such measure."373 Thus PH was able to reassert its claim to authority on 
what was supposed to be its area of expertise. 
An exchange between the Controller General of IA&C, R. Boucher, and 
Major General Balfour, Chief of IA&C, demonstrates both the military perspective 
on the running of the occupation and the CCG(BE) perspective, as well as 
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individual differences in style. Boucher's letter expressed his feeling of being 
"seriously disturbed" at the action of 30 Corps and his belief, based on past 
experience, that this would only drive the disease underground. He argued that 
while he knew that the Germans had made a similar change to their law, it was 
far too early to know what the result would be, and he suspected it would not 
meet their expectations.374 In addition, 30 Corps was apparently "told it was a 
purely Mil Gov [sic] affair" and the CC's (CCG's?) role was never entirely clear to 
the military as regards their own troops. Furthermore, the Director of Medical 
Services stated that he was "not greatly concerned with the German's legal 
rights" but was clearly in favour of anything that will help with the VD situation 
and agreed that the Ordinance would not have the desired effect.375 A few days 
later the office of the Deputy Military Governor informed the Director of Medical 
Services (DMS) that the Ordinance in question [had] been unconditionally 
withdrawn bringing 30 Corps into line with the rest of the zone.376 
By the spring of 1946, efforts were underway to create a British style 
public health system. In April the WO approved penicillin for treatment in all 
cases of gonorrhea (MG Instruction No. 60) and at the same time more effort 
was made to convince the German population that treatment at a hospital was 
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preferable to seeing a doctor privately. On one hand, this is openly discussed by 
the CC authorities as a move to a more open system.377 On the other hand, 
although not explicitly stated, due to the shortage of penicillin, it was also the only 
logical way to approach the problems of both the equitable distribution and 
sulpha-resistant strains. The German Advisory Committee (Beratungsstelle) 
realized that this would require more clinics than Instruction No. 60 provided for 
and decided to prepare area-specific reports which were sent to the PHO at 
regional HQ. It was part of the stated policy of Public Health Branch (PHB), 
IA&C,"to bring about a state of affairs in which the German civilians become 
habituated to the idea of having V.D. treatment at treatment centres sited in 
suitable, preferable general, hospitals." PHB expected to staff such clinics with 
VD specialists who were to be "paid sufficiently well to compensate them" for the 
income they would lose through the reduced number of private patients. It was 
also anticipated that most Germans would want to be treated with penicillin rather 
then anything else and this would also encourage them to be treated at hospital, 
since that was the only place it would be legally available. Of course it was also 
assumed that this would give the German health care system more control over 
the VD situation "in a manner which has never before been attempted in 
Germany."378 
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One of the most controversial and criticized parts of the scheme to control 
VD were the raids on public places. Bars were raided, but also cafes and other 
leisure venues. Both the CC authorities and German police were involved in 
these activities, and eventually German women felt unsafe on the streets even 
during daylight, since they were routinely harassed and forcibly confined by VD 
patrols. An article in the Hamburger Volkszeitung entitled "Persecution of 
women" (Jagd auf Frauen) described the forcible transport of some women and 
girls to a VD centre to be examined (in this case Altona hospital). The women 
quoted in the newspaper were two of those released; one was taken on her way 
home from work and was released at 3:00 am and compelled to walk home. The 
newspaper article states that "[t]he population is exasperated by these measures, 
as only women and no men are being taken for inspection." More damagingly, 
the reporter relates the action of a British soldier who, after his two companions 
were taken away, walked over to a third woman and "laughingly discussed his 
present experience and was looking forward to a pleasant evening."379 
Other complaints from Hamburg include one from a local doctor, a teacher 
and a 20 year old woman. Dr. Albrecht, on behalf of the Hamburg Chamber of 
Doctors, expressed his concern to the MG stating that, as well as the raids 
having upset people in general, they had also "seriously disturbed the nervous 
system of many a young girl." It was his opinion that it was "unbearable" that 
women at tram stops and well reputed restaurants were indiscriminately rounded 
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up. He related women having been taken away for examination even though their 
papers were in order and they were with their husbands. Apparently, the only 
reason to have suspected them at all was because they were in a cafe by a train 
station. Although a female police officer accompanied the British police, in the 
doctor's opinion the new women recently hired had very little experience and no 
power to oppose the male British police. In addition, he objected to juveniles 
being detained with older women particularly when no judgment was brought to 
bear on whether or not the young women or girls even required such an 
examination.380 
The teacher voiced similar complaints. He related an incident where some 
female students were apprehended on their way home, along with some other 
women who were standing on the same corner and were accompanied by 
German men who protested on their behalf. The students complained of being 
subjected to "an extremely unpleasant physical search and examination." They 
were released at 9:00 p.m. to return home on their own.381 This episode is similar 
to the experience of Ruth Brandt, twenty years old, who was apprehended on her 
way home from a dance at 9:15 in the evening in Blankenese. By her account 
she was driven to Dammtor to a hospital "bunker" and examined for VD. 
According to her testimony, when the women were leaving they had to "pass 
between a double row of British police and torches were flashed in the face of 
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each one of us." She was released at 1:00 a.m. and had to walk back to 
Blankenese. She also stated that there were no female police present.382 
When the doctor's complaint was initially received in August, the district 
Inspecting Officer (KIO) requested that the whole procedure be accomplished 
differently. He acknowledged that the women picked up by police were driven in 
open trucks and often stood in line for hours "with local prostitutes and harlots." 
He recommended closed trucks, only picking up women known to the police and 
that "women free from disease be returned to their homes by transport after 
Public Service Vehicles have ceased to function [and] that more discretion be 
used by Military Police."383 As a result of the complaints and recommendations, 
changes were recommended by the Deputy Provost Marshall (DPM) including 
avoiding the larger reputable cafes, and only apprehending those women 
identified by pro-forma, known prostitutes, women "obviously loitering for 
purposes of prostitution" or "in the company of British soldiers in circumstances 
giving rise to the probability of immoral purpose." The DPM felt that the 
resentment was better avoided but claimed that the system was working. In 
Hamburg in the previous three months, 742, 518 and 808 women had been 
checked and women found positive for VD were 113, 70 and 98 respectively.384 
Despite the assertion that overall this is 13.6% it also means that 710 women 
were "checked" for no reason.385 When the DPM received additional complaints 
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in December, he was reportedly "annoyed and deeply concerned" and re-issued 
the orders to stop the raids.386 The second order did have more effect but raids 
continued and remained controversial. 
The statistics regarding VD in 1946 vary widely between regions and 
Lander, both in numbers and in the manner in which they were reported although 
some comparisons can be drawn. Hannover reported an estimated 100,000 
cases of VD among DP's in August while other, smaller areas such as Minden, 
Detmold and Dusseldorf, reported lower overall statistics.387 The categories from 
Nord-Rhine Westfalen in one specific report allow a more detailed view since age 
groups are noted. For the week ending 22 November in Detmold, in the age 
category fourteen to twenty-one years, four cases of VD were reported, two 
syphilis and two gonorrhea. In the category "21+" years, eight women were found 
positive, three with syphilis and five with gonorrhea. For the week of 7 December, 
Minden reported twenty-one men with gonorrhea and eighteen with syphilis, and 
forty-five women with gonorrhea and thirty-one with syphilis. For the same week, 
the Dusseldorf report gives both age and gender categories reporting that one 
hundred eighty-nine women were reported to have VD, three under age fourteen 
and twenty-nine between fourteen and twenty-one. Of a total of two hundred and 
seven men reported positive, none were below age fourteen and seventeen were 
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one. Interestingly, the only category in 
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which syphilis was higher then gonorrhea was males, aged fourteen to twenty-
one.388 Possibly young men in this age group were more motivated to seek out a 
physician due to the more immediate symptoms of gonorrhea. 
In early 1946 a good deal of confusion remained and the debate 
concerning the number of prostitutes and where to lay responsibility for the rate 
of VD was unresolved. A report from Gunnersbach stated that VD was "rife 
amongst the local prostitutes... [and] 80% suffer from it. Cases amongst the 
troops, thanks to the continual lectures from the M.O. have declined."389 The PH 
department covering Oberbergischer Kreis reported that there were no registered 
prostitutes in their area. They also reported that "of the 'amateurs' reported as 
sources of infection, all have been examined either by order of Mil Gov Det [sic], 
German Police, or on the initiative of the P.H. Dept. [sic]...The result of most 
examinations was negative, and it is estimated that not more then 10% are 
suffering from V.D."390 
The main challenge for the occupation authorities in 1947 was the 
devolution onto the Lander governments of exclusive powers to legislate by MG 
Ordinance 57 (see chapter one) which meant in this instance that the German 
authorities were in charge of the VD and prostitution laws. This increased tension 
between occupied and occupier, particularly since individuals within PH and 
other departments were not ready to give up control over how VD was handled, 
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and control of the police remained with the MG. The British wanted raids to 
cease and VD to be seen as a social issue. The Germans favoured a more 
legalistic approach and thought raids were a good tool. Part of the argument 
however, clearly concerned what German women should or should not be 
allowed to do since some part of the debate concerned how much freedom 
should they have to negotiate their own treatment. For example, if a woman 
knew she had VD and would therefore be incarcerated until cured, she might 
prefer to begin treatment after she had negotiated childcare or any number of 
other daily responsibilities. A welfare worker might give her the time, the police 
probably not. The differences between the two groups on the approach to the 
problem were eventually worked out in various committee and conference 
settings involving many officials from both sides. Not surprisingly, none of the 
planning committees involved any of the women the rules were designed to 
control. 
Part of the difficulty between British and German health authorities in early 
1947 was the process of redefining the dynamics after Ordinance 57. For 
example, a coordinating committee (inter-zonal and inter-departmental) met in 
January to discuss a draft law regarding combating VD in Germany, even though 
at that point they did not have the legal power to pass a law. Hence the wording 
in the resulting report is very careful to make agreement in principle as clear as 
possible and to confirm the message that combating VD among the German 
population was not a suitable subject for CC legislation. At the same time a 
Directive (No. 52) rather than a law was signed in Berlin and a memo was sent to 
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all the Regional Commissioners requesting them to inform their "Minister 
President" to introduce new legislation in accordance with the new principles, 
suspending police raids and replacing them with a VD welfare system.391 
The principles of a system to replace raids and forced detention were 
discussed in July between a very broad group of CC and German 
representatives including PH, PS, Public Health & Welfare (PHW), a female 
police officer, a German Legal Advisor and other representatives from the 
Landesjugendamt und Sozialbehorde, and the German Board of Health. In the 
opinion of Dr. Lennox, the Principal Control Officer for PH and Chairman of the 
Committee, the discussion was "considerable and free" and it was agreed that 
VD should be entirely under the control of PH which in effect meant that 
physicians and hospital clinics treating VD could only do so with the approval of 
the Minister of Health. It was additionally agreed that the welfare department 
would be responsible for ensuring that identified subjects received treatment from 
a doctor. And although these treatment options were theoretically to be applied 
equally to men and women, the language betrays the prejudices of the system 
since both the welfare worker and the infected person were assumed to be 
female. "If she failed to [go for treatment] within 48 hours, the [treatment] clinic 
should report to the welfare organization [and] she should interview the girl and 
unless she then complied" the police should be authorized by welfare to arrest 
her.392 
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The German City Council (Burgerschaft), however, did not approve of this 
system and wanted the police involved from the beginning. To begin with, in the 
judgment of the Burgerschaft, anyone who had a venereal disease and did not 
present himself or herself for treatment was committing a crime that should be 
dealt with by the police. In addition welfare personnel were assumed to be 
women and viewed as having very little authority. The official statement was, "if 
female assistants of the Social and Youth Administration are engaged in [this 
process], it could, in view of the lack of authority of such personnel, be efficiently 
carried through only be [sic] means of Police assistance."393 Not surprisingly, PH 
disagreed, particularly Dr. Lennox.who suggested that the Burgerschaft was 
being undemocratic. He stated that he had "gone through a great deal of trouble 
to get VD welfare on its feet" and his opinion was that the main objection of the 
Burgerschaft was the expense of hiring the new welfare workers. Since in Dr. 
Lennox's opinion "the whole purpose of the Ordinance was to prevent too much 
power going to the police" and the purpose of the welfare system was "to give 
help to these delinquents in their unfortunate position" it would defeat the whole 
system if the police were allowed to have more jurisdiction.394 The official end 
statement on the question was Directive 52. Despite the fact that it was arrived 
at through a series of conferences organized by PH and included German 
representatives, it had still to be taken only as advice (even though this was 
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advice in the strongest terms) since Ordinance 57 conferred authority for legal 
decisions on the Lander government. Since the Burgerschaft and the Senate 
continued to oppose Directive 52 it was recommended that "further persuasion" 
be attempted through a conference called and chaired by the Regional 
Commissioner.395 
This additional meeting was duly held and the principles of Directive 52 
were generally agreed upon, although there were some additional suggestions. 
The Niedersachsen representatives proposed a Zonal Venereal Disease 
Committee (ZVDC) sub-committee to consider the comments and criticisms of 
the various Lander and then develop revised uniform legislation for the whole 
zone. It was presumed that the interests of British forces and CCG would be 
safeguarded by the fact that the Regional Commissioner still retained approval 
on legislation passed by Lander governments. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this meeting is the language of the 
Deputy Regional Commissioner (DRC), who chaired it and began with an outline 
of intent. The DRC, Mr. Dunlop, began by stating that the British PH authorities 
were convinced that a "proper solution" could only be obtained through a broad 
moral education (and therefore presumably the use of female welfare workers) 
and not through "technical, Police or medical precautions." Most notably, Mr. 
Dunlop attempted to reassure the group that neither the military nor the CC was 
any longer solely concerned with protecting soldiers from the effects of VD. They 
had developed a program principally concerned with "their education into the 
395
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conviction that a happy and satisfactory family life as husbands and fathers in the 
years to come could have its best and most sure foundation on a life of self-
control and fair living in the days of their youth." This was the new message that 
Commanders were passing on.396 
Furthermore, Mr. Dunlop assured the Burgerschaft of German men that 
"any suggestion of the right of a victor to express his victory in terms of 
possession of the bodies of German women is completely abhorrent to our 
British way of thought." There was also, however, the expectation that the 
Burgerschaft would assist in this endeavour by "securing among the German 
girls a standard of chastity and self-respect to match the ideals which we are 
trying to instill among our British soldiers." The British were well aware of the 
difficulties faced by German girls and women according to the DRC, particularly 
poverty, over-crowding and "lack of German men their own age." The situation of 
German women was being explained to British soldiers and it was hoped that this 
would assist in a change of attitude and behaviour. Mr. Dunlop did acknowledge 
that until this was accomplished, the technical measures were needed to prevent 
the spread of disease.397 
A number of additional inter-services VD committees were initiated at the 
same time, since the rate of VD within the whole of the British occupation force 
was considered to be alarmingly high. It was hoped that, if the problem was 
discussed from a multitude of perspectives, the behaviour of the force could be 
changed. These committees operated on a number of levels and included 
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representatives from the RAO, the Army and the CCG, Legal, PS, the Ministry of 
Labour, Reconstruction and Health, the Ministry of Health, and Ministry of the 
Interior from each of the Lander. They addressed a range of issues including 
loopholes in the identification system, condom distribution, treatment of infected 
persons and the situation of the German police. These committees met until the 
end of 1949 and are one signifier of the range of issues that required attention, 
and what changed and what did not. The minutes of these committees will be 
referenced. 
One of the first issues that the Zonal, Regional and Land Committees 
intended to address was the behaviour of service personnel and how to gain 
more control over their actions with regard to both the prevention and treatment 
of disease. Actions with this intention necessarily involved other groups of 
people, including German doctors and women who were just as often the object 
of control. Issues such as condom use and distribution did, however, get the 
attention of these prevention focused committees. In late 1947, condoms were 
available at the rate of one per week which was recognized at all levels as being 
inadequate for the circumstances.398 In addition, there was some suggestion that 
the condoms that were available were finding their way into the Russian zone 
and onto the Black Market.399 However, the Zonal committee disagreed with this 
and stressed that the Russians made their own and were not impinging on the 
supplies of other zones. It was estimated by this committee that the combined 
398
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requirements for the British and US zones was 36,000 gross per month and 
acknowledged that current production was at 8,022. It was doubted that even at 
capacity production enough condoms would be available.400 An additional 
obstacle was the attitude of the Catholic Church which was against any pressure 
on soldiers to use condoms.401 
Other measures to impose more direct control included suggesting that 
Forces Medical Services examine the men more frequently, particularly those 
who had suffered from VD previously.402 Soldiers could be charged if they failed 
to use a Prevention Ablution Center (PAC) after they had exposed themselves to 
the risk of infection. Visits to a PAC were recorded with the result that frequent 
users were ostracized and if later tested and found infected, were charged with 
failing to obey unit orders. A second charge made the soldier liable for Courts-
martial.403 Furthermore, some units took a social approach such as 2nd Infantry 
whose policy was intended to provide "the maximum possibly amenities inside 
bks [barracks] in order to lessen the desire to seek his amusements outside bks 
where he is subject to temptation....and it is hoped that his life in the British Army 
of the Rhine (BAOR) will be such a full one that he will have little desire to 
associate with undesirable women."404 Those who did go out of bounds were 
subject to disciplinary action and out-of-bounds cafes were checked by Watch 
Committees, although since there were not very many of these, the checks were 
400
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probably not all that frequent. In addition, German cafe owners were acted 
against if they served soldiers.405 
German doctors became the focus of scrutiny at some points and the 
various committees often disagreed concerning how to handle the situation. One 
of the loopholes in the system was that German doctors could treat service 
personnel and were not required to report having done so if the person 
concerned finished the necessary treatment,406 although the soldier could be 
convicted of concealing the disease, if he was caught.407 The Niedersachsen 
representatives recommended nevertheless that a zonal ordinance be created 
forbidding German doctors treating British service personnel. The Zonal 
committee rejected the idea as it felt the cooperation of German authorities was 
good and did not want to be too heavy handed.408 The Regional VD committee 
suggested that German doctors were giving negative certificates to women who 
were actually infected and that these doctors did not check the woman's identity 
carefully and infected women were sending replacements in for the test. There is 
no evidence supplied for this accusation but nevertheless a request was made 
for a Belgian or British doctor to attend exams to ensure they were done properly 
and that German doctors checked the identity of their patients.409 German 
doctors were a further focus for PH and its experts in the transition to the 
exclusive use of penicillin for the treatment of syphilis. It was recognized that the 
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traditional treatment for syphilis was limited in various respects, but the technique 
and application of penicillin was not proven to German doctors. PH was anxious 
for German doctors to cooperate with its use and appears to have provided 
additional information and training that made a great deal of difference during 
1949.410 
Useful statistics from this period can be found in comparative figures for 
Niedersachsen and the zone. During the first quarter of 1947 a total of 5,363 
people were treated for gonorrhea and 4,040 for syphilis. In the zone as a whole 
the numbers were 16,872 and 13,844 respectively. In the second quarter, slightly 
more information is available and it indicates that men were more commonly 
treated for gonorrhea and women for syphilis. Of a total of 5, 696 treated for 
gonorrhea, 3,028 were men and 2,668 were women. The total syphilis cases 
were 4,066 of which 1,723 were men and 2,343 were women. The statistics for 
the zone were 18,481 with gonorrhea and 13,338 with syphilis.411 The 
percentage of persons per 1,000 in Niedersachsen and the zone are very similar 
at 30 - 35/1,000 with gonorrhea and 23 - 25/1000 with syphilis. By 1948 this had 
dropped to 12.2/1,000 and 12/1000 respectively, and by 1949 to 9.1 and 7.2.412 
Throughout 1948, raids, the powers of the German police, and the women 
themselves remained the main focus of attack. Vice squads continued to work 
with the German police to track down women "suspected of infecting soldiers," 
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but legally the Police had no powers of arrest when VD was suspected. The 
authority to enforce compulsory examination and treatment rested solely with the 
Health Authorities as a result of Ordinance 57 and Directive 52. However, raids 
were still undertaken by the Police with or without British or Belgian Military 
Police but were supposedly more carefully carried out then had previously been 
the case including the fact that these forces only raided certain cafes and only 
arrested known women, those who appeared to be vagrant or those "whose 
appearance or the circumstances in which they are found give grounds for strong 
suspicion of their mode of life." Women who had not committed an offence, but 
were suspected of having VD because of their behaviour or appearance, were 
"directed" to attend a clinic for examination and the Health Office was notified.413 
This in itself presented some problems for the authorities, because 
vagrant women often had identity cards and since they could not therefore be 
arrested on the spot, were given a 48 to 72 hour notification to appear. The 
suspicion that such women sent another healthy woman to be examined and that 
German doctors did not do enough to check the woman's identity prompted the 
committee in Nord-Rhine Westfalen to recommend that some powers of arrest 
without warrant be given to police with regard to VD suspects so that this could 
be stopped. The committee was aware, however, of the dynamics with regard to 
the problem of the powers of the German police and therefore also 
recommended that these powers be outlined very carefully so that innocent 
people were not humiliated. In addition, they wanted it to be noted that men were 
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"just as serious a source of infection as women though this point is not often 
mentioned." Uniquely, they suggested that as living conditions improved, so 
would the VD rate. In their view, 
the root cause of the lowering of moral standards are the present 
conditions in Germany. Persons who normally would not think of it are 
drifting into immorality to obtain food, clothing and other extras. It is felt 
that if the cause were removed the effects would gradually disappear. This 
is, of course, an obvious truth.414 
It is noteworthy that food and clothing are listed with "other extras." 
The behaviour of certain groups of German women was a fairly constant 
focus for these committees. They discussed the many ways of defining women 
as prostitutes, charging them with solicitation and forcing them to undergo 
treatment and quarantine. By German law, identified women were to refrain from 
intercourse until a certificate of cure was obtained but some VD committees 
wanted this to be more stringent. The pro-forma filled in for PH records, stated 
that she must refrain from intercourse for six months but is unclear how this 
might be enforced. The Niedersachsen Minister of Health stated that every 
patient was given an information pamphlet and women under treatment were 
required to sign an undertaking that they would not cohabit until they had been 
certified as cured.415 At the Regional Committee meeting in February 1948, 
discussion ensued as to whether or not German police had the right to arrest a 
person suspected of soliciting. According to German law, the police had to have 
proof that it was for gain and, in the case of amateurs, this was not automatically 
clear since they were not regular prostitutes registered with the Health 
414
 Ibid. 
415
 Minutes of the Third Conference of Regional Standing Inter-Services VD Committee, 
Hannover, 13 January 1948. FO 1013/1932. 
185 
Authorities. The majority of amateurs was to be found loitering around train 
stations, dance halls or cinemas and this activity could not be proved to be 
habitual. This group of women were, however, considered to be prostitutes by 
the British and a greater source of VD then the professional prostitutes who 
reported twice weekly for examination.416 In one specific instance a Brigade 
Commander obtained lists of suspected infected women before a dance which 
was to be held in that area and the women whose names were on the list were 
turned away.417 
The available statistics for this period are thin but appear to indicate some 
success in the war against VD. In April 1948 VD among the troops in North-
Rhine Westphalia was reported to be twenty-five per week, down from fifty to 
sixty the previous August. At the same time rates of VD among the civilian 
population were stable. The ratio of infected men to women was reportedly 
2:3.418 In July this had dropped to 1:1, the rate per week among troops had 
dropped to twenty-one and cases among the civilian population had also 
dropped.419 In January 1949, the Minister of Health for Niedersachsen reported 
"rough figures" for syphilis and gonorrhea for 1947 at 18,000 and 24,000 
respectively, and for 1948 at 15,562 and 19.250.420 In April 1949, the rate of 
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disease among the DP population was determined to have dropped as well. In 
1948 the rate of syphilis was 4.7/1000 and gonorrhea was 6.4/1000. In the first 
quarter of 1949 these rates had dropped to 3.7/1000 and 3.8/1000.421 
By 1949, although controversy remained regarding raids, the degree of 
organization in combating VD was significant. The minutes of the Zonal Sub 
Inter-Services VD Committee held in June, show organized categories of 
concern and reporting structures from each Land. CCG Directive 52 and the 
progress on related Land legislation, action regarding "Notes for guidance in 
combating VD", VD propaganda films, VD rehab centres and the DP aspect were 
all reported on with each Land reporting improvement. It also appears that 
progress had been made regarding target groups and related problems. For 
example, it was confirmed that the VD rate in the DP population was consistently 
low and it therefore ceased to be a major target. At the same time it was 
discovered that cafes were kept open beyond legal closing because forces 
personnel refused to leave.422 The problems that remained concerned the shift of 
an additional level of responsibility to the German authorities with the 
promulgation of the Basic Law, and the resultant reordering of roles with regard 
to the civilian German population. 
In Niedersachsen, for example, a new law regarding prostitution and the 
apprehension and treatment of suspected VD carriers was a contentious process 
and the document was sent back and forth between the regional committee and 
421
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the Landtag several times. In the meantime, guidelines had to be set that both 
satisfied PH and did not violate the pending legislation. In February 1949, VD 
patrol activities re-commenced under a new structure. In contrast to the earlier 
indiscriminate raids and apprehension of women, a specified team went out with 
a specific objective. Legal authority for the control of VD was vested in the 
Gesundheitsamt under the terms of German law {Gesetz zur Bekampfung der 
Geschlechtskrankheiten, 1927). Under this law all other authorities were required 
to give assistance as required. The police were clearly one of those authorities, 
but had no power of arrest in a suspected case of VD. They could arrest 
someone only on the request of the Health Authority but if they suspected 
someone they could submit the name and address. Due to the fact that most of 
the women the police suspected at that point were vagrants who did not have a 
permanent address, they could not be found when the health authorities went 
looking for them. In order to circumvent this, it was decided that a welfare worker, 
invested with the authority of the Gesundheitsamt would carry out vice patrols 
with the support of both the Allied and German police. Their role was to ensure 
that the welfare officer was able to complete the task as efficiently as possible 
without interference by either military personnel or civilians. If the welfare officer 
suspected that a person possibly needing treatment would not appear at the 
appointed time for examination, they could order the person hospitalized until 
examined. 
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Difficulties arose in some cities, however, where the military had 
maintained control of operations. Although welfare was to be determining the 
tone and agenda of actions in public places, this was not always the case. The 
CO, 101 Provost Company, Corps of Royal Military Police (RMP), sent a letter to 
the 7th Armoured Division requesting clarification in August regarding vice raids. 
He reported that he had received direction from Bielefeld PS that "the practice of 
visiting German cafes, by Military Police accompanied by German Police and 
German Women Police, for the purpose of checking VD suspects has been 
declared by recent legislation to be illegal." The raids, he stated, had therefore 
been discontinued "until a ruling has been obtained from a higher authority."424 It 
is not clear why he thought PS might be incorrect on this. The CO was informed 
by return letter that these had been renamed Medical Inspection Patrols and 
must be led by welfare.425 The CO then asked for assistance from PS in Bielefeld 
and was told of course that PS could not assist with the patrols.426 Subsequent 
letters make it clear that several people in this scenario were operating under 
misunderstandings. The Principal Health Officer in Dusseldorf believed that "the 
introduction of the Occupation Statute" was what had changed the role of PS and 
neither he nor the 7th Armoured Division appeared to be aware of Directive 52.427 
Memo to DPM, 7 Armd Div [sic] BAOR by T E Collins, Capt., for Major Commanding, 
101 Provost Company, Corps of Royal Military Police, 16 August 1949. FO 1013/1931. 
425
 Memo to O.C. 101 Pro Coy [sic] by A Hunt Lt Col., DPM HQ 7 Armd Div. [sic], 22 
August 1949. FO 1013/1931. 
426
 Memo to DPM HQ 7 Armd Div [sic] BAOR 23, by G W Jones, Major, Commanding 
101 Provost Coy [sic], Corps of Royal Military Police, 26 September 1949. FO 
1013/1931. 
427
 Memo to Public Safety, Land Commissioner's Office, Dusseldorf, BAOR 4, from Mr. 
L.J. Nichols, Principal Health Officer, Public Health Branch, Land Commissioner's Office, 
Dusseldorf, BAOR 4, 19 October 1949. FO 1013/1931. 
189 
There are many number of reasons for this - frequently changing personnel for 
example - but this seems an important item to have missed in training, and the 
result was less than satisfactory consistency in the observance of the changing 
dynamics between what was now the Federal Republic and the British military 
which was no longer an occupying army. Directive 52 stopped raids in July 1947 
and German welfare took over with Ordinance 57. In January 1949, the Basic 
Law was passed yet raids continued in Bielefeld until August. 
Public Health continued to work with the new German Sozialministerium 
after the propagation of the Basic Law to keep VD under control, especially given 
that it was clear, particularly into 1950, that military personnel would continue to 
be in Germany. Several types of individual cases from 1949 and 1950 illustrate 
the coordination of efforts between PH, the German agency and the police. 
These cases also indicate the degree to which conventional categorization of 
women remained consistent. For example, in October 1949 the German health 
authorities passed on to PH the name of a soldier serving with the Belgian forces 
who had been identified by a German woman.428 This information was then 
passed to the Belgian Liaison officer who traced the person but found that he 
was not suffering from gonorrhea, had never had it according to him and was 
very indignant that he had been accused of having such a disease.429 He in turn 
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asked to be told the name and address of the woman concerned so that he could 
prosecute her. The Principal Health Officer (PHO) suggested that in view of the 
fact that it was such a serious accusation the German authorities should release 
the woman's name.430 They replied that they could not do this and they were 
then challenged by the Principal Health Officer to "forward a copy of para [sic] 10 
of the Anti VD (Law) to which you refer."431 Nevertheless, the Sozialministerium 
did forward the PHO's concerns to the PH office in Aachen for "repeated 
investigation of the case." When they did so, they found that the woman 
concerned was at that point living in "a new Belgian territory," and this was likely 
why she had acquired the soldier's name. It also drew attention to her having 
been identified by the PH officials in Aachen, implying that she was not reliable in 
any case.432 The Sozialministerium did include the above mentioned paragraph 
from the 1927 VD law. The PHO in Dusseldorf felt that at that point no further 
action was needed.433 Other similar cases can be found where a soldier named 
was subsequently found to be free from VD and the physician involved wrote to 
the health department, in one case suggesting that he was "being victimized by a 
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former girlfriend" and again requesting the name and address of the woman 
involved.434 
In contrast, cases were followed where it was found that the soldier did 
have a disease but had left the army and could not be located. One such case 
involved a soldier identified as Sergeant "Erny" or "Oerny." This Sergeant was 
reported by two different women one who met him near the barracks (Essen-
Kray) and reportedly had sexual intercourse in the open air near the barracks, 
and another who met him at a near-by public house and had intercourse there; 
both said that they received no payment. He was reported by both women to 
have an unnatural colour of blue-black hair.435 This Sergeant was eventually 
identified as having left the army and his whereabouts were unknown.436 A 
similar case involved another Belgian who was eventually identified by a fellow 
soldier, who reported that he had had to leave the army for reasons not stated 
and that it was quite possible he had syphilis.437 
The scenarios involving searching for women are more resolute. While the 
search for Sergeant Erny appears a bit of a lark, the search for "Black Inge" and 
the so-called "secret prostitute" Hilde, are much more serious in tone. Inge was a 
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young, 22 year old woman, who was described as a prostitute who was 
"wandering." She was known to visit a bar in Ruhrort. The Sozialministerium did 
find her and had her arrested for having "promiscuous intercourse."438 Hilde was 
24 years old and variously identified as a prostitute or secret prostitute.439 In May 
1950 the Sozialministerium notified PH that she was in prison and was being 
treated for syphilis.440 Martha Kalthoff was found to have syphilis and completed 
the first round of treatment. She did not appear for the second round and when 
the Intelligence Office investigated they found that she had left for England. She 
was located there in a sanatorium in Westmorland.441 These are some of the 
street prostitutes that the Army continued to be concerned about throughout the 
occupation. Given the living conditions and lack of food and clothing in 1945 
there were no doubt many more of these early in the occupation and they 
presented likely as serious a disease threat to the soldiers as the soldiers were to 
them. 
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Diseased German women were a primary focus throughout the 
occupation period. For a number of reasons, but in part as the VD rate among 
soldiers increased during 1944, plans were made to put a non-fraternization ban 
in effect to attempt to maintain some control over the situation and keep British 
soldiers and German women apart. This was not even remotely successful and 
the VD rate skyrocketed. The image of German women as carriers of disease 
and subsequent efforts to control and treat them is quite clear in the development 
of the VD program from 1945 to 1950. After Ordinance 57, German agencies 
became increasingly involved in and responsible for the VD program, but 
continued to focus primarily on women. Although this shifted somewhat over 
time, and troop behaviour was addressed at some points, women continued to 
be seen as the primary carriers of venereal disease and therefore the focus of 
control and treatment. 
The VD welfare program itself was designed and implemented by the 
British. Initially, raids and a police controlled program appeared to both PH and 
the fledgling German authorities to be the most efficient means of controlling both 
women's actions in public places and, they assumed, VD at the same time. 
Eventually this method of war on VD changed as the British discerned the 
amount of criticism this was engendering among the German public at large. The 
Burgerschaft and Senate disagreed and wanted to keep police raids as the main 
operating principle but the British would not allow it and their program of welfare 
VD became the standard. Probably German women benefitted from a program of 
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welfare rather than immediate incarceration although this was not the concern of 
either of these organizations. 
The "promiscuous patronage of street prostitutes" was indeed a problem 
for the British army and the CCG. The focus on German women as prostitutes 
and the fact that generally both of these organizations cast German women as 
prostitutes did not help them in their war against VD. They had difficulty 
identifying the difference between victims and perpetrators and German women 
were seriously disadvantaged by this attitude. In addition, since they were unable 
or unwilling to identify a large group of perpetrators, they missed many 
opportunities to combat the spread of the disease. 
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Chapter 7: The Official Organization of German Women 
A report describing German women in December 1947 stated, 
Their energy and political experience are on a low level. This is understandable 
as the old feminine tradition of subservience to the male and his ideas had never 
been shaken and demolished as in England...The advent of Hitler which stripped 
German women of all social and political rights sent them back ruthlessly to the 
kitchen and nursery, followed by the war, has resulted in a blank 12 years of 
complete suppression.442 
This description contains the central assumptions concerning German women made by 
both the German Education Department (GED) and Women's Affairs (WA): that 
German women were even more inexperienced in democratic principles than German 
men, and furthermore, had a great distance to travel to be equal to British women with 
regard to social status. The stated purpose of these two departments was to educate 
German women concerning their role as active democratic citizens. Like the Legal or 
Political Departments, GED and WA attempted to work within the existing German 
framework and to build in British-style improvements. Furthermore, like many other 
departments within the CCG (BE) administration, the work of WA was unplanned and 
had to be developed on the ground. Its situation was worse, however, because WA 
lacked the resources of other departments and could not make any independent 
decisions. The officers of WA felt that their voices were not heard and their efforts were 
often ineffective as a result. This chapter will discuss the efforts of the WA section to 
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educate and garner support for German women and the ways that they were limited in 
their efforts by the bureaucracy of which they were a part. 
The WA section, which existed from 1946 to 1951, has a complex bureaucratic 
history partly because it suffered from the same lack of clear objectives as other 
departments. It was initially placed in the new Civic Development Section (CDS) of 
Administration and Local Government (A&LG) which appointed the first three officers in 
May 1946.443 In the fall of 1946, CDS was transferred from A&LG to Education (both of 
which were part of Internal Affairs and Communication (IA&C)) until it was disbanded in 
1947. Education then became a separate branch and CDS was officially renamed 
Women's Affairs.444 WA officers were also appointed at CCG HQ in Berlin and at 
Political Division HQ, also in Berlin.445 Denise Tscharntke insists that WA was primarily 
a liaison and advisory group reporting to different people within the administrative 
structure at different times. She notes that in 1948 the reporting structure was different 
in each Land: the Regional Government officer was responsible for WA in Nord-Rhine 
Westfalen, the Chief Education Officer in Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein, and in 
Hamburg the WA officers were only loosely connected with the Education 
department.446 However, in the context of the wider functioning of CCG (BE), WA was 
not the only group lacking a cohesive direction. Given the prevailing British attitude to 
German women, it would be surprising if this department had been supported. 
The main goal of WA was, with GED, to provide both education and vocational 
training for German women, with the objective of their greater participation in the public 
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domain. Education was to be informal and provided primarily through voluntary 
organizations. Vocational training was geared mainly to social work and nursing. The 
objective of both of these programs was that German women take more responsibility in 
their reformed democratic society. Despite the view of the British women involved that 
they were light-years ahead, very little of what they proposed to do for German women 
was anything other than traditional. A more central role in the public domain, from a 
British perspective, involved working to get the "Hausfrau" out of the house but not into 
the male domains of business or law for example, and with a limited role in public 
politics. The GED therefore undertook to set up non-political, non-sectarian, 
democratically organized societies, "which could provide a liberal education in 
citizenship."447 German women were already organizing their own voluntary 
organizations.448 WA officers and visiting experts, however, considered German 
voluntary groups too political and CDS was to organize and thereby demonstrate 
alternatives that German women were expected to follow. In addition, the main German 
voluntary groups were organized at Lander level or higher and the British felt that 
German women could learn the most on the local level. 
The central policy statement regarding this part of the education of German 
women is Military Government Instruction No. 78, also known as Education Control 
Instruction No. 60: 
447IA & C. Division, Military Government Instruction No. 78, "Women's Voluntary 
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For the ordinary woman, formal education methods are rarely the most 
successful. Experience elsewhere has shown that voluntary, non-political 
organizations on the lines of the Rural Women's Institutes, Townswoman Guilds, 
Church Guilds, Co-operative Women's Guilds, YWCA can provide the type of 
education required in its most palatable form.449 
These voluntary organizations were expected to give women a forum within which to 
discuss common "practical, social and human" problems, to learn from experience how 
to conduct meetings democratically, and how to give advice and assistance to others in 
the community. This was to be accomplished through "the free exchange of ideas and 
information on subjects of immediate interest" so that "German women may learn to 
practice democracy in ways which cannot fail to benefit their families and the 
community."450 It was noted that no public funds were currently available for such 
endeavours.451 This was an important point; the obstacles involved in holding meetings 
included lack of transportation and fuel to heat the meeting places. German women 
were often found to be apathetic, depressed or exhausted because of the problems of 
their daily lives and lack of food and a cold, unheated meeting room discouraged 
attendance.452 It appears that another obstacle to the success of these meetings was 
the bewilderment of German women. Herta Gotthelf, the SPD executive representative 
for women's affairs, reported after a visit to Hannover that the women she dealt with 
were getting a strange impression of policy for the participation of women in affairs in 
Germany. She suggested that if this was a reflection of women's activities in England, 
449
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Women's Guilds and Institutes seemed to be the sole pastime of English women. She 
complained that she was not getting enough understanding and help for her efforts to 
bring over Englishwomen who had some experience of politics and wanted to be told 
when parliamentary delegations including women were coming over.453 
WA officers appear to have spent a good deal of time categorizing and keeping 
watch on German women's associations both because of the central role they 
themselves saw for these groups and because they saw leadership within the groups as 
a method of countering communism. One report submitted to the Third Conference of 
Women's Affairs Officers included a descriptive list of all organizations in Hamburg in 
the categories of "political" (associated with a political party), "non-political" (not 
associated with a political party) and welfare. Some of the descriptions of these 
organizations reveal as much about the writer as the group. For example the Christlich-
Demokratische Union (CDU) women were described as "younger and of freshed [sic] 
mentality then some of the other parties. They are more inclined to cut the cackle and 
get on with the practical work."454 This group reportedly focused on disabled soldiers 
and pensions. The Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) women's group led by Frau Dr. 
Lange worked, primarily with the poor and refugees but also strongly desired study and 
lectures from prominent women such as "female doctors, welfare nurses and police 
women." In the opinion of the reporter, one of the most important things about this 
group was that it was willing to work much more "'uberpartleich' [sic] then [sic] some." 
The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SED) members were described as 
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"using the normal channels" since the SPD was the party in power. The 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) group was found to be a very energetic 
one that had lots of meetings and told "everyone else where to get off." Its focus, not 
surprisingly, was on the equal distribution of rations and supplies and "championing the 
cause of the poor and the workers." The leader of this organization was Frau 
Langhans, a member of the Burgerschaft and a leader of the Women Committee 
(Frauenausschuss).455 
The Frauenausschuss and the Women Circle (Frauenring) were identified as 
competing umbrella organizations. The SPD was reported to be active in the Frauenring 
and the KPD, CDU and FDP, it was suggested, worked harmoniously together in the 
Frauenausschuss. From the British perspective, the Frauenring was the most 
representative since it had members from various political parties, welfare, social, 
religious and cultural organizations, as well as 300 individual members who were 
"chiefly professional and vocational women."456 This group was reported to have made 
progress in "furthering the interest and active part taken by women in public affairs" as 
evidenced by the election of a woman to the Senate, a woman in an administrative 
position in the housing department, and a nursing advisor on the Board of Health.457 
The description of the Frauenausschuss is less sympathetic describing it as "professing 
to be non-party [while] it is actually backed and policy dictated by the KPD." Its agenda 
was admittedly more political from the British point of view, having as its goals equal 
pay for women and the equal distribution of food and fuel. The Frauenausschusse were 
believed to have been organized by the Soviets in Berlin before the other Allies had 
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arrived, to carry out social welfare work. WA hoped that these two groups would work 
together on some unspecified mutual matters but were concerned that the 
Frauenausschuss would use these possible occasions as recruiting opportunities.458 
Voluntary associations were also to have a central role in what WA designated 
as "welfare work", while more formal education schemes would be provided by 
Education. The goal of these activities was nothing less than the "changing of German 
society" according to Mr. Marsden-Smedley of the German General Department 
(GGD).459 He expressed the opinion that social work was as important as the police 
system in a democratic society and German social services should be taught not to use 
authoritarian methods. Teaching Germans the methods of a free democratic society 
would, he believed, encourage developments which would make Germans "more 
impervious to communism which thrives on mental and physical distress."460 To this 
end, WA visiting experts researched the existing welfare groups in Germany. The list of 
associations included 13 which were said to "be with" the Red Cross, political parties, 
religious or relief committees. Cooperation in getting the work done was judged to be 
good, with less political friction than expected although it was noted that the SPD and 
FDP did not work as well together and the KPD "work only for their members of the 
Frauenausschuss and ex-political prisoners."461 Despite the positive comments, the 
visiting experts were occasionally somewhat judgemental in their assessments. 
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Where religious and political organizations have co-operated over welfare work, 
they have made the (to them) tremendous discovery that it is possible for people 
who do not hold the same views on every subject, to work together for a common 
cause...In other words, they have discovered one aspect of practical 
democracy.462 
Pressure on WA officers regarding the teaching of social welfare and practical 
democracy was increased substantially as the fear of communism grew. The Soviets 
were very active in soliciting the support of German women and this becomes a clear 
theme throughout the minutes and reports from 1947-1951. A central initiative of the 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) was a Peace Conference held in 
Berlin in March 1947, the main thrust of which was to found the Demokratischer 
Frauenbund Deutschlands. Reportedly 2,000 women attended, including 84 delegates 
from the British Zone, 17 from the American and three from the French.463 The report 
from one of the British delegates was blatantly skeptical of the democratic claims of the 
Soviet-sponsored conference. She described the "organization and showmanship" as 
"excellent along totalitarian lines."464 The Cold War was constantly apparent, the pomp 
and ceremony underlining the importance of Berlin, which was constantly implied to 
belong to the Russian Zone according to the reporter. Two of the main speakers were 
Madame Bokalowa of Soviet Military Government in Berlin and Madame Parfjonowa of 
the Women's International League from Moscow who "addressed the Congress in 
Russian using interpreters with moderate effect." As soon as the Demokratischer 
Frauenbund was founded, the delegates were immediately directed to form committees 
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in the Western Zones and the observer astutely noted that the resulting liaison between 
Berlin and the West created a legal channel of communication between the SED and 
KPD. The report claims that official policy at that time was to avoid forming any 
additional groups or associations on British initiative since there had been a suggestion 
from the German side that there were already enough. One of the difficulties facing the 
British organizers was that the formation of the League allowed the Soviets to take the 
lead in championing the cause of German women and if the British did not at least 
found a zonal committee they were in danger of not being able to compete. 
Shortly after this, in a long report to Mr. Crawford in GED, Rita Ostermann, the 
WA officer for Political Division, highlighted what appeared to be the main difficulty for 
the British in this area. In describing what she had heard and observed on a recent trip 
through the zone, her clear message was that with concern to the "whole field of 
women's activities... we are barely touching the fringe of the subject...any real approach 
to what would normally be women's problems is blocked by economic considerations at 
every turn." Given the very difficult living conditions she felt there were few inducements 
available for German women to "exert themselves beyond their daily routine, much less 
to participate in anything as vague and complicated as politics or as burdensome as 
public affairs and civic government."465 The only answer she felt were the practical 
results that the communists appeared to be better at producing. In Ostermann's view 
the SED had successfully carried out a number of initiatives to get the attention of 
German women. For example, Ostermann reported that emphasis was being given in 
the press to articles written by women for women and about issues concerning women. 
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There was additionally a publicity campaign protesting the disbanding of the 
Frauenausschuss in the Western zones.466 Great importance was publicly placed on 
social welfare by the Soviets whether anything was actually greatly improved or not, and 
Marshal Sokolowsky had, in addition, recently announced a prohibition on heavy 
manual labour for women.467 Earlier in the year, the Deputy Military Governor, Brian 
Robertson had expressed his view that "interest in women's affairs has rapidly 
increased of late in all four Zones of Germany, since it is realized what an immense 
political force they represent."468 As far as Ostermann could see, this was not being 
addressed in any effective way by the British. 
Ostermann had many complaints concerning what she saw in the British zone. 
Some departments and officials, she felt, were relying too heavily on the circumstance 
of Ordinance 57, arguing that welfare was a German responsibility. Ostermann notes 
that the British, like the Soviets, controlled how much heavy manual labour women 
could do in their own zone. Furthermore, there was very little in the press to interest 
women and many areas where their opinions should have been solicited. Similarly, at a 
recent Zonal conference on education there were not any women present which meant 
schooling and vocational training for girls was discussed exclusively by men.469 One of 
the most scathing criticisms Ostermann had was the MG's inability to solve the problem 
466
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of children's shoes. This was really a public relations blunder on the part of the British 
who had ordered the Wirtschaftsamt to agree to an "order for the manufacture of 
thousands of pairs of shoes for Mil. Gov. [sic] employees, while children cannot go to 
school to receive meals provided from British sources because they have no 
shoes...unless their parents carry them on their back, as some are now doing."470 
Ostermann recommended several positive steps to be taken, which appear to 
have been ignored. She made some radical suggestions, such as inserting a clause in 
the new Lander constitutions defining the economic status of housewives and their 
position regarding joint property acquired during marriage.471 Primarily, however, 
Ostermann tackled the thorny issue of the purpose of the work of WA. Her main 
recommendation was that a Zonal Committee be formed, even though, she noted, the 
trend at that time was to dissolve purely women's organizations for lack of resources. 
She argued that a Zonal level committee would provide the means of soliciting and 
publicizing women's views on a range of vital issues, such as equal pay, domestic 
workers' tariffs, lack of contraceptives, overcrowding, inadequate hospital services and 
abortion. She was realistic enough to point out that the Zonal Committee was only going 
to work with the support of the two main parties and argued that simply boycotting 
anything organized by the KPD was not going to get women's voices heard.472 She 
furthermore made a number of suggestions regarding an increased presence in the 
form of magazines and lecturers and an increase in publicity on British activities. But in 
Ostermann's opinion, this was not going to be enough. If German women were to retain 
any faith in the British, she argued, "official quarters must show more than a vague if 
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benevolent interest in what is sometimes inadequately described as 'women's 
affairs'."473 
Similar recommendations and suggestions were made by other WA officers, but 
the official attitude did not change. Mrs. A.B. Reeves from GED travelled to Germany in 
July 1947 and recorded a long list of frustrations, many very similar to Ostermann's.474 
Mrs. Reeves was noticeably annoyed by the lack of transport and other resources 
available to WA officers which she found indicative of their general exclusion from the 
CCG (BE) power structures. In her quite detailed report Mrs. Reeves gives many 
examples of the frustrating circumstances. For example, she stated that she was "set 
on" by Mr. Shelton the E.C.O. in Hamburg who apparently suggested that he was 
receiving far too many requests for transport from WA officers, particularly since he did 
not think they were appropriate. She also reported "fur flying" at a meeting in Bunde to 
discuss additional transport issues as well as exit visas for German women. WA in 
Luneburg was attended to by Miss Gash who was responsible for schools but looked 
after WA "when she [had] time."475 WA officers in Berlin complained that they were 
constantly short of paper. The only response Mrs. Reeves felt able to record in her 
report regarding this issue was that "priority for paper is being taken up at a high 
level."476 Mr. Knowles, in Kiel, stated that he did not receive enough background 
information concerning lecturers who were coming to the area and wondered why since 
he suspected that it was available ahead of time. An exhibition was proposed in Berlin 
but none of the officers had the authority to act on this without the approval of ISD. Exit 
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permits for German women were handled by Miss Dickinson (Public Health) who had to 
travel to Berlin frequently to get them. She was reported to be leaving directly after a 
meeting "to spend two nights in the train and a day in Berlin in order to get through the 
permits for her next party of fiancees." Since these were often urgent requests for the 
fiancee to reach England this officer invariably makes these trips...whenever a party is 
due to leave."477 In both Kiel and Koln the WA officers sometimes had friends from 
Relief Organizations attend meetings for them because they have no transport. 
The reaction of German women to the efforts of WA appears to have been 
lukewarm at best. Regarding a branch of the cooperative movement being set up in 
Liibeck, Mrs. Reeves reported that the representatives from England were described as 
"sob sisters" and commented that "the visit was said not to have had much result."478 
This was in no small part due to the fact that they were somewhat out of touch with the 
daily lived reality of German women. As Herta Gotthelf commented in 1946, 
though they too are very nice and absolutely willing to be helpful, they have not 
the slightest idea of working class organizations [sic]. They are just this type of 
quite intelligent feminists - not very political and absolutely unable to understand 
conditions different from those in their own country. They sang to me the praise 
of rural women's institutions and towns women's guilds, which just might give you 
an idea.479 
Nevertheless, WA and GED persisted in their belief that women's voluntary groups were 
a means to an end as they defined it, and gave German women an opportunity to 
develop democratically. Mrs. Grennan, the Assistant to the WA officer in Dusseldorf was 
of the opinion that these were the only groups in her Land that were doing any practical 
work. They reportedly did everything that WA officers wanted to be doing including 
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assisting women in avoiding bread queues and organizing active committees on 
education and the press. Mrs. Grennan also felt it important to note that they were not 
all run by the KPD and that in some areas the CDU was also heavily involved.480 Mrs. 
Reeves agreed that it was entirely clear that until the basic needs problem was solved 
"no talk of democracy or attempts to 'awaken' German women are likely to have much 
result."481 
This work, as it was conceived by WA and GED to awaken German women to 
their full potential, was going to continue to be a challenge for both groups because of 
the lack of support. This was true of both parts of the WA and Education plan. While 
inducing women's involvement in voluntary associations along British lines was a 
central initiative, vocational training and employment were equally important to the 
British for the future of German women, both in terms of their place in a democratic 
society and with an eye to development of the German economy. As part of this, WA 
officers saw it as their job to assist German women in the development of their own 
vocational and educational organizations. Once again, however, this assistance 
involved setting up a British-style system with British assumptions regarding standards 
and appropriate positions for women. Not unexpectedly, nursing and social work were a 
major focus. These occupations were supported in a variety of ways. Many German 
women for example were sent to England on nursing training sessions under a program 
called "NORDSEE."482 In Germany, assistance was given by visiting experts in such 
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fields as child development and psychology. They encouraged German women to 
develop their institutions of education and child rearing in ways that they felt would 
support the development of democracy in Germany. For example, nursery school 
training was to involve the understanding that children develop as individuals, not as 
members of a group that must all do the same thing when the teacher instructs them 
to.483 
German women also travelled to England on "visits" to observe British methods 
of providing social services, again with the objective of instruction in democratic 
principles. It was believed that the German inability to deal properly with social problems 
was a significant contributor to their "erratic political behavior."484 Marsden-Smedley 
suggested that "without wishing to impose our social system on the Germans", the 
British wanted to demonstrate the benefits of their own system, including the significant 
contribution of voluntary organizations.485 With this goal British experts in Germany 
assisted in the revision of the curriculums of "social welfare training schools."486 This 
training and use of voluntary organizations in the delivery of social services was a 
particularly important aspect of democratization and de-nazification from the British 
perspective, since some welfare activities had previously been the duty of the police, 
particularly female officers.487 The new Germany it was believed, needed new models of 
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social welfare, and this new system should be delivered by women, much of it through 
volunteer work. 
This was an important part of what WA and GED saw as their purpose in 
Germany. Social work and nursing were an integral part of the development of the 
future of Germany and its ability to resist communism. From the British perspective, 
much of the work of social services could and should be done by women's voluntary 
organizations. WA and GED were also aware, however, that many women in Germany 
needed to be employed and this was a parallel aspect of the focus on vocational 
training. It was anticipated that German women would of necessity be contributing to the 
economy as part of their larger role of rebuilding their country. In part, then, this was 
also a question of what to do with the "surplus" women; those who would not be 
supported as mothers in a traditional family setting and would need to support 
themselves. This in turn, was a part of debate concerning the role of German women in 
industry as part of the existing concerns over German economic conditions before the 
currency reform. In 1947, Mrs. Reeves did not think that conditions in Germany 
permitted a large scale campaign to encourage women to go into industry, particularly 
since women's wages were sometimes 40% below men's.488 From Manpower's 
perspective it was a non-issue since statistics showed a lack of available women given 
that those with young children or who were attending school were exempt. In Hamburg 
for example, they contended that there were 173,800 women employed and 2,500 
unemployed of whom 1,400 could not work and 500 were clerical.489 Mr. Luce took 
issue with the general assumption that there were "vast numbers of unemployed women 
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in the British zone of Germany... [and] that in some miraculous way we can create work 
for them."490 Mr. Crawford was under the impression that a large number of women 
would be needed in German industry in order to achieve the Level of Industry plan.491 
Since this was the case, he suggested that his department should be prepared to 
consider the broad social and educational questions that would arise as a result.492 
Alternately, Lord Pakenham expressed the opinion that the fundamental problem 
connected with women's role in Germany was the "maladjustment caused by the 
excess of women over men."493 
The role of women in industry was a topic debated by several departments within 
the CCG (BE) administration. The British plan, at that point, was to bring German 
industry back only to its 1936 level.494 There were, however, so many unknown factors 
that it was not clear how this could be done, nor, by 1948, that it was desirable to do so 
given the escalation of the Cold War. Questions such as what percentage of the zonal 
population was female, what percentage of industrial workers could be expected to be 
female and was this the best "use" of women in German society were debated at length. 
Some argued that it was a German problem and some that cold war issues were too 
important to simply hand it over to the Germans as a social issue. Again, the factor of 
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the surplus women was raised and it was suggested that they be sent to Britain or other 
countries to obtain domestic work.495 Joy Evans in Education Branch reported that 
figures were available for the number of women who would be needed for the next few 
years but Manpower Division was unwilling to take on their training on any large scale 
"in case there should be unemployment."496 Not surprisingly, a good deal of the concern 
generated by this question centered on the activities of the communists to recruit 
women. These questions were thought to be "closely linked, in that the success of the 
Communists is likely to vary inversely with our success in inspiring a satisfactory and 
lasting form for the German economy and society."497 
There is some evidence that the opinions of German women were taken into 
account in the discussion, however marginally. In an article in the Arbeitsblatt, members 
of the Frauenring addressed some major questions including political representation 
and that of directing "surplus women into industry."498 According to Mrs. Reeves's 
summary, these women objected to such an initiative because it would create a deficit 
of young women entering the manual trades. One of the expressed opinions was that 
artisans would recover their standard of living faster than industrial workers particularly 
due to the restrictions on industrial output. In a subsequent section of the article, 
Letters between R.S. Crawford, German Education Department, Mr. Marsden-
Smedley, German General Department, Lord Pakenham and Sir Brian Robertson, 
Military Governor, Manpower Division, Berlin, 2 February 1948 to 19 March 1948. FO 
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another participant called for increased participation of women in public life.499 Along 
with her summary, Mrs. Reeves circulated yet another report, but this one 
communicated the ideas of a group of visiting experts who had sought out the views of 
German women. According to their assessment, the general feeling was that women 
were out of place in industry and that it was only a short term solution to employ the 
surplus women. In the following generation, training would not be wasted on girls 
because there would be enough boys. Since the surplus women had parents or children 
to support they would take the work, but the next generation should be trained in 
occupations in which they had some future.500 In the comments that accompany the 
report, Betty Norris, from Political Division, suggested that it was a shame that 
employers thought that training women was a waste of time or that in some areas 
separate vocational officers existed for girls and boys.501 No doubt many German 
women agreed with her. 
The attention given to WA as a result of concern focused on the threat of 
communism and economic questions resulted in a major effort to seek decisions 
regarding policy. A conference was arranged in response to a telegram sent to the GGD 
by Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary. The success of the Demokratischer 
Frauenbund had come to his attention and he directed the department to solve some of 
the problems associated with WA and strengthen the position of women and democracy 
in Germany.502 Joy Evans and Rita Ostermann were brought from Germany to attend. 
Other attendees included Mrs. Reeves and Mr. Crawford from GED and Mr. Marsden-
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Smedley of the GGD. Despite the FO presence, it was clear from the outset that the WA 
officers were not going to receive anything in the way of policy direction from the 
meeting. It was opened by Mr. Crawford who began with an inquiry regarding the level 
of awareness of the German authorities. He asked the representatives from Germany if 
they felt the Germans understood the scope of the problem concerning the future role of 
women in the German economy. Miss Ostermann replied that all opportunities were 
taken to discuss this with the German authorities and that she felt that they were 
cognizant of the fact that a great deal of change would be required. She added, 
however, that the communists were the only ones who were practically addressing the 
questions of women in industry, their education and role in politics. It is remarkable that 
no discussion is recorded as having followed this comment. Not surprisingly, the next 
item on the agenda was a general agreement that "a good deal remained to be done 
before it could be said that C.C.G. and F.O. (G.S.) had a clear and definite policy to 
work on."503 
There appears to have been a great deal of information exchanged at this 
conference, but because neither Evans nor Ostermann had any ability to make 
decisions on behalf of the CCG (BE), policy was no clearer at its conclusion. For 
example, with regard to women in industry, the end result was a decision to send a 
letter to the Military Governor. The language of this resolution is worth quoting at length. 
A draft letter.. .emphasizing the importance which we attached [sic] to reaching at 
an early date authoritative conclusions on the question of the future employment 
of women in industry as a first step to considering the economic and social 
adjustments that would be needed and the nature of the educational task that 
would have to be undertaken by the Germans with our help.504 
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The conference also identified many daily operating difficulties. For example, 
Evans and Ostermann made it clear that the responsibilities of the Education 
Department and Public Health Division often overlapped or left large gaps. Training of 
social workers, for example, varied region to region depending on the qualifications of 
the personnel in each department. The result of this discussion was another letter, this 
time to the CCG (BE) asking them for a statement of policy.505 Some discussion 
occurred regarding relevant media coverage of the state of affairs in Germany such as 
the changing social structure and its effect on women. Again, no action was taken on 
this and it was only agreed that this would be pursued when policy was clearer.506 
The last item of concern was women's organizations and their place in the future 
of Germany. Ostermann stated that her department was pursuing the policy of a 
balance between political and non-political organizations and that it was important to 
support both since some women did not want to get drawn into party politics. She 
agreed that Frau Bahnisch (the founder of the Club Deutscher Frauen, the main group 
in the Frauenring) had done the most to interest "educated women of the middle 
classes" in the affairs of their country. She further concurred that the "above-party 
groups" appealed chiefly to middle-class women but objected to the criticism that they 
did not appeal to young people.507 The central discussion concerning these 
organizations centered on the perception that the communists were attempting to 
infiltrate them. It was acknowledged that German women had the right to choose what 
group they joined but the fear existed that "non-politically minded women" would join a 
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"Moscow-dominated organization without knowing what they are doing."508 Mr. Crawford 
also noted, however, that these organizations could hardly go so far as the Russians 
had since the objective was not to have them too closely associated with an occupying 
power.509 
The connection between women's organizations, the work of WA and the Cold 
War continued throughout the existence of the department. Indeed when WA was 
closed down in 1951 a number of letters were sent to the editor of the Times after the 
announcement was made, addressing the work WA had done in this area and deploring 
its end. Interestingly, the first letter came from Katharina Petersen, Vorsitzende des 
Niedersachsischen Frauenrings in Hannover. She commended the WA officers for 
giving "kind and honest support," for sending speakers and doing much to "break down 
barriers early in 1945."510 A subsequent letter from Lucile Sayers, a recent visiting 
expert to Germany, broadened this to include valuable work WA had done to assist 
German women in resisting communist propaganda. Sayers suggested that the 
influence of women might prove to be a decisive factor in the "war of nerves" that 
existed in international politics.511 Helena Deneke, a former visiting expert, made the 
connection even more explicit in suggesting that WA had been instrumental in the 
development of "a social and political atmosphere in which support for the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization can take root. Yet another contributor invoked the Nazi past in 
claiming that, 
the influence of the uneducated German woman is powerful in the home. Many 
such supported Hitler; some swayed by the dangerous German emotion, some 
older women, with short-term vision, encouraging their husbands to join the 
party...one of Hitler's first steps was to drive women out of public and 
professional life and suppress the organizations which trained them in civil and 
international responsibility.513 
By withdrawing the support of WA, she argued, Britain was ignoring the influence of the 
politically suppressed German woman.514 
This was, no doubt, the British congratulating themselves on a job well done from 
their own perspective. Herta Gotthelf might disagree with their assessment of the work 
of WA. Nevertheless, it is clear that it had some impact, even if this was restricted to 
influence on middle-class women. It was a very small section of the CCG (BE) and 
given the limitations it worked under it is surprising in some ways that it was able to 
accomplish as much as it did. The support of the GED was helpful at times but each 
department had its own priorities and they sometimes competed for resources. Clearly, 
the main difficulty for WA was the lack of policy support that would have supplied it with 
the authority to make more changes in the daily lives of German women. Resources on 
every level were in short supply: heating for meeting rooms, paper for magazines and 
transportation to meetings were all lacking. 
The occupation administration was never clear concerning what role WA would 
play in the overall goals of the occupation. The political importance of women in the 
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development of German democracy, in the British view, might have resulted in more 
action to support these women and the efforts of WA. This became even more 
complicated by the position of the WA officers themselves who were unable to exercise 
their own political power and acquire the resources necessary for the job they thought 
they were there to do. The approach of British women to their German counterparts 
reflected their belief that German women had failed to guide their own society in a 
democratic direction and that it was the job of WA officers to teach German women their 
proper place. They were assumed, even by WA, to be the embodiment of the failure of 
Germany. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The British made many assumptions about German women, their 
characters and motivations. These beliefs concerning German women reflected 
British notions of appropriate gender roles and their own identity as victors which 
likewise coloured their approach to occupation and the development of civil 
society. As the previous chapters have shown, policy created and implemented 
by WA, Legal, PH, PS and other departments of the CCG(BE) reflected these 
beliefs. Alongside the implementation of democratic principles and British-style 
political and social structures, occupation authorities imposed conditions of 
behaviour through the regulation of relationships, both public and private. These 
codes of behaviour were also designed within traditional paradigms of gender 
and victory/defeat. This created many practical problems for both the occupiers 
and German women. Faced initially with rules concerning fraternization, the 
practicalities of employing Germans became problematic. Furthermore, since 
British occupation authorities were unable to control the behaviour of their own 
troops they attempted to impose rules designed to keep German women from 
interfering with the victors. In this way, German women continued to be an 
enemy and additionally came to be regarded as a specific kind of obstacle to a 
peaceful order. 
In this manner, German women often experienced the occupation as a 
continuation of war rather than as a transition to peace since they continued to 
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be treated as enemies long after official hostilities ceased. In July 1945, the 
Military Government for Hannover district reported that the remains of the Nazi 
party and its supporters appeared to fall into five categories, including "'big 
shots'...young male rank and file... the 'bread and butter' Nazis...the disillusioned" 
and women. Furthermore, women were identified as "the major problem...[t]heir 
hysterical worship of Hitler allows no room for the working of logic."515 This 
assessment of the role that German women continued to play in post-war 
Germany was one of the main difficulties that they faced in the reconstruction of 
their lives in the British zone. 
In the wider picture of occupation, the British experienced a long list of 
challenges in planning, structuring and implementing the occupation. Planning 
was incomplete at the cessation of hostilities and as the army and CCG moved 
into Germany, administrative structures were improvised in order to meet the 
overwhelming destruction of Germany, both physically and socially. Moreover, in 
some instances where a regulatory institution required rebuilding, it was from the 
ground up as in the case of the German police. The extent to which the British 
intended to impose democracy and project a British system is clear in their 
rebuilding of this service as a civil institution with British-style reporting systems 
and regulating mechanisms. The development of the many structures necessary 
for the reconstruction of German society, some beyond the scope of this study, 
was an enormous task. Establishing a denazified police system, defining and 
redefining crime - everything from theft to categories of sexual crimes such as 
prostitution and abortion - and restructuring courts and juvenile systems were all 
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core projects. German women were involved in all of these things although not 
always in a realistic manner. The assumption of their ability to bring a motherly 
tone to the juvenile system was not credible for example. At the same time, 
crimes specifically against women such as rape and sexual assault were not 
given any particular attention. While this particular aspect of the treatment of 
German women may be understandable within the larger context of German war 
crimes, it is still worth noting. 
Other obstacles regarding the occupation in general included the 
structural confusion within the occupation bureaucracy which was handicapped 
by poor communication and confusion of purpose. Initially, this involved the army 
as it moved into Germany and attempted to establish lines of communication and 
a reporting structure. However, as noted in chapter two, Hannover experienced 
six changes in administrative units in six weeks. While this was unavoidable due 
to the movement of military personnel, it did not lend itself to the establishment of 
a permanent communication structure. The creation of COGA resulted in a lack 
of attention to the CCG(BE) development from the FO. The resulting lack of 
mandate for CCG(BE) created rivalry between the military and civilian sections of 
the occupation force. This in turn meant a lack of effective implementation of the 
principles and practicalities of the occupation. The army was not equipped to be 
part of an occupation that had education at its center. As late as 1948 a senior 
control officer stated, 
I entirely agree...that the army must be briefed and, more than that, 
convinced if it is to lend a really helpful hand, and I feel a little sceptical as 
to how deep such briefing will sink with people whose main objectives lie 
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in other very different directions.. .[i]t really amounts to a re-education of 
the Army before you can start re-education of Germans by the Army.516 
The attitude of the army compounded the difficulties of the CCG(BE) to carry out 
its job of developing a democratic civil society in Germany along the British 
model. The same senior control officer identified the army "attitude at many 
conferences where we ask for concession to Germans" as difficult. He felt that 
the CCG(BE) could "generally sympathise with it, to some extent" but it was very 
frustrating to talk to field officers who knew so little of the "aims and activities" of 
the CCG(BE) and to note the apathy of the troops towards these aims.517 
One of the aims of the occupation administration was to maintain 
separation between British personnel and German women. This goal was 
unsuccessful, particularly where the army was concerned. After the ban on 
marriage to Germans was lifted in 1947, the majority of requests for marriage 
came from the military. It is noticeable that the ban was lifted despite the 
questioning of the motivations of German women and that security checks were 
put in place due to suspicions regarding their characters. It is remarkable that 
given the official opposition to German women, who were still labelled "ex-
enemies'", British men "on the ground" formed apparently meaningful 
relationships with them and pushed for changes to the regulations. Some 
regulations such as the security checks were eventually changed because they 
were, in the end, felt to be too onerous given the lack of evidence of any threat to 
security on the part of German women. It is also remarkable that members of the 
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Legal Division made such efforts to stay within German law when designing 
marriage regulations. 
The lifting of the ban on marriage also meant that German women 
qualified for Operation Union benefits including married housing and higher 
rations. On the negative side, German born wives sometimes met with the 
hostility of British born wives, and some of their children did not receive the 
material benefits of those born of a British father. Marriage to a British man was 
not the "lark" it was sometimes painted as being by individuals within the 
bureaucracy. Given the length of time couples waited to be married, the number 
of forms to be filled in, medical and security checks and questionnaires 
(Fragebogen) it is evident that this was a very serious undertaking requiring the 
time and patience of both parties. If the objective of German women had simply 
been to acquire British citizenship and leave Germany they were sorely 
disappointed, especially after the changes to the FMA when German women no 
longer acquired British nationality on marriage. Leaving Germany was also not 
easy, either practically or emotionally. German women were required to have 
proof of accommodations before they could even arrange their transportation 
ensuring that they were leaving Germany for a legitimate purpose from the British 
point of view. 
German women faced a great deal of hostility and suspicion in many 
areas. The most extensive attacks on their persons, characters and national 
identity came in the form of police raids which were largely carried out by their 
own police force, backed up by the occupying police force. The assumptions 
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made with regard to women who appear to have simply been in a particular 
location indicate most clearly the extent to which German women were 
demonized as "bad" Germans. The examples given of girls taken for 
gynaecological exams who were simply waiting for a bus or who were at a dance 
are noteworthy. The assumption that "good" women do not go to dances or 
frequent certain cafes (even with their husbands) is a traditional characterization 
of good and bad women that was an aspect of the gender system the British 
brought with them. 
A much greater gap in understanding existed in the British and German 
approaches to the political role of women and women's groups. WA officers 
expected German women to ally themselves with democratic principles rather 
than party politics. This did not happen as WA and GED expected. Efforts to train 
women for specific vocations and roles were partially successful but German 
women continued their own familiar constructions of proper public involvement. 
The British plan to re-educate German women was unsuccessful in part because 
it was based on contradictory assumptions. On the one hand, German women 
were regarded having been weak and unthinking in following Hitler. On the other, 
women were held to be potentially able to hold the basis of democratic traditions 
through voluntary group activities. It was obvious that the administration was 
concerned that German women would be as easily swayed by the communists 
as they had been by the Nazis and British policy was in this respect a reflection 
of the escalating Cold War. One of the goals of WA was to prevent this 
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happening. They were to accomplish this in the same manner as other 
departments of the CCG(BE), through direct contact and education. 
The success of this model of cultural education appears peculiarly British. 
Tschamtke notes that British experience in India and elsewhere gave the British 
a view that no matter how alien their culture was or how distant from the peoples 
with whom they were involved, a real change in political outlook could be brought 
about. A shift in attitude through occupation and education was always 
possible.518 They therefore set up information centres, libraries, created space for 
discussion groups, developed exchange programs and generally expected that 
Germans could become democratic and learn to run their own society according 
to the methods of a liberal democracy that would bring it into line with the rest of 
Western Europe. Much of this, however, took a rather patronizing tone, assuming 
many things about the German character and history that were significant 
obstacles from the British perspective. The patronizing tone was not peculiar to 
the British experience in Germany but had a different emphasis given that it was 
characterized as a military occupation rather than a colonial responsibility or 
experiment. 
The British did bring their colonial experience to Germany in some ways. 
For example, the arranging or prohibiting of marriage in distant places was one 
thing the British were familiar with. A method of coding information for marriage 
certificates could be transferred from experience in the Congo for instance. One 
central difference in the two situations for the British was the amount of attention 
paid to relations with the civilian population. The extent to which non-
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fraternization with the enemy was enforced in post-war Germany was unique to 
the situation. Many of the mechanisms developed for controlling the post-war 
population were directed at German women exclusively. This was in part an 
effort to impose order and the British were willing to use the police to do it. It was 
also an attempt, however, to impose a British notion of the proper role of women 
in a democratic society. The womanliness that the British intended to impose on 
German women was the "flip-side" of the manliness that they had constructed for 
themselves. The conjunction of masculinity and victory that was projected onto 
German women was specific to that historic circumstance. German women were 
to fulfill the British notion of womanliness and defeat. 
German women attempted to maintain a position of power in the transition 
to a democratic society primarily in opposition to the occupation. They challenged 
the new British order on both symbolic and practical levels by contesting 
categories and living their daily lives in a way that made sense to them, even if 
not officially sanctioned. This negotiation informed occupation policy, 
necessitating adaptation in many instances to circumstances on the ground. 
Occupation marriage policy was modified due to pressure from both German 
women and their marriage partners. In this way, German women challenged 
British perceptions and assumptions regarding their gender. This is one of the 
ways that Germans responded to the occupation they were given. German 
doctors, lawyers and police all had a role to play in defining the outcome of the 
occupation. Women, who were not often members of these professional groups, 
had their own response and a specific impact on the development of the manner 
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in which the occupation was carried out. They were not passive participants. 
Rather, they acted in ways that appeared to them necessary for survival, and in 
doing so, created obstacles for the occupation authorities. Occupation policy was 
then adapted to suit the situation. 
This study has raised questions concerning the nature of occupation, the 
realities of the British occupation of Germany and the experiences of German 
women in the transition from war to peace. It has answered these questions in a 
number of ways. It has examined how the actions of the occupation authority 
defined occupation and how that definition changed as the occupied population, 
particularly the women, negotiated their lives under that authority. It has shown 
that part of the method by which this particular occupation operated was based 
on the British attempt to impose definitions of masculinity and femininity, victory 
and defeat. This can be seen on a number of levels, but most noticeably that, as 
political threats changed on an international level, German women continued to 
be seen as enemies in significant ways. The Cold War did not obviously affect 
the security checks done on women who were engaged to marry British soldiers 
for example. This also indicates that the lives of women do not transition from 
war to peace in conjunction with wider political events or negotiations. 
This leads to wider issues and raises questions regarding future research 
on the occupation experiences of women. The experience of women during an 
"occupation" is a problem that has not received enough attention. Although the 
bombs and physical destruction stopped in this particular case, it did not stop the 
hostility that German women experienced at the hands of the occupiers. Is this 
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typical of women's experiences in this type of occupation? How, in comparison 
with the British zone, have other women in the American, French and Soviet 
zones negotiated the "rules of engagement" with their occupiers? These are 
important questions in creating a better understanding of the lived realities of 
women in a transition from war to peace. 
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